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Preface
One advantage of conducting my PhD research in the past few years is that
I could benefit from the extensive microdata recently made available through
the Remote Access facility of Statistics Netherlands. It remains impressive to
have access to (anonymised) administrative data of, for instance, all Dutch
employees. Interesting questions have arisen concerning the functioning of the
Dutch labour market that beg to be explored though these data.
When I began the research, the goal of a PhD thesis was only in the back
of my mind, as I took the approach that I would ‘cross that bridge when I
come to it’. As the work progressed, this goal became more tangible and came
to the forefront. The research work alone has always given me a great sense of
determination and motivation, but I must admit that completing this thesis
feels rather satisfying.
This dissertation benefited from the cooperation with and support of many
people. I am very grateful for the opportunity offered by my former heads of
department, prof.dr. Bas ter Weel and prof.dr. Danie¨l van Vuuren to develop
my own research ideas and for the confidence they placed in me. My thanks
also go to my co-authors Rob Euwals, Marloes de Graaf-Zijl and Wiljan van
den Berge for their inspiring and purposeful collaboration, which has been a
stimulating experience for me. I want to express my gratitude to my promotor,
prof.dr.ir. Jan van Ours for his valuable guidance that certainly helped me
to stay on course. Furthermore I am grateful to the members of the PhD
committee, prof.dr. Robert Dur, prof.dr. Dinand Webbink, prof.dr. Bas ter
Weel, prof.dr. Olivier Marie and Dr. Hans van Kippersluis for their time and
effort.
I would also like to thank my bright and ever-helpful colleagues at the
CPB units of Labour and Education for enlightening discussions and often-
witty conversations over lunch. I thank my paranymphs Nicole Bosch and
Suzanne Heijnen for their recent kind support. Last but not least, I thank my
relatives and friends for being there when it matters, Erwin for his ceaseless
support and encouragement, and my daughter and son for keeping me balanced
between work and family life.
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Introduction
Not unlike life itself, the labour market resembles a game of ‘Snakes and
Ladders’.1 Over time, workers develop skills and move along the wage ladder.
When they happen to run into a snake and lose their job, they often face a
disadvantage, at least in the short run. Whereas the board game is a simple
contest based on sheer luck, in the labour market the dice may be loaded: the
probabilities of losing and finding a job can vary by worker, job contract and
firm characteristics, as do the sizes of wage drops when a new job is found.
In the terms of this metaphor, chapters 1 and 2 study the steepness of Dutch
‘wage ladders’, and chapter 3 analyses the consequences of encountering a
‘snake’ for various groups of workers. Chapter 4 considers both the ladders
and the snakes in studying how firms react to headwinds: do they adjust
wages, or do they predominantly adjust employment?
The Dutch labour market is characterized by strict employment protec-
tion for open-ended contracts, especially for long-tenured jobs (Deelen et al.
(2006)), combined with strong growth in temporary contracts. Compared
to other countries, job mobility among older workers is low (Deelen et al.
(2014b)), while the average duration of unemployment for older jobseekers
is high. Moreover, international data suggest that wages in the Netherlands
increase more steeply with age than they do in many other countries (e.g.,
OECD (2006)).
This inadequately functioning labour market for older workers, combined
with an ageing workforce, is the problem that motivates the first three chapters
of this thesis. Understanding this problem demands a sound grasp of the
relationship between wage profiles and their determinants, on the one hand,
1‘Snakes and Ladders’ is an ancient Indian board game considered worldwide today to be
a classic. Played between two or more players on a game board having numbered, gridded
squares, the board pictures a number of ‘ladders’ and ‘snakes’, each connecting two specific
board squares. The object of the game is to navigate one’s game piece, according to the
die rolls, from the start (bottom square) to the finish (top square), helped or hindered
by ladders and snakes, respectively. The historic version offered morality lessons, where a
player’s progression up the board represented a life journey complicated by virtues (ladders)
and vices (snakes; source: Wikipedia).
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and the labour-market position of older workers, on the other hand. The
fourth chapter discusses downward wage rigidity, analysing how firms adjust
their wage bills when sales decline.
The research questions of this thesis follow.
• Chapter 1, ‘Wage-tenure profiles and mobility’: How can wage-tenure
profiles explain patterns of job mobility? The chapter provides a set
of estimated wage-tenure profiles for 1999–2005 and analyses the rela-
tionship between workers’ seniority and wages. The correlation between
high returns to tenure and the job mobility of older workers is analysed
at the sector level.
• Chapter 2, ‘Do wages continue increasing at older ages? Evidence on
the wage cushion in the Netherlands’: Does the wage cushion—that is
the difference between actual wages and collectively agreed-upon (max-
imum) contractual wages—contribute to the fact that wages continue
to increase at older ages? This chapter investigates older male workers’
wages from 2006 to 2010 by comparing actual wages with wage informa-
tion obtained from collective labour agreements.
• Chapter 3, ‘Labour market effects of job displacement for prime-age and
older workers’: Which factors explain that older workers are in more
vulnerable positions after job loss? This chapter studies the effects of
bankruptcies on the employment status and wages of prime-age and
older workers using Dutch administrative data from 2000 to 2011. We
investigate to what extent the differences over age groups correlate with
three factors: (1) long tenures in the job prior to displacement, (2)
finding re-employment in a different industry and (3) local labour market
conditions in the industry from which workers have been displaced.
• Chapter 4, ‘Flexible wages or flexible workers? A decomposition of wage
bill adjustment by Dutch firms, 2006–2013’: To what extent do firms
adjust wages and employment in periods of adverse economic circum-
stances? How do adjustment strategies vary with firm characteristics,
and what role is played by downward wage rigidity?
Chapter 1 and 4 are single-author papers. In the early phase of the research
for chapter 4, Wouter Verbeek provided data assistance. Chapter 2 was joint
work with Rob Euwals, while Richard de Groot and Janneke Rijn provided
data assistance in the early stage of the project. Chapter 3 is joint work
with Marloes de Graaf-Zijl and Wiljan van den Berge, with Adri den Ouden
providing data assistance in the initial phase of the project.
2
Moksha Patam (‘Snakes and ladders’) board on cotton cloth. Gujarat, dated
1834. 63x63 cm. Calico Museum of Textiles, Ahmedabad.
3

Chapter 1
Wage-Tenure Profiles and Mobility1
1.1 Introduction
The ageing of the workforce demands a sound understanding of the relation-
ship between wage-tenure profiles and the labour-market position of older
workers. This particularly applies to countries with rigid labour markets,
such as the Netherlands. Compared to other countries Dutch job mobility
is low and average unemployment duration and employment protection are
high. Furthermore, international data suggest that wages in the Netherlands
increase steeper with age than they do in many other countries (e.g., OECD
(2006)). These characteristics are likely to be interrelated: The wages of older
workers are high due to tenure- and age-related labour-market institutions
that protect workers with long tenures, while low job mobility among older
workers is caused by the steep wage-tenure profiles.
The aim of this research is to provide a set of estimates on wage-tenure
profiles in the Netherlands. These estimates reveal whether or not wage-
tenure profiles in the Netherlands are steep and whether or not such profiles
are related to labour-market institutions and low mobility. The paper focuses
on the impact of tenure (the duration of a match between a worker and a firm)
on wages, as opposed to the impact of overall experience in the labour market.
Returns to tenure are estimated using several models that address the problem
of endogeneity of tenure in the wage equation (e.g., Altonji and Shakotko
(1987) and Topel (1991)). Returns to tenure are generally interpreted as the
firm-related component of wages, which may act as an impediment to mobility.
1This chapter has been published in De Economist (2012) 160: 141. The final publica-
tion is available at Springer via https://doi.org/10.1007/s10645-011-9183-4. The paper
benefitted from comments and suggestions from the editor and referees of this journal, Frank
Co¨rvers, Rob Euwals, Andries de Grip, Danie¨l van Vuuren and Bas ter Weel.
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The returns may reflect the return on firm-specific human capital (Becker
(1962)) or deferred compensation schemes, with senior employees receiving
wages in excess of marginal productivity (Lazear (1981)). If the worker moves
to another firm, he will no longer receive this wage component. Next, the effect
of workers’ seniority positions on wages is analysed. The underlying idea is
that workers with the longest tenures may have a good bargaining position,
possibly because they are protected by labour-market institutions (e.g., Buhai
et al. (2014)). Finally, the research investigates whether or not there is a
correlation between high returns to tenure and the low job mobility of older
workers across different sectors (e.g., Zwick (2012)).
Three main results are obtained. First, Dutch wage-tenure profiles are
steep compared to those of other countries. The estimates suggest that wage
growth is partly related to firm-specific elements, which are lost in the case
of job mobility. Second, the estimates suggest that seniority increases wages:
conditional on overall experience in the labour market and tenure, real wages
are 3-4 percent higher when comparing the recently hired worker with the
most senior worker. This estimate does not explain the steep wage-tenure
profile because the effect is modest in an international comparison. Third,
a correlation between high returns to tenure and low mobility is found: the
higher the returns to tenure in a sector, the higher the share of older workers,
and the average age and the average tenure of the sector’s workforce.
From a policy perspective, it is important to note that steep wage-tenure
profiles and low job mobility do not necessarily pose a problem for the Dutch
labour market. Firms may adopt increasing wage profiles for several reasons.
For example, wage profiles do not necessarily push the wages of older workers
above their marginal productivity when the costs and benefits of firm-specific
investments are shared between employer and employee. Firms could even
have an incentive to lower the mobility of workers to lengthen the period of
the returns to the training investments or to lower transaction costs associated
with hiring. Firms could use wage-tenure profiles to promote worker effort. If
this is what is going on, returns to tenure and low job mobility could be optimal
from a social point of view. With the ageing of the workforce, the mechanisms
favouring steep wage-tenure profiles could however be under pressure. The
reason is that the period of employment lengthens, increasing the risk that
the knowledge of older workers becomes obsolete (e.g., De Grip and Van Loo
(2002)). In addition, a rigid labour market harms labour-market efficiency by
preventing an optimal allocation of workers to jobs. Low mobility reduces the
flexibility of the economy in case of a technological shock or when the economic
environment becomes more challenging (e g., Ter Weel et al. (2010)).
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1.2 Background and strategy
The paper is organised as follows. Section 1.2 discusses the theoretical
background and the empirical strategy. Section 1.3 presents the data. Section
1.4 presents the basic estimates and compares them to estimates for other
countries from previous studies. Sections 1.5 and 1.6 discuss the estimates
showing the importance of seniority and differences across firms in explaining
tenure profiles in the Netherlands. Section 1.7 concludes.
1.2 Background and strategy
The measurement and interpretation of wage-tenure profiles is not without
debate in the economic literature. There are several ways to estimate the
returns to tenure. The seminal approaches by Altonji and Shakotko (1987),
Abraham and Farber (1987) and Topel (1991) are likely to produce biased
estimates. The reason is that tenure is not a fully exogenous explanatory vari-
able of wages, since unobserved individual and match-specific characteristics
determine both the wage level as well as tenure. In other words, highly pro-
ductive individuals tend to experience fewer quits and layoffs and high-quality
matches tend to survive longer. Nevertheless, the first analyses in this paper
use these approaches to present a sound international comparison.
Topel (1991) finds substantial returns to tenure for the United States. He
applies a two-stage first-differences procedure, in which the second step is a
wage regression at job entry to identify the effect of experience on wages. A
problem with this model is that workers who start a new job are a mixture
of workers who are improving on their previous wage, workers who have been
fired, and workers who have been displaced because of firm closure, all of whom
find the current offer more attractive relative to unemployment. The impact
of experience on wages is upward biased in case most new jobs are due to
voluntary job mobility. This biases the estimated effect of tenure downward.
The true bias is unknown because the fraction of voluntary and involuntary
mobility is unknown. Furthermore, the method does not fully take individual
heterogeneity into account and this biases the estimated effect of tenure up-
ward (e.g., Altonji and Williams (2005) for a discussion). In the first step, a
wage equation expressed in first differences is estimated on a sample of workers
who work for the same firm since at least a year:
∆Yijt = ∆Xijtβ1 + ∆Xijt
2β2 + ...+ ∆Tijtβ3 + ∆Tijt
2β4 + ...+ ∆ijt (1.1)
where ∆Xijt denotes the first difference in the real hourly wage of individual
i in job j between time t and t-1, Xijt is potential labour-market experi-
ence, Tijt is job tenure in the current job and ijt is the error term with the
7
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usual assumptions. Estimating in first differences assures that fixed job and
individual effects are controlled for. A drawback is that the linear effects of
tenure and experience cannot be distinguished because both rise by one year
(∆X = ∆T = 1). Therefore, a second step is needed to disentangle the linear
effects of tenure and experience. In the second step, workers who started a
new job are used to estimate the impact of experience on wages.2
Next to the Topel-approach, this research estimates models suggested by
Altonji and Shakotko (1987) and Abraham and Farber (1987). The endogene-
ity problem is addressed by using instrumental variables (IV) for tenure and
experience. The degree to which an individual’s actual tenure deviates from
his average tenure over the observed job spell is used as an instrument3 for
that tenure, and likewise for experience:
Y˜ijt = X˜ijtβ1 + X˜
2
ijtβ2 + ...+ T˜ijtβ3 + T˜
2
ijtβ4 + ...+ ijt (1.2)
with Y˜ijt = Yijt − Y ijt and T˜ijt = Tijt − T ijt and where X˜ijt is defined as the
deviation of Xijt from the mean over job spell Xijt, and similarly for T˜ijt.
Two models are distinguished: a model for which only tenure is instru-
mented, and a model for which both tenure and experience are instrumented.
As the method does not deal with unobserved match-specific characteristics
the resulting estimates provide underestimates of the true effect of tenure on
wages (e.g., Altonji and Williams (2005) for a discussion).
Two recent studies address the problem of unobserved match-specific char-
acteristics and show its relevance. Dustmann and Meghir (2005) exploit in-
formation on displaced workers to identify the effect of experience and tenure
on wages. The idea is that displaced workers due to firm closure are a random
sample, because they switched jobs neither by their own choice nor by being
selected for dismissal by the firm. The estimates point at positive returns
to job tenure in Germany, especially for unskilled workers. Buchinsky et al.
(2010) exploit a structural dynamic model with endogenous mobility. They
confront the model with the data by estimating a wage equation along with
separate equations for mobility and participation. The estimates suggest low
returns to tenure in France and high returns in the United States. The latter
2First, simulated wages at the start of the job (calculated using results from the first-
difference equation) are estimated using simulated experience at the start of the job as an
explanatory variable. Second, the wage change of involuntary job switchers (who received
unemployment benefit before starting the job) is regressed on experience. The average return
to experience from these two approaches is subtracted from the joint effect of tenure and
experience to determine returns to tenure.
3The variables X˜ijt and T˜ijt serve as instruments in the technical sense that they correlate
with tenure and experience respectively, while the correlation with the individual random
effect is eliminated.
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are even higher than the estimates of Topel (1991). The interpretation of these
estimates is that returns to tenure in the United States are likely to serve as
a device to counter excess job mobility.
A variety of theoretical models explains the rise of wages with job tenure,
including theories on human capital and incentives. First, human capital accu-
mulation due to investments in specific human capital provide an explanation
for why wages rise with tenure (e.g., Becker (1962) and Ben-Porath (1967)).4
Second, incentive theories emphasise that, since effort is often difficult to ob-
serve, deferred compensation may be optimal (e.g., Lazear (1981)). Firms
and workers enter into an implicit contract that serves as an incentive device
which solves the agency problem of the firm. Workers receive a wage below
their marginal productivity when tenure is still low and a wage above their
marginal productivity when tenure rises. Third, search and matching models
explain returns to tenure by focusing on the costs of hiring and firing (e.g.,
Burdett (1978); Jovanovic (1979)). Fourth, bargaining theories are congruous
with wages rising with tenure. In the current study an attempt is made to
quantify the wage effect of bargaining power, possibly derived from the LIFO
layoff rule. Since firm-specific capital represents a value to the firm, under
certain assumptions it is in the firm’s interest to avoid workers quitting. One
such strategy may be to let wages increase gradually with tenure (Burdett and
Coles (2003)). Other theories say that firms need senior workers to instruct
and cooperate with new workers (Lindbeck and Snower (1991)) and that in-
cumbent workers receive a seniority profile in wages as well as a LIFO layoff
rule in exchange (Kuhn and Robert (1989)).
Not many empirical studies exist on the relation between wages and pro-
ductivity, because labour productivity is often unobserved. Borghans et al.
(2007) give an overview of studies on productivity–wage gaps regarding the
United States and Canada. These studies (Medoff and Abraham (1981); Kot-
likoff and Gokhale (1992); Dostie (2011)) generally provide evidence that older
workers are paid wages exceeding their marginal productivity. For the Nether-
lands, Van Ours and Stoeldraijer (2011) found that many specifications esti-
mated in their study indicate that older workers are relatively overpaid. The
final specification, however, accounting for the potential endogeneity of the
change in age composition, shows that productivity and wage both increase
with age. Their study concludes that the productivity–wage gap at high ages
is bound to be small in the Netherlands.
4However, investment in specific human capital does not necessarily imply that wages
depend on job tenure. In an ideal world, the firm, instead of the risk-averse worker, should
bear the entire risk of the investment and receive all quasi-rents, since firms can diversify
risks on the capital market. In practice labour contracts are incomplete, leaving room for
renegotiation during the contract period (e.g., Grout (1984) and Hosios (1990).
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Some recent studies address the relation between the wage-tenure profile
and mobility. For the Netherlands, Borghans et al. (2007) finds a high wage
growth for older workers to be related to a low outflow of older workers. For
Germany, Zwick (2012) finds that establishments with high returns to tenure
are characterized by high average tenures of workers and less inflow of older
employees.
1.3 Data
The main dataset applied in this research is the Dutch Social Statistical
Database (SSB-jobs). It contains information for the years 1999–2005. It
is a linked employer-employee dataset and based on administrative data. It
includes information about all jobs, with information on gross wages and hours
worked available for about one-third of the observations. Since the sample of
observations that includes wages and hours worked remains the same over
time, the dataset has the characteristics of a panel. The level of educational
attainment is included by merging SSB-jobs to the Dutch Labour Force Sur-
vey (DLFS). The DLFS is a repeated cross-section covering about 10 percent
of the labour force. Education is assumed to be time invariant. We further
restrict our analysis to male workers, working full-time (35 hours or more),
employed in the private sector, aged 18-64, and working in firms with at least
10 employees. Standby employees and employees working for temporary work
agencies are excluded from the sample. Depending on the specification of the
empirical model 300-400 thousand observations are obtained.
Since the exact starting date of jobs is known, tenure can be computed.
A job is defined as a contractual relationship between an employee and an
employer. Internal mobility within a firm is not observed. Potential experience
is defined as age minus years of education.
1.4 The wage-tenure profiles
Table 1.1 presents the cumulative effects of tenure on the real wages of male
workers in the private sector. The top row in the top panel shows estimates
of equation(1.1) and the top rows in the middle and bottom panels display
the estimates from estimating equation(1.2). The cumulative effect of tenure
can be interpreted as an estimate of what a typical worker would lose if his
job were to end exogenously. As discussed above in Section 1.2, the first-
differences approach (shown in the top panel of Table 1.1) generates a higher
return to tenure. The results from the IV-models (middle and bottom panels
of Table 1.1) indicate that the return of remaining in a job for 10 years,
10
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compared to leaving earlier, is 6–7 percent in terms of real wages. After 20
years of tenure, the cumulative return is between 11–12 percent.
Table 1.1: Returns to tenure (in percentages)
5 yrs 10 yrs 15 yrs 20 yrs
First differences
Netherlands 2000–2005 (a) 21 42 62 81
Topel (1991) USA 1968–1983 18 25 28 34
Lefranc (2003) USA 1981–1992 6 11 15 19
Lefranc (2003) France 1990–1997 8 15 20 25
Williams (2009) UK 1991–2001 8 11 N.A. 9
Zwick (2012) West-Germany 1998–2003 23 40 56 73
Instrumental variables for tenure (b)
Netherlands 1999–2005 (a) 3 7 9 12
Altonji and Shakotko (1987) USA 1968–1983 3 3 3 4
Dustmann and Meghir (2005) W.-Germany 1991–’97 1 2 4 6
Williams (2009) UK 1991–2001 5 6 N.A. 8
Zwick (2012) West-Germany 1998–2003 6 8 9 10
Instrumental variables for tenure and experience
Netherlands 1999–2005 (a) 4 7 10 11
Altonji and Shakotko (1987) USA 1968–1983 4 3 4 5
Dustmann and Meghir (2005), W.-Germany 1991–’97 -1 -2 -3 -3
Zwick (2012) West-Germany 1998–2003 5 5 5 5
Notes: (a) The figures refer to the cumulative returns to tenure (in %) according to the
different estimation techniques with additional correction for experience, demographics and
educational attainment. For all regressions the impact of tenure is highly significant. The
cumulative returns are based on point estimates; estimated coefficients and standard errors
are presented in the Appendix, table A.1–A.2. The results on the method of first differences
are based on Topel (1991), while the results for the instrumental variables are based on
Altonji and Shakotko (1987) and Abraham and Farber (1987). (b) For comparison, returns
to experience after 10 (20) years according to the IV model with tenure being instrumented
amount to 62% (80%) for the Netherlands, 47% (91%) for the US (Altonji and Shakotko
(1987)), and 68% (132%) for West Germany (Zwick (2012)).
Source: Own calculations using registration data from Statistics Netherlands
To assess whether or not wage-tenure profiles in the Netherlands are steep,
the estimation results are compared with other countries’ outcomes obtained
by the same regression techniques. Compared to other studies, the first-
differences model appears to generate relatively high returns to tenure in the
Netherlands, much higher than those found for the United States. In addition,
compared to several European countries, the returns in the Netherlands are
high. Only the returns to tenure in West Germany are of the same order of
magnitude. Cross-country comparison of the IV models confirms this picture.
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Again, the returns in the Netherlands are comparable to those in West Ger-
many. The returns in the United States are lower. For the IV models with
tenure and experience, the returns to tenure are relatively high in the Nether-
lands compared to both the United States and West Germany. Relative to the
returns to tenure, the returns to experience are high (see Table 1.1, footnote
b)). This is not only the case for the Netherlands; it is a common finding
across countries. Since experience is not necessarily firm-related, returns to
experience are not an impediment to labour mobility.
1.5 Seniority
One source of high returns to tenure is the increase in bargaining power of more
senior workers. This power may increase with seniority due to for example
LIFO layoff rules in the Netherlands.5 We assess the impact of seniority on
hourly wages, apart from the effect of tenure, by estimating the effect on wages
of a worker’s relative seniority position in the firm.
The seniority index, which describes the seniority of an individual relative
to that of his colleagues in the same firm, is determined using information
about all workers in all firms in all years. The seniority index is defined, con-
sistent with Buhai et al. (2014), in such a way that it is zero for the most
recent hire and rising in the time workers are employed with the firm.6 The
seniority index is useful but not a perfect approximation of the potential in-
crease in bargaining power of senior workers. Labour-market institutions play
a role and job heterogeneity within firms can restrict the representativeness
of the index because employers may want to reduce employment in some age
groups more than in others.
The empirical analysis of the impact of seniority on real wages is imple-
mented by extending the real wage equation with the seniority index. This
has been done for the standard specifications of the various models discussed
earlier in this section. The effect of seniority is measured in addition to that
of tenure, so that it can be seen as the impact of higher seniority if all other
characteristics, including tenure, are equal.
Table 1.2 presents the estimates. All specifications suggest that seniority
has a significant positive effect on real wages. An effect of 0.004 implies that, if
a worker develops from being the most newly hired worker to the most senior
5In case of collective dismissal or dismissal for economic reasons, the LIFO principle is
applied per job group. The Dutch government implemented a reform in 2006, which is
however outside our period of observation.
6The seniority index of worker i in firm j at period t is defined as -log(number of workers
in firm j at period t employed at least as long as worker i)/(total number of workers in firm
j at time t). See Buhai et al. (2014) for more information.
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worker in a firm, his real wage increases by about 3 percent due to senior-
ity.7 The magnitude of the Dutch seniority effect is low in comparison to the
effects for Portugal and Denmark, as found by Buhai et al. (2014). This is
remarkable because employment-protection legislation for regular contracts in
the Netherlands is stricter than in Denmark. Although there is some positive
effect of seniority on wages, Dutch workers apparently exploit their individual
bargaining power derived from their seniority position only to a limited extent.
A possible interpretation of the modest effect is that the pivotal role of unions
in the Netherlands reflects a high social value attached to wage equality and
low importance of wage renegotiations at the individual level. A second pos-
sible interpretation is that the need to exploit individual bargaining power is
low because returns to tenure are high for other reasons.
Table 1.2: Estimation results regarding the effect of the seniority index on real
wages
Netherlands (a) Denmark (b) Portugal (b)
First difference 0.002 ∗ 0.005 0.014 ∗∗∗
(0.0008) (0.0004) (0.0007)
IV (tenure and experience) 0.004 ∗∗∗
(0.0024)
Notes:The seniority index measures the seniority position of a worker relative to his col-
leagues in the same firm. ∗∗∗, ∗∗and ∗indicate that the estimated coefficient is significant at
1%, 5% respectively 10% level. Standard errors in parentheses.
(a) Own estimation results.
(b) Buhai et al. (2014). This study also reports results for Fixed Effect, and also for this
method the impact for the Netherlands is clearly smaller than for Denmark and Portugal.
Source: Own calculations using registration data from Statistics Netherlands
1.6 Composition of the workforce
The composition of the workforce, and in particular the share of older workers
in an industry, may be related to the returns to tenure in that industry. This
will not explain high returns to tenure in the Netherlands relative to other
countries, but it sheds light on patterns of returns within the Netherlands.
These patterns may be related to the share of older workers, average age and
to average job duration. In particular the latter variable is related to job
mobility as a high average duration would indicate low mobility.
7For example, for a firm with 1,000 workers, when a worker moves from being the newest
hire to the most senior worker, the effect on wages is the estimated coefficient times the
change in seniority index, that is, 0.006 ∗((- log(0.001) - (- log (0.999)) = 0.04.
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The relationship between the composition of the workforce and returns to
tenure is analysed by regressing an outcome variable, for example the share
of older workers in firm, on an industry-specific tenure effect (conditional on
several control variables).8 Alternative variables, like average age, average
tenure, share of young workers and share of flexible workers, are analysed
as well.9 The measure for the industry-specific tenure effect is derived from
the wage-tenure analysis described earlier, where now the specification of the
IV model with tenure and experience is extended by introducing one extra
variable that measures tenure in a specific industry.10 In total, 33 industries
in the private sector are distinguished. The regression produces 33 estimated
industry-specific tenure coefficients, which serve as a measure of the effect of
tenure on wages in these particular industries.
Table 1.3 presents the coefficient of the measure for the industry-specific
tenure effect; coefficients for other control variables are not presented. Each
row relates to a regression with the same right-hand side variables, but with a
different left-hand side variable. All effects are significant at the one percent
level. The results suggest that the higher the returns to tenure, the higher
the share of older workers (aged 55–64) in the firm and the lower the share of
younger workers (aged 15–24) and workers with flexible contracts. Further-
more: the higher the returns to tenure, the higher the average age and tenure
of workers in the firm. In particular the correlation with the average tenure
suggests there is also a positive correlation between the wage-tenure profiles
and the composition of the workforce.
Economic theory offers several possible explanations for a positive corre-
lation between wage-tenure profiles and mobility. First, such a correlation
may be obtained when firms apply deferred compensation schemes as a tool
to purposefully reduce the mobility of their workforce. High transaction costs
when hiring workers may, for example, be an argument for firms to apply de-
ferred compensation. It lengthens the period of return of their investments.
Second, the correlation may indicate that firm-specific human capital invest-
ments are important. The returns to firm-specific investments will take place
for employer-employee matches with a long expected duration. The causality
may however also run the other way around: a high share of older workers
in a firm may generate steep wage profiles as well-protected older workers
8The variables regarding the composition of the workforce are calculated using an integral
dataset of all workers in all Dutch firms.
9Zwick (2012) performs a similar analysis for Germany and finds that ‘German establish-
ments paying stronger seniority wages than the average establishment in their sector have a
higher tenure of their employees’.
10The extra variable is an interaction consisting of an industry dummy variable times the
linear tenure variable.
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may use their wage bargaining position. Another explanation may be that
older workers are overrepresented in sectors of industry where investments in
firm-specific human capital are important.
Table 1.3: Estimation results regarding various aspects of the composition of the
workforce of firms
Dependent variable Coef. industry-specific tenure effect Std. Error
Share of workers aged 55–64 1.0 ∗∗∗ (0.10)
Share of workers aged 15–24 -7.1 ∗∗∗ (0.17)
Share of flexible workers -7.8 ∗∗∗ (0.16)
Average age workforce ∗100 1.8 ∗∗∗ (0.06)
Average tenure workforce ∗100 1.1 ∗∗∗ (0.05)
Notes: a) The table depicts estimation results for five separate regressions explaining dif-
ferent aspects of the workforce composition of firms. Variable of interest is a measure of the
industry-specific tenure effect. The regressions include control variables for firm character-
istics like firm size and firm growth. ∗∗∗indicates that the estimated coefficient is significant
at 1% level. Standard errors in parentheses. Complete estimation results are presented in
the Appendix, Table A1.4-A1.3.
Source: Own calculations using registration data from Statistics Netherlands
1.7 Conclusions
With an ageing labour force, there is an increasing need to understand the
relation between wage-tenure profiles and the labour-market position of older
workers. This applies in particular to the Dutch labour market, which is
relatively rigid. This paper investigates whether the wage-tenure profiles in
the Netherlands are steep and whether such profiles are related to the seniority
position of a worker and to the composition of the workforce using a large
linked employer-employee dataset.
The estimates presented in this paper suggest that the returns to tenure
in the Netherlands are high relative to other countries. The estimates suggest
that for older workers it is not very attractive to be mobile. Furthermore,
the seniority position of a worker turns out to increase wages. This may
be related to labour-market institutions protecting senior workers relative to
younger workers. However, the estimates suggest that the impact of seniority
on wages is not particularly large. Finally, the results suggest that firms in
industries with high returns to tenure employ relatively high shares of older
workers. These industries also employ workers with high average tenures,
indicating that steep wage-tenure profiles are correlated with low mobility.
In the Netherlands, investments in firm-specific human capital may be
high or deferred compensation schemes may prevail in many industries and
15
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firms. Another explanation is that a high share of older workers in firms
generates steep wage-tenure profiles. Although from a theoretical point of
view high returns to tenure and low job mobility may be optimal in terms
of welfare, the ageing of the workforce underlines the policy relevance of the
subject. With the ageing of the workforce, the mechanisms favouring wage-
tenure profiles become under increasing pressure. As the period of employment
at old age lengthens, the knowledge of workers risks becoming obsolete, and
the employment share of young workers decreases. In addition, a rigid labour
market can harm labour-market efficiency by preventing an optimal allocation
of workers across jobs.
A limitation of this research is that the data do not allow pinning down all
possible determinants of steep wage-tenure profiles. For example, investments
in firm-specific human capital are difficult to identify and the importance of
deferred payment schemes is not explicitly addressed. So a remaining question
is: Which are the underlying mechanisms inducing Dutch wage-tenure profiles
to be steep? Perhaps the high share of large firms in the Netherlands, offer-
ing large internal labour markets with high specific investments and deferred
payment schemes contributes to the explanation. It is a challenge for future
research to pin down such underlying mechanisms in more detail.
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Appendix A: Additional regression results
See Tables A1.1, A1.2, A1.3 and A1.4
Table A1.1: Regression results for Instrumental Variables estimations
IV for tenure IV for tenure and experience
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Dep. variable: ln(real hourly wage)
Tenure 0.0085 ∗∗∗ 0.0011 0.0087 ∗∗∗ 0.0022
Tenure2 -0.0109 ∗∗∗ 0.0030 -0.0158 ∗∗∗ 0.0031
Seniority index 0.0037 0.0023 0.0040 ∗ 0.0024
Indicator job tenure <1 year -0.0085 0.0063 -0.0069 0.0064
Experience 0.1012 ∗∗∗ 0.0013 0.0870 ∗∗∗ 0.0037
Experience2 -0.4898 ∗∗∗ 0.0121 -0.3768 ∗∗∗ 0.0463
Experience3 0.1105 ∗∗∗ 0.0041 0.0767 ∗∗∗ 0.0168
Experience4 -0.0096 ∗∗∗ 0.0005 -0.0060 ∗∗∗ 0.0021
ln(number of workers firm) -0.0013 ∗∗∗ 0.0004 -0.0005 0.0015
Year dummy 2001 0.0221 ∗∗∗ 0.0017 0.0215 ∗∗∗ 0.0022
Year dummy 2002 0.0185 ∗∗∗ 0.0017 0.0171 ∗∗∗ 0.0034
Year dummy 2003 0.0232 ∗∗∗ 0.0018 0.0213 ∗∗∗ 0.0045
Year dummy 2004 0.0245 ∗∗∗ 0.0018 0.0222 ∗∗∗ 0.0054
Year dummy 2005 0.0185 ∗∗∗ 0.0018 0.0157 ∗∗∗ 0.0063
Dummy education:
-Lower secondary 0.1143 ∗∗∗ 0.0030 0.1212 ∗∗∗ 0.0104
-Higher secondary 0.3134 ∗∗∗ 0.0029 0.3282 ∗∗∗ 0.0233
-Tertiary 0.7184 ∗∗∗ 0.0029 0.7354 ∗∗∗ 0.0280
Sector of industry:
- Mining Industry 0.3020 ∗∗∗ 0.0095 0.3030 ∗∗∗ 0.0096
-Manufacturing 0.0190 ∗∗∗ 0.0068 0.0206 ∗∗∗ 0.0069
-Energy and water supply 0.1735 ∗∗∗ 0.0073 0.1679 ∗∗∗ 0.0144
-Construction 0.0830 ∗∗∗ 0.0068 0.0808 ∗∗∗ 0.0072
-Wholesale and retail trade 0.0221 ∗∗∗ 0.0067 0.0275 ∗∗∗ 0.0089
-Hotels and restaurants -0.0354 ∗∗∗ 0.0089 -0.0347 ∗∗∗ 0.0097
-Transport and comm. 0.0707 ∗∗∗ 0.0068 0.0710 ∗∗∗ 0.0069
-Financial services 0.1409 ∗∗∗ 0.0066 0.1412 ∗∗∗ 0.0067
Constant 11.9730 ∗∗∗ 0.1010 12.2290 ∗∗∗ 0.0719
Number of observations 363,274 363,274
Adj. R-squared 0.4592 0.4591
Source: Own calculations using registration data from Statistics Netherlands
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Table A1.2: Regression results FD-model (excluding/including seniority index)
FD FD
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Dep. variable: ln(real hourly wage growth)
∆ Tenure2 -0.0082 ∗∗∗ 0.0019 -0.0076 ∗∗∗ 0.0021
∆ Experience2 / 100 -0.2696 ∗∗∗ 0.0094 -0.3994 ∗∗∗ 0.0088
∆ Experience3 / 1000 0.0512 ∗∗∗ 0.0030 0.0885 ∗∗∗ 0.0029
∆ Experience4 / 10000 -0.0041 ∗∗∗ 0.0003 -0.0077 ∗∗∗ 0.0003
∆ ln (number of workers firm) 0.0014 ∗∗∗ 0.0001 0.0037 ∗∗∗ 0.0009
∆ Seniority index 0.0020 ∗∗ 0.0008
Constant 0.0837 ∗∗∗ 0.0025 0.1031 ∗∗∗ 0.0025
Number of observations 258,692 253,016
Adj. R-squared 0.0613 0.0709
Notes: This regression refers to step one of the FD-model (See Topel (1991)). Note that
∆experience and ∆ tenure (which are equal to 1 each year by definition) are not included;
their effect are included in the estimated constant. The regression is carried out on a sample of
full time working males, aged 23-60, and employed in the private sector in enterprises with at
least 10 employees. As control variables are included: 5 year dummies (2001-2005), 3 dummy
variables for level of attained education, 8 dummy variables for sector of industry and 40
dummy variables for occupation. The regression including the seniority index refers to age
group 18-60 (consistent with Table 1.2); for the age group 23-60 the estimated coefficient for
the seniority index would be 0.0014 ∗(std. err. 0.0008).
Source: Own calculations using registration data from Statistics Netherlands
Table A1.3: Regression results for average age and tenure of firms
Average age in firm∗100 Average tenure in firm∗100
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Sector specific tenure coef. 17.5330 ∗∗∗ 0.0627 10.6850 ∗∗∗ 0.0504
Share educ lower sec. -0.0100 ∗∗∗ 0.0019 -0.0009 0.0016
Share educ higher sec. -0.0092 ∗∗∗ 0.0018 0.0012 0.0015
Share educ tertiary -0.0021 0.0020 -0.0093 ∗∗∗ 0.0016
ln (number of workers firm) -0.0019 ∗∗∗ 0.0002 0.0025 ∗∗∗ 0.0002
Growth firm size -0.0067 ∗∗∗ 0.0006 -0.0101 ∗∗∗ 0.0005
Constante 0.3734 ∗∗∗ 0.0002 0.0516 ∗∗∗ 0.0017
Number of obs. 36,650 36,650
Adj. R-squared 0.0493 0.0355
Notes: These two regressions are carried out at the firm level. Year dummies 2001-2005 are
included as control variables. The dependent variables are the average age in the firm∗100
and the average tenure in the firm∗100. The variable of interest is the sector specific tenure
coefficient. This coefficient is obtained from an ‘IV for tenure and experience’-regression
comparable to the one in Table A1.1, but extended with the following interaction term:
sector of industry ∗tenure.
Source: Own calculations using registration data from Statistics Netherlands
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Chapter 2
Do Wages Continue Increasing at
Older Ages? Evidence on the Wage
Cushion in the Netherlands1
2.1 Introduction
The central research question in this study is whether the wage cushion is
more important at older ages and contributes to the fact that wages continue
increasing at older ages.2 Wages that continue increasing at older ages are
perceived to be partly responsible for the unfavourable labour-market oppor-
tunities of older workers in many countries, including the Netherlands (OECD
(2006),OECD (2014)). Wages that continue to increase with age hint at a
wage-productivity gap at older ages, as empirical evidence suggests that pro-
ductivity at best remains stable at older ages (Bo¨rsch-Supan and Weiss (2011),
Van Ours and Stoeldraijer (2011)). Note that in cases in which productivity
decreases with age, even a constant wage profile over age can be associated
with a wage-productivity gap.
Empirical studies show that wages continue increasing at older ages in
1This chapter is joint work with Rob Euwals and has been published in De Economist
(2014) 162:433–460; The final publication is available at Springer via https://doi.org/10.
1007/s10645-014-9237-5. The authors thank Rob Alessie, Rik Dillingh, Marike Knoef,
Bas van der Klaauw, Danie¨l van Vuuren and an anonymous referee for useful comments and
suggestions.
2The wage cushion, defined as the difference between actual wages and contractual wages
as stipulated in collective labour agreements, consists of two parts: the first comprises ad-
ditional wages paid above the contractual wage, and the second consists of the degree to
which contractual wages exceed the highest wage-scale ceiling, as stipulated in the collective
labour agreement.
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several European countries. On the basis of descriptive statistics from survey
data, Table 3.3 of OECD (2006) concludes that wages continue increasing at
older ages in Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Italy, Spain and Switzerland.
Applying panel data analysis to longitudinal administrative data, Zwick (2012)
and Deelen (2012) find that wages continue increasing with experience at older
ages in Germany and the Netherlands. These results are surprising because in
continental European countries, wages are perceived to be determined largely
by collective bargaining. The collective labour agreements generally include
wage ceilings for the various wage-scales in a sector of industry. In such a
system, wages that increase with experience or tenure at older ages are not
evident, unless the wage cushion plays an important role at older ages.
Several studies have assessed the incidence of wage cushions, but none
of them associate the cushion with seniority wages. Cardoso and Portugal
(2005) investigate how a system of collective bargaining can coexist with low
unemployment and high wage flexibility in Portugal. They find that the wage
cushion serves as a means to overcome the constraints imposed by collective
bargaining. The results indicate that the wage cushion enhances the returns
to workers and firm attributes. Jung and Schnabel (2011) find that more than
forty per cent of German plants whose employees are covered by collective
agreements pay wages above the level stipulated in the agreement, giving rise
to a wage cushion. Their results indicate that the wage cushion varies with
profits and labour shortages. While plants with single-employer agreements
are less likely to have wage cushions, plants bound by multi-employer agree-
ments seem to pay wage premiums to overcome the restrictions imposed by the
centralized bargaining system in the western part of Germany. Our study in-
vestigates how a system of collectively-bargained wage-scales can coexist with
wages that continue increasing at older ages.
We investigate how older workers’ wages develop over time using adminis-
trative panel data on contractual and additional wages in twenty-two Dutch
CLA (Collective Labour Agreement) sectors of industry.3 Our dataset is com-
prised of male workers between the ages of 23–63 in these sectors for the period
2006 – 2010. We merge our administrative data with wage-scale data collected
from collective labour agreements, such as the number of wage-scales, the min-
imum and maximum wages per scale and the number of spinal points (the
wage levels associated with standard increments along a wage-scale). Com-
bining actual wages with wage-scale data enables us to analyse the effect of
the wage-scale system on actual wages.
3The contractual wage refers to the wage that is agreed upon in the labour contract. The
additional wage refers to the sum of the incidental wage (performance-related, not part of
the contract) and extra wage (a regular, extra wage component; for example, a thirteenth
month of salary). Overtime pay is part of neither the contractual nor the additional wage.
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First, wage regressions show how gross hourly wages develop after twenty
or more years of potential experience and tenure.4 Using the results of sim-
ilar regressions done with contractual hourly wages, we define an indicator
for receiving a contractual wage that is equal to a collectively-agreed wage-
scale ceiling. We cannot tell with certainty whether a worker is receiving a
contractual wage that is equal to the wage-scale ceiling of a particular wage-
scale, as hourly wages are prone to measurement error, even in administrative
data. Second, regressions show whether the likelihood of receiving a contrac-
tual wage at a wage-scale ceiling—or, alternatively, exceeding the highest wage
ceiling—increases with age and tenure. Third, wage regressions show whether
workers receiving a contractual wage equal to a wage ceiling receive more in
additional wages. Fourth, wage growth regressions show whether workers re-
ceiving a wage exceeding the highest wage ceiling experience more contractual
wage growth.
The results indicate that in the public sector, wage ceilings stipulated in
collective agreements are guiding for older workers’ wages. wage-scale ceilings
are, however, less restrictive in the private sector. Older workers in the private
sector more often receive a contractual wage exceeding the highest wage-scale
ceiling, resulting in a wage cushion in accordance with our definition. Workers
earning a contractual wage equal to a wage-scale ceiling do not receive more in
additional wages. Workers earning a contractual wage exceeding the highest
wage ceiling, however, experience higher contractual wage growth. In the
private sector, this group of workers contributes to the steepness of the age-
wage profile. Our study shows the limited role of the wage bargaining system
in explaining wage growth at older ages. In the public sector, wage growth
at older ages is limited by the system, as wage growth is actually restricted
by the wage ceilings. In the private sector, wage growth at older ages is the
result of the wage cushion.
The structure of this paper is as follows: the next section discusses the
system of wage-scales and wage bargaining as it prevails in the Netherlands,
section 2.3 describes the empirical methodology of our analysis, section 2.4
presents descriptive statistics, section 2.5 presents the analysis of the wage
cushion, section 2.6 gives the sensitivity analysis and section 2.7 concludes.
4Potential experience is defined as age minus years of education, determined using the
highest level of education attained, minus 4 years that represent the period before enter-
ing primary school. Time in the educational system cannot be less than 12 years because
education is compulsory until age 16.
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2.2 Institutional setting
Many sectors of industry in the Netherlands have a wage system that defines
starting wages, wage increments and wage ceilings for the various wage-scales
in a sector. Wage negotiations and the resulting collective labour agreements
generally contain an agreement on the general wage growth for all workers.
The twenty-two sectors of industry in this study are chosen on the basis
of their size, measured as the number of total workers covered by a collec-
tive agreement. Almost all collective agreements cover over 100,000 workers5,
ensuring a large sample size in our empirical analysis. Note that we do not
consider the total number of workers in a sector of industry because not all
workers may be covered by the same agreement. The financial sector, for
example, drops out of our selection, as most banks have their own firm-level
agreement. The largest agreement in this sector therefore covers substantially
fewer than 80,000 workers. We collect information on wage-scales, wage floors,
wage ceilings and spinal points for all twenty-two sectors (see Appendix A for
details).
Table 2.1: Wage system of the transportation sector, gross monthly wages, 2006
wage-scale number: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Floor 1,432 1,503 1,563 1,629 1,711 1,793 1,876 1,958
Ceiling 1,710 1,800 1,878 2,000 2,181 2,371 2,606 2,855
Spinal points 5 5 5 5 6 7 8 9
The sectors we consider in this study have a similar wage system. The
transportation sector serves as an example (see Table 2.1). In 2006 and in
the following years, the wage system has contained eight wage-scales. Each
job in the sector has wages according to one or more wage-scales. Drivers of
standard trucks may have wages according to wage-scale 1, while drivers of
special trucks (for example, of chemical products) may have wages according to
wage-scales 2, 3 and 4. Logistics planners will have wages according to higher
wage-scales, while managers are likely to be paid according to the highest
wage-scales. The lowest wage-scales have five spinal points. Drivers in wage-
scale 1 will normally start at the wage floor and may have four wage increases
during their career as a driver. The speed at which a driver climbs the ladder
within a wage-scale is at the discretion of the firm. The same holds for placing
workers on a higher wage-scale. Wage policy is likely to vary among firms,
and it is also likely that worker performance and market circumstances play
5Except for the coachwork industry (over 80,000 workers), public administration-region
(over 13,000 workers), police and social work activities (each about 65,000 workers).
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an important role. Note furthermore that the wage-scales overlap. The ceiling
of wage-scale 1, for example, is higher than starting wages in wage-scales 2, 3
and 4.
The wage systems of the various sectors differ with respect to wage floors,
wage ceilings and the number of wage-scales and spinal points. As Table 2.2
shows for the year 2006, the sectors have four (secondary education) to twenty
(public administration at the municipality level) wage-scales. The wage floors
in the lowest wage-scales vary from 1,173 (police) to 2,242 (secondary edu-
cation) euros per month. The wage ceilings in the lowest wage-scales vary
from 1,250 (cleaning) to 3,427 (secondary education) euros. The lowest wages
in primary and secondary education are high, as the sector requires a high
level of education of its employees. The number of spinal points in the lowest
wage-scale is zero in sectors in which the wage ceiling is equal to the starting
wage (retail sale, clothing and footwear, cleaning and home care). The educa-
tion sector has the greatest number of spinal points in the lowest wage-scale.
In some sectors, wages are flexible within a wage-scale (building construction,
hotel and catering, temporary employment agencies and public administration
at the regional level). The wage floors in the highest wage-scales vary from
1,671 (clothing and footwear) to 6,164 (public administration at the munic-
ipality level) euros. The wage ceilings in the highest wage-scales vary from
1,764 (cleaning) to 8,311 (public administration at the regional level) euros.
The number of spinal points in the highest wage-scales varies from six (cloth-
ing and footwear) to nineteen (social work activities). Note that the wage
ceilings of the highest wage-scales are substantially higher in the public sector
than in the private sector. The wage-scale system of the public sector includes
all managerial jobs, while in the private sector this may not be the case.
Wage negotiations and collective labour agreements generally take the
wage system as given. Consequently, negotiations between employers and
unions generally lead to the same wage growth for all workers. Employers can
reach agreement with one or more unions, and the Dutch Ministry of Social
Affairs and Employment can extend the agreement to all workers in the sec-
tor, in cases in which these unions represent a large portion of the employees.
Agreements are almost always extended; thus, the wage systems we consider
here are in place for a large majority of workers.
Wage negotiations and collective bargaining may lead to differences in
wage increases within a sector or to a reform of the wage system. In sectors
such as hotel and catering and the police, the increase in the wage ceiling
during the period from 2006–2010 was larger than the average wage increase.
Furthermore, the wage ceilings of the highest wage-scales in the home care sec-
tor increased substantially as it merged with the sector comprised of nursing
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Table 2.2: Wage system of 22 large sectors of industry (a), gross monthly wages,
2006
Lowest wage-scale Highest wage-scale
sbi08 #sc. floor ceiling #sp.p. floor ceiling #sp.p.
Private sector
Basic metal industry 240 11 1,472 1,485 1 2,166 2,855 10
Metal products industry 250 10 1,265 1,537 3 1,738 3,079 14
Coachworks industry 292 10 1,265 1,537 3 1,738 3,079 14
Construction installation 432 10 1,265 1,537 3 1,738 3,079 14
Repair of (motor) vehicles 452 10 1,265 1,537 3 1,738 3,079 14
Retail sale (large stores) 472 9 1,523 1,523 0 3,160 3,504 Flex
Retail sale (small stores) 472 9 1,523 1,523 0 3,160 3,504 Flex
Clothing and footwear 477 5 1,285 1,285 0 1,671 1,972 6
Transport 494 8 1,432 1,710 5 1,958 2,855 9
Hotel and catering 551 11 1,339 1,559 Flex 2,844 3,584 Flex
Temp, Empl, Agencies (b):
- TAE (I) 782 9 1,317 1,666 Flex 1,941 3,290 Flex
- TAE (II) 782 9 1,317 1,666 Flex 1,941 3,290 Flex
Cleaning 812 7 1,250 1,250 0 1,698 1,764 12
Public sector
Social unemployment relief 329 12 1,252 1,297 2 2,461 3,979 11
Public administration:
- municipality, revised (b) 841 20 1,283 1,646 11 5,783 8,220 11
- municipality 841 19 1,283 1,540 5 6,164 8,220 9
- region 841 18 1,263 1,598 Flex 5,818 8,311 Flex
- state 841 18 1,287 1,618 10 6,044 7,934 10
Police 842 18 1,173 1,751 10 5,470 7,598 11
Secondary education 853 4 2,242 3,427 17 2,912 4,933 17
Nursing homes for disabled 872 16 1,266 1,543 7 5,200 7,350 14
Social work activities 889 15 1,342 1,985 15 3,454 7,885 19
Notes: (a) The sectors of industry are chosen on the basis of their large size and the fact that
all workers in these industries are covered by the same collective agreement. The code sbi08
refers to standard business classification codes in 2008, #sc. refers to the number of wage-
scales, and the floor and ceiling are the lowest and highest wages, respectively, according
to the wage-scale. #sp.p. refres to the number of spinal points per wage-scale (’Flex’
meaning that no spinal points are specified). (b) Two separate collective labour agreements
for temporary work agencies are taken into account. Due to a reform, there are two different
wage-scale systems for municipalities’ public administrations. The revised system holds for
employees who started their jobs in 1996 or later.
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homes for the elderly and disabled. Moreover, the wage system was reformed
during our period of observation in the metal products and coachwork indus-
tries, as well as in the cleaning sector. Such reforms were partly responsible
for newly-defined wage ceilings. The changes in the wage ceilings and wage
systems have subsequently led to additional variation in the wage ceilings.
Such variation will contribute to the identification of the impact of the wage
ceilings on wage growth at older ages. We nevertheless decide not to exploit
these changes and reforms as natural experiments due to the fact that the
necessary assumption of exogeneity in these experiments is likely to be false,
as the changes and reforms may be driven by labour-market considerations.6
2.3 Empirical methodology
The central question is how wages can continue increasing at older ages in a
wage system with wage bargaining and wage ceilings. We define an indicator
I=it for the likelihood of receiving a contractual wage that is equal to a wage
ceiling of a wage-scale for individual i at time t. Remember that all sectors have
a wage system with more than one wage-scale. Furthermore, we will define
an indicator I+it for the likelihood of receiving a contractual wage exceeding
the highest wage ceiling in a sector. The indicators will be used to answer a
number of empirical questions to unravel the puzzle of wages that continue
increasing at older ages:
1. Does the likelihood of being at a wage ceiling continue increasing at older
ages? Or alternatively, does the likelihood of receiving a contractual
wage above the highest wage ceiling continue increasing at older ages?
2. Do workers receiving a contractual wage that is equal to a wage ceiling
receive more in additional wages?
3. Do workers that receive a contractual wage above the highest wage ceil-
ing experience more contractual wage growth?
A positive answer to the first part of the first question may be interpreted
as evidence against wages that continue increasing at older ages. Wages paid
above the wage ceiling, however, leave room for wages that continue increasing
at older ages. The second and third questions also leave room for wages to con-
tinue increasing at older ages. Each question will be answered using empirical
models for (1) the indicators, (2) additional wages and (3) wage growth. The
6In 1999, the government made a mistake in wage negotiations for the police, leading to
higher wage growth than intended for police officers in certain wage-scales. This would be a
true natural experiment.
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first empirical model will explain the indicators from individual demographic
and educational characteristics, while the second and third empirical models
will also include the indicators as explanatory variables. Note that both the
second part of the first question and the third question refer to parts of the
wage cushion (see footnote 2).
The empirical complication to answering the questions is that we do not
observe the wage-scale of individual workers. In other words, we first need
to define measures for the indicators of being paid the maximum on a wage-
scale and being paid more than the highest wage ceiling. To do this, the
section defines an empirical model with specification and measurement errors
for wages. The model is used to determine the workers’ wages vis-a`-vis the
ceilings in the wage-scales of the sectors of industry concerned. We will propose
measures for indicators I=it and I
+
it . In addition, the empirical model for wages
is used to check whether wages continue increasing with experience or tenure
at older ages—i.e., whether the results of Zwick (2012) and Deelen (2012) are
reproduced with these data.
We follow contractual and additional wages of male workers in twenty-
two large Dutch sectors of industry over the period from 2006 – 2010, using
administrative data from the Social Statistical Database of Statistics Nether-
lands.7 The sectors of industry are chosen such that all workers are covered
by the same collective agreement (see also Section 2). Individual, contractual
wages are compared to wage ceilings to determine the ‘likelihood’ of receiving
a contractual wage that is equal to the ceiling of a wage-scale.8 We also de-
termine the likelihood of receiving a contractual wage exceeding the highest
wage ceiling in a sector of industry. Our data sources do not indicate with
certainty whether or not a worker receives a wage equal to a wage ceiling for
two reasons. First, wage assessment contains measurement error, even in the
case of administrative data. For example, information on working hours is
used to calculate full-time wages, and this information may contain measure-
ment error. Second, we do not observe the wage-scales of individual workers.
Since adjacent wage-scales may be partly overlapping (see Table 2.1 for an
example), a worker receiving a contractual wage equal to a wage ceiling may
7The Social Statistical Database of Statistics Netherlands actually consists of several
databases that can be merged; our main datasets (‘polisikvbus’ and ‘polisikobus’) contain ad-
ministrative data from employers, the tax authority and social security organisation, UWV.
Employers provide a code for the collective labour agreement under which the workers oper-
ate, which is used as a key variable to merge the wage-scale data obtained from the collective
labour agreements (see Appendix A). In addition, we used a dataset containing data from
municipal base administrations (GBA) as well as data on the level of education of workers.
8We determine an indicator for the probability of receiving a contractual wage equal to
the highest wage ceiling; we cannot determine the true probability, as we do not observe the
salary scale of a worker.
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not be at this ceiling, as he may receive a wage according to a higher adjacent
wage-scale. We assume a worker is at a ceiling when (1) his wage is close to
a wage ceiling of a wage-scale and (2) his contractual wage growth is close to
the contractual wage growth stipulated in the collective labour agreement.
Define Wit as the observed wage of individual i at time t. All wage equa-
tions will be sector-specific whereby we suppress the sector index. Assume the
following random effects wage equation:
Wit = X
′
itβ + ωi + ωi, t (2.1)
where ωi and ωit are individual job-specific and idiosyncratic error terms, re-
spectively. Individuals with more than one job during our period of observation
have more than one draw from the distribution of the individual job-specific
error terms, but for notational convenience we suppress the job index. The
vector Xit contains standard demographic and human capital variables includ-
ing (potential) labour-market experience and tenure. The vector β contains
parameters. The error terms are assumed to be independent and identically
distributed. We will allow the individual specific wage equation error ωi to be
correlated with tenure and potential experience. The model is still to be inter-
preted as a random effects model, although because of the allowed correlation
with some exogenous variables it contains elements of a fixed effects model.
The estimation model will be used for two purposes. First, we will inves-
tigate whether the gross hourly wage continues increasing with experience or
tenure at older ages. We instrument experience with the deviation between
experience and the individual job average of experience, and tenure with the
deviation between tenure and the individual job average of tenure (Altonji
and Shakotko (1987), Abraham and Farber (1987)). As this method does
not deal with unobserved, match-specific characteristics, the results underes-
timate the true effect of tenure and experience on wages (Altonji and Williams
(2005)). Dustmann and Meghir (2005) deal with match-specific characteristics
and Buchinsky et al. (2010) deal with endogenous mobility, but such issues
are beyond the scope of this study.
Second, we apply the model to gross hourly contractual wages since the
second purpose of the model is to use the results to calculate an indicator of the
likelihood that an individual worker receives a contractual wage at the wage
ceiling of a wage-scale. Note the error terms ωi and ωit contain two types
of errors: measurement error and specification error. Define ωi and ωitas
individual specific and idiosyncratic measurement error, respectively. The
distribution of these error terms cannot be identified from Eq.(2.1), but we
know the variances of measurement error (σ21, σ
2
2) are smaller than or equal
to the variances of the estimated model for the contractual wages (σ2ω1, σ
2
ω2).
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Define W ∗it as the true (unobserved) contractual wage of individual i at
time t. Two conditions must be met for an individual worker to receive a true
contractual wage equal to the wage ceiling Wmaxj of wage-scale j: (1) the
wage must be equal to the wage ceiling of wage-scale j, and (2) the contrac-
tual wage growth must be equal to the contractual wage growth stipulated
in the collective labour agreement (CLA): which for reasons of convenience
we assume it to be zero here, but we do take it into account in the empirical
exercise. We implement condition (1) as follows:
P
(
W ∗it = W
max
j
)
= P
((
Wit −Wmaxj
)− δh1 < Tit ≤ (Wit −Wmaxj )+ δh1)
(2.2)
with Tit=i+it ∼ N
(
0,
(
γ1σ
2
ω1 + γ2σ
2
ω2
))
whereby we define h1 as half of the average contractual wage increment in a
sector of industry when a worker moves to the next spinal point on his wage-
scale. Two sensitivity parameters are important in determining the probability
of receiving a contractual wage equal to the maximum wage level of a job: δ
determines how large the bandwidth of the wage system is and γ1 and γ2 de-
termine which portion of the error term of the empirical wage model is due to
measurement error. Next, we implement condition (2) as follows:
P
(
W ∗it −W ∗it−1 = 0
)
= P
(
(Wit −Wit−1)− 2δh2 < Uit ≤ (Wit −Wit−1) + 2δh2
)
(2.3)
with Uit=it - it−1 ∼ N
(
0,
(
2γ2σ
2
ω2
))
whereby we define h2 as half of the average year-to-year change in contractual
wages at a particular spinal point of the wage-scale in a sector of industry. In
order to calculate the joint probability of both conditions one needs to take
into account the fact that the error terms (Tit, 
U
it) are correlated as both con-
tain error term it (see Appendix B for details). For the base case we assume
the sensitivity parameters δ=1, γ1=0.01 and γ2=0.05. This implies that we
assume wages are equal to a wage-scale ceiling in cases in which they are less
than half of a wage increment from the ceiling, and in Eq.(2.2) we assume
one percent of the individual error terms and five percent of the idiosyncratic
error terms of the empirical model to be due to measurement error. We will
provide sensitive analyses for the choices of parameters (δ, γ1 and γ2).
We define indicator I=it as the joint probability of receiving a contractual
wage that is equal to a wage ceiling of a wage-scale and a contractual wage
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growth that is equal to zero. We define indicator I+it as the probability of
receiving a contractual wage exceeding the highest wage ceiling in a sector
(Appendix B). Note that although these indicators are defined as probabilities,
they should not be interpreted as true probabilities of being at a wage ceiling
or being paid above the wage ceiling as we do not observe this directly. In
other words, they remain to be interpreted as indicators. These indicators are
used to answer the three empirical questions defined at the beginning of this
section.
2.4 Descriptive statistics
In the public sector, contractual wage levels appear to be fairly close to the
exact wage levels stipulated in the collective labour agreement, while in the
private sector the CLA-wage scheme seems to be less of a constraint on con-
tractual wages. The histograms in Figure 1, displaying the frequencies of con-
tractual wages from 2000–2500 euros per month (with a bin width of 10 euros)
for the basic metal industry and the state public administration, provide illus-
trative examples. wage-scale ceilings are clearly recognizable as spikes in the
contractual wage distribution of the public administration, while this is not
the case for the basic metal industry. It is unclear whether this reflects true
deviation from the wage-scale system or measurement error. For this reason,
it is difficult to assess whether an individual worker’s contractual wage equals
the CLA-wage ceiling in the private sector. Therefore, the contractual wage
growth also has to be taken into account in order to assess whether a worker’s
wage is at the ceiling of the wage-scale.
Figure 2.1: Histograms of contractual wages for the basic metal industry and the
state public administration (wage range 2000–2500 euros, bin width 10 euros).
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Notes: vertical lines depict the ceilings of CLA-wage-scales.
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Table 2.3 shows the CLA-sample to be representative of the total popu-
lation of men. The table presents mean, median and standard deviation of
main characteristics for the total population of male workers, as well as for
male workers in the sample of industries for which CLA-data are collected.
Demographic characteristics such as age are similar in both datasets. Poten-
tial experience and tenure are only slightly higher in the CLA-sample. In
the sample, large firms (≥ 500 employees) are slightly overrepresented, at the
expense of small firms. About eighty per cent of the workers operate on a
full-time contract in both datasets. Higher-educated individuals seem to be
slightly underrepresented in the CLA-sample.
The major difference between the full dataset and the CLA-sample con-
cerns the wages.9 Contractual wages are about 16 percent lower in the CLA-
dataset compared to the full dataset, while median wages are 12 percent lower.
The average additional wage is also significantly lower in the CLA-sample.
This is mainly caused by differences in the upper part of the distribution,
since the median is fairly similar. The main reason for the deviations in wages
is that high-paying sectors such as financial services, ICT and professional
services are not included in the CLA-sample.
Table 2.4 focuses on the development of average wages over age ranges.
The first four columns, displaying the average contractual wage by industry,
show a steep increase between ages 23–34 and ages 35–44. In age ranges 35–44
and 45–54, private sector wages on average increase by 7 per cent, compared
to 12 per cent in the public sector. Between the ages of 45–54 and 55–64,
average contractual wages decrease by 5 percent in the private sector, while
on average remaining constant in the public sector. Cohort effects may play
a role here. The second set of four columns in Table 2.4 displays the average
additional wage, which is the sum of the incidental wage and extra salary, over
age ranges. Again, there is a clear but flattening increase up to ages 45–54.
This pattern is much more pronounced in the private than in the public sec-
tor. Between age groups 45–54 and 55–64, average additional wages decrease
by only 2 percent in the private sector and by 11 percent in the public sec-
tor. Demonstrating the opposite of the patterns for contractual wages, which
hardly decrease at older ages in the public sector but do decrease in the private
sector, additional wages typically decrease in the public sector but remain at
the same level in the private sector. The level of additional wages, relative
to that of contractual wages, is higher in the public sector (9 percent for age
group 35–44) than in the private sector (6 percent), probably because a thir-
9In order to prevent that unrealistically low wages or exceptionally high wages influence
the outcomes, real hourly wages below 6 euro’s and above 200 euro’s are excluded from the
data throughout the analysis.
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Table 2.3: Wage system of 22 large sectors of industry, gross monthly wages, 2006
All men (a) CLA-sample (a)
mean p50 sd mean p50 sd
Age 42.3 42.0 10.8 42.4 43.0 11.0
Tenure 8.5 5.6 9.0 8.9 5.8 9.5
Potential experience (b) 25.1 25.0 11.6 25.6 26.0 11.5
Dummy firm size:
- 10-18 employees 0.08 0.27 0.07 0.26
- 20-49 employees 0.12 0.33 0.12 0.32
- 50-99 employees 0.09 0.28 0.09 0.29
- 100-199 employees 0.09 0.28 0.09 0.29
- 200-499 employees 0.11 0.32 0.12 0.33
- ≥ 500 employees 0.39 0.49 0.44 0.50
Dummy reg. contract (c) 0.95 0.21 0.89 0.31
Dummy fulltime contract 0.83 0.38 0.80 0.40
Dummy educational level (d):
- low 0.04 0.20 0.05 0.22
- intermediate 0.12 0.33 0.12 0.33
- high 0.16 0.36 0.10 0.31
Wages (in euros) (e):
- yearly contractual wage 35,026 31,239 23,383 29,256 27,505 15,943
- yearly incidental wage 2,328 273 15,996 1,205 241 6,404
- yearly extra salary 875 0 2,680 812 0 1,867
- contractual wage per month 3,129 2,750 1,889 2,635 2,429 1,276
- gross wage per month 3,030 2,691 2,658 2,612 2,457 1,331
Notes: (a) statistics for ‘all men’ are based on 3,3 million observations, while statistics for
‘CLA-sample’ are based on 1,0 million observations for male workers. (b) potential experience
is defined as age minus years of education, determined using the highest level of education
attained, minus four years that represent the period before entering primary school. Time in
the educational system cannot be less than 12 years because education is compulsory until
age 16. (c) regular contract is defined as no TWA/on-call contract (d) Level of education
is available for approximately one third of the observations in our dataset. (e) Wages are
observed in the month October as we consider this as a relatively representative month, we
do not consider yearly wages as the wage level of many workers changes during the year.
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Table 2.4: Average gross contractual and additional wages per age group, by
collective labour agreement, 2008
Average contractual wage Average additional wage (a)
23–34 35–44 45–54 55–64 23–34 35–44 45–54 55–64
Private sector
Basic metal industry 27,954 35,896 37,938 37,763 1,973 3,084 3,601 3,527
Metal products industry 25,226 32,383 34,518 33,096 1,326 1,939 2,208 2,389
Coachworks industry 23,948 30,544 31,896 29,347 776 1,013 1,107 1,082
Construction installation 25,866 33,758 36,468 35,186 1,286 2,209 2,626 2,537
Repair of (motor) vehicles 23,900 32,016 33,432 29,322 1,163 1,802 1,784 1,489
Retail sale (large stores) 20,506 29,904 32,234 32,957 897 1,364 1,592 2,103
Retail sale (small stores) 19,116 29,615 33,449 28,772 382 825 1,097 1,537
Clothing and footwear 18,985 29,580 33,043 29,072 671 1,573 1,761 1,039
Transport 23,260 26,837 27,152 25,398 995 1,288 1,273 1,153
Hotel and catering 16,646 22,410 22,863 19,323 265 743 762 560
Temp, Empl, Agencies I(b) 12,044 15,734 16,960 17,196 414 528 486 514
Temp, Empl, Agencies II(b) 10,885 13,878 14,644 14,351 283 366 370 371
Cleaning 16,847 20,901 21,361 19,228 349 569 644 531
Public sector (incl, health care)
Social unemployment relief 16,670 18,553 19,587 19,678 615 688 739 744
Public administration:
- municipalities, revised (c) 29,020 35,754 39,318 38,517 2,538 3,168 3,562 3,292
- municipalities, 29,421 35,671 39,618 39,137 2,844 3,231 3,635 3,262
- region 32,106 39,284 43,576 43,110 3,627 4,563 5,028 4,956
- state 30,225 41,470 45,559 47,687 3,200 3,755 3,555 3,031
Police 28,168 37,113 42,980 43,909 4,880 5,381 5,641 5,437
Secondary education 25,312 32,481 39,692 40,923 1,909 2,505 3,154 3,250
Nursing homes for disabled 21,447 27,131 31,956 32,682 ,111 1,473 1,759 1,768
Social work activities 22,217 28,679 32,345 32,260 1,142 1,492 1,685 1,727
Notes: (a) Additional wages refers to the sum of incidental wages (performance-related, not part of the
contract) and extra wages (a regular extra wage component, e.g., a thirteenth month of salary). (b)
Two separate collective labour agreements for temporary work agencies are taken into account. (c) Due
to a reform, there are two different wage-scale systems for municipalities’ public administrations. The
revised system holds for employees who started their jobs in 1996 or later.
34
2.4 Descriptive statistics
teenth month of salary is common in the public sector. Additionally, sectors
that probably have high productivity-related pay, such as financial services,
ICT and professional services, are not included in the CLA-sample. Note that
the descriptive statistics do not take into account all kinds of composition
effects such as level of education.
The first four columns of Table 2.5, presenting the incidence of additional
wages, show that in the public sector, it is common for workers to receive
additional wages, while in the private sector, the incidence varies widely across
sectors of industry. The second set of four columns shows the incidence of
wages exceeding the highest wage-scale ceiling. While wages exceeding the
wage ceiling of the highest scale are rare in the public sector, probably because
wages in the highest wage-scales are high, it is common in the private sector
where the wages in the highest wage-scales are relatively low in some sectors
of industry. Evidently, wage ceilings stipulated in collective agreements do not
serve as a cap on wages in the private sector and probably not all managerial
jobs are included in the system. The incidence increases between ages 23–34
and ages 35–44 and remains constant over older age ranges.
Table 2.6 presents descriptive statistics on the indicators discussed in Sec-
tion 2.3 for the private- and public-sector CLAs as a group (information per
CLA-industry can be found in the Appendix, Table A2.1). Indicator I1 (re-
flecting the proximity of the individual contractual wage to the wage ceiling
of a wage-scale) is higher in the public sector than in the private sector. This
holds especially true for public administration and may be related to the fact
that the contractual wage distribution of public administration tends to be
clustered around scale ceilings. Also, indicator I2 (reflecting the proximity
of contractual wage growth to collectively-agreed wage growth) is on average
higher in the public sector, indicating that the public sector has a larger share
of workers at a scale ceiling than the private sector. Indicator I= (the indicator
of the contractual wage being at the wage ceiling of a wage-scale) combines
both sources of information. Indicator I+ (the indicator of the contractual
wage exceeding the wage ceiling of the highest wage-scale) is on average higher
in the private sector. Table A2.1 shows that in general, indicator I+ is approx-
imately zero in the public sector.10 Since wages above the highest wage-scale
ceiling are very rare in the public sector, we leave out its results regarding I+
in the subsequent tables.
The calculations of the indicators of 2.6 are based on wage regressions
for contractual wages. The regressions are implemented for each CLA-sector
10The secondary education sector is an exception, caused by the fact that we included
wage ceiling for teachers in the dataset, while we are unable to distinguish teachers from
governors. The CLA for secondary education contains multiple wage-scale tables for various
occupations within the sector.
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Table 2.5: Incidence of additional wage and of contractual wages exceeding
collectively agreed wage ceiling, by CLA and age-groups, 2008
Incidence additional wage Incidence wage exceeding
ceiling highest CLA-scale
Age-group: 23–34 35–44 45–54 55–64 23–34 35–44 45–54 55–64
CLA
Private sector
Basic metal industry 0.92 0.89 0.90 0.88 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.01
Metal products industry 0.95 0.94 0.94 0.92 0.06 0.21 0.25 0.25
Coachworks industry 0.94 0.93 0.94 0.90 0.04 0.15 0.16 0.18
Construction install. activ. 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.92 0.06 0.25 0.32 0.32
Repair of (motor) vehicles 0.93 0.92 0.92 0.88 0.05 0.19 0.22 0.20
Retail sale (large stores) 0.77 0.73 0.73 0.74 0.03 0.10 0.14 0.14
Retail sale (small stores) 0.37 0.40 0.38 0.39 0.02 0.10 0.17 0.15
Clothing and footwear 0.60 0.56 0.53 0.51 0.32 0.68 0.72 0.73
Transport 0.86 0.84 0.83 0.80 0.10 0.17 0.16 0.14
Hotel and catering 0.32 0.35 0.34 0.33 0.01 0.05 0.06 0.06
Temp. empl. agencies (a) 0.67 0.68 0.63 0.63 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.07
Temp. empl. agencies (a) 0.71 0.72 0.72 0.7 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.08
Cleaning 0.48 0.51 0.52 0.48 0.30 0.42 0.41 0.41
Public sector (incl. health care)
Social unempl. relief 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Public adm. (munic.) (b) 0.99 1.00 0.99 0.98 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
Public adm. (munic.) (b) 0.96 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Public adm. (region) 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
Public adm. (state) 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01
Police 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
Secondary education 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02
Nursing homes disabled 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02
Social work activities 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Notes: (a) Two separate collective labour agreements for temporary work agencies are taken into
account. (b) Due to a reform, there are two different wage-scale systems for municipalities’ public
administrations. The revised system holds for employees who started their jobs in 1996 or later.
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Table 2.6: Descriptive statistics Indicators (a)
I1 I2
mean sd min max mean sd min max
Private sector 0.81 0.36 0 1 0.38 0.32 0 0.92
Public sector 0.90 0.23 0 1 0.50 0.35 0 0.99
Indicator wage equal to Indicator wage above
scale ceiling (I=) highest ceiling (I+)
mean sd min max mean sd min max
Private sector 0.31 0.32 0 0.92 0.15 0.34 0 1
Public sector 0.44 0.35 0 0.96 0.02 0.09 0 1
Notes: (a) Indicator I1 reflects the proximity of the individual contractual wage to the wage
ceiling of a wage-scale (equation (2.2) in Section 2.3), indicator I2 reflects the proximity of
contractual wage growth to collectively agreed wage growth (equation (2.3) in Section 2.3),
indicator I= is the indicator of the contractual wage being at the wage ceiling of a wage-scale
and combines the information of I1 and I2 (Appendix B). Indicator I+ is the indicator of
the contractual wage exceeding the wage ceiling of the highest wage-scale (Appendix B).
Descriptive statistics for the underlying CLA-sectors are presented in the Appendix, Table
A2.1.
separately to calculate sector-specific variances (see Section 2.3).
Appendix Table A2.2 presents the pooled results for the private and pub-
lic sectors and for four separate CLA-sectors. Similar regressions, but for real
gross hourly wages (instead of contractual wages), are presented in the Ap-
pendix, Table A2.4, in columns (1) and (3). The lower panel of Table A2.4
shows the cumulative effects of potential experience and tenure on the log real
hourly gross wages. The estimation results confirm the results of Zwick (2012)
and Deelen (2012), who found that wages continue increasing with experience
and tenure at older ages. Wages do indeed continue increasing with experi-
ence, although slightly less so than reported in Deelen (2012), which was based
on administrative data for the time period 1999-2005.
2.5 Analysis of the wage cushion
Descriptive statistics show that wage cushions exist in the Dutch private sec-
tor, just like in Portugal (Cardoso and Portugal (2005)) and Germany (Jung
and Schnabel (2011)). The central research question in this study is whether
these wage cushions are more important at older ages and contribute to the
fact that wages continue increasing with experience at older ages. We first
investigate whether older workers are more likely to be at a wage ceiling of a
wage-scale, using indicator I=, or receive a wage above the ceiling of the high-
est wage-scale, using indicator I+, for the private and public sector separately.
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Table 2.7 shows the results of regressions explaining the indicators. In the
private sector, the indicator of being at a wage-scale ceiling increases slightly
with age, whereas in the public sector this indicator increases strongly with
age and continues increasing at higher ages. This is in line with the fact that
the wage-scale system is more extended in the public sector. The effect of
tenure is clearly positive in the public sector, while in the private sector, the
effect of tenure is more modest. The indicator for a wage above the highest
wage ceiling increases strongly with age in the private sector.
Table 2.7: The effects of age and tenure on the indicators describing the position
of contractual wages vis-a`-vis the CLA-wage-scales (a)
Indicator wage equal to Indicator wage above
scale ceiling (I=) highest ceiling (I+)
Private sector Public sector Private sector
Years of age
30 0.08 0.39 0.55
40 0.10 0.48 0.64
50 0.10 0.54 0.68
60 0.10 0.58 0.68
Years of tenure
10 0.04 0.08 0.01
20 0.04 0.12 0.01
30 0.05 0.12 0.01
40 0.08 0.11 0.02
Notes: Indicator I= is the indicator of the contractual wage being at the wage ceiling of a
wage-scale and combines the information of I1 and I2 (Indicator I1 reflects the proximity of
the individual contractual wage to the wage ceiling of a wage-scale, indicator I2 reflects the
proximity of contractual wage growth to collectively agreed wage growth). Indicator I+ is
the indicator of the contractual wage exceeding the wage ceiling of the highest wage-scale.
The effects of age and tenure are obtained from random effects regressions containing age and
age2 and tenure, tenure2, tenure3 and tenure4. Included as control variables are two dummy
variables for the level of education, four year variables, a dummy for fulltime contracts, five
dummies representing the size class of the firm as well as dummies for the CLA sectors of
industry. The underlying regression results for I= and I+ can be found in the Appendix
(Table A2.3). The results of I+ in the public sector are left out since according to Table 2.5
the incidence of wages above the highest wage-scale is very low.
Do workers whose wages are equal to the wage-scale ceiling receive more in
additional wages, as a means to enhance their motivation and productivity? If
so, it could help to explain the fact that wage profiles continue increasing over
age despite the fact that sooner or later, most workers end up at a wage-scale
ceiling. Does the position of wages vis-a`-vis the CLA-wage-scales explain
the share of additional wages (incidental wages plus extra wages) in total
wages (contractual wages plus additional wages)? Regression results in the
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first row of Table 2.8 show a negative effect of the indicator of a wage at
a wage-scale ceiling on the additional wage share, in both the private and
public sectors. Hence, workers receiving a wage at a wage-scale ceiling receive
relatively less in additional wages than workers who have not yet reached a
ceiling. Apparently, additional wages are not used as a means to motivate
workers who find themselves at the ceiling of their wage-scale.
For workers receiving a contractual wage exceeding the highest wage-scale
ceiling, the picture is different. In the private sector, wages exceeding the
highest wage ceiling go hand in hand with extra additional wages, as the
effect of the indicator I+ is significantly positive.
To conclude, for the private sector, the finding that workers with contrac-
tual wages exceeding the highest wage ceiling receive more in additional wages
provides an explanation for a paradox: wage profiles are increasing over time,
while workers reach the end of their wage-scale sooner or later. We find, how-
ever, no indication that additional wages are used to motivate workers who
have a wage equal to the maximum of their wage-scale.
Table 2.9 analyses the effect of the position of wages relative to the wage-
scales on the growth in contractual wages and additional wages. A wage
equal to a wage-scale ceiling implies relatively low contractual wage growth, by
definition (see Eq.(2.3)). The growth in additional wages is lower for workers
who have not yet reached the ceiling. Workers earning wages that exceed the
highest wage-scale ceiling experience a relatively high contractual wage growth.
Beyond the boundaries of the CLA-scale system, not only the level but also the
growth of contractual wages is higher. The growth of their additional wages
is lower, apparently due to the fact that there is less need to use additional
wages if contractual wages can be set freely.
2.6 Sensitivity analysis
Table 2.10 repeats the analysis of Table 2.9 for two different sets of param-
eter values used in the calculation of the indicators I= and I+. The indi-
cators change, as do the estimated coefficients, but the overall picture does
not change: workers earning wages that exceed the highest wage-scale ceiling
experience relatively high contractual wage growth.
What is the effect of wages exceeding the highest wage-scale ceiling on the
age-wage profile? In the Appendix, A2.5, columns (2) and (5) present wage
regressions in which jobs exceeding the highest wage-scale ceiling in any year
are removed from the dataset in all years. The lower panel of A2.5 shows the
cumulative effects of potential experience. Comparing column (2) with column
(1), which refers to the full sample, shows that excluding wages exceeding the
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Table 2.8: Does additional wage depend on the indicators?
Private sector Public sector
Indicator wage equal to scale ceiling (I=) -0.0038 ∗∗∗ -0.0042 ∗∗∗
(0.000153) (0.000142)
Indicator wage above highest ceiling (I+) 0.0073 ∗∗∗
(0.000337)
Observations 1,524,927 1,336,327
Groups 585,358 438,227
R2 within 0.0002 0.1457
R2 overall 0.0738 0.1371
R2 between 0.0912 0.1368
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001. The results are
based on random effects regressions. The dependent variable is the growth in contractual
wages or additional wages. Additional wages refer to the sum of annual incidental wages
(performance-related, not part of the contract) and extra wages (regular, extra wage compo-
nent; e.g., a thirteenth month of salary). Growth in contractual wages is based on the wage
for October and is rescaled to a full-time wage in cases of part-time contracts.
Explanatory variables of interest: Indicator I= is the indicator of the contractual wage being
equal to the wage ceiling of a wage-scale. Indicator I+ is the indicator of the contractual
wage exceeding the wage ceiling of the highest wage-scale.
Control variables: tenure is instrumented with the deviation between tenure, and the indi-
vidual job average of tenure and potential experience is instrumented likewise. Furthermore,
we have taken into account all four-year variables, two dummy variables for the level of
education, a dummy for full-time contracts, five dummies representing the size class of the
firm, as well as 22 dummies for the CLA sectors of industry and a constant. The results
of I+ in the public sector are left out since, according to Table 2.5, the incidence of wages
above the highest wage-scale is very low.
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Table 2.9: Does wage growth depend on the indicators?
Growth in contractual wage Growth in additional wage
Private
sector
Public
sector
Private
sector
Public
sector
Indicator for wage
equal to scale ceiling (I=) -0.0183∗∗∗ -0.0544∗∗∗ -1.465∗∗∗ -0.302∗∗∗
(0.00355) (0.00255) (0.38300) (0.05280)
Indicator for wage
above highest ceiling (I+) 0.390∗∗∗ -1.914∗∗
(0.00823) (0.60500)
Observations 1,524,927 1,336,327 1,267,886 1,305,273
Groups 585,358 438,227 512,370 428,324
R2 within 0.0163 0.0052 0.0018 0.0012
R2 between 0.0012 0.0037 0.0010 0.0006
R2 overall 0.0003 0.0039 0.0008 0.0006
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001. The results are
based on random effects regressions. The dependent variable is the growth in contractual
wages or additional wages. Additional wages refer to the sum of annual incidental wages
(performance-related, not part of the contract) and extra wages (regular, extra wage compo-
nent; e.g., a thirteenth month of salary). Growth in contractual wages is based on the wage
for October and is rescaled to a full-time wage in cases of part-time contracts.
Explanatory variables of interest: Indicator I= is the indicator of the contractual wage being
equal to the wage ceiling of a wage-scale. Indicator I+ is the indicator of the contractual
wage exceeding the wage ceiling of the highest wage-scale.
Control variables: tenure is instrumented with the deviation between tenure, and the indi-
vidual job average of tenure and potential experience is instrumented likewise. Furthermore,
we have taken into account all four-year variables, two dummy variables for the level of
education, a dummy for full-time contracts, five dummies representing the size class of the
firm, as well as 22 dummies for the CLA sectors of industry and a constant. The results
of I+ in the public sector are left out since, according to Table 2.5, the incidence of wages
above the highest wage-scale is very low.
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Table 2.10: Does contractual wage growth depend on the indicators? Sensitivity
analysis with alternative indicators
Private sector CLAs Public sector CLAs
Base case Altern. 1 Altern. 2 Base case Altern. 1 Altern. 2
I= -0.0183∗∗∗ -0.0263∗∗∗ -0.0884∗∗∗ -0.0544∗∗∗ -0.0882∗∗∗ -0.0131∗∗∗
(0.00355) (0.00703) (0.0226) (0.00255) (0.00432) (0.00586)
I+ 0.390∗∗∗ 0.357∗∗∗ 0.468∗∗∗
(0.00823) (0.00785) (0.00987)
#Obs. 1,524,927 1,524,927 1,524,927 1,336,327 1,336,327 1,336,327
#Groups 585,358 585,358 585,358 438,227 438,227 438,227
R2:
-within 0.0163 0.0154 0.0203 0.0052 0.0057 0.0064
-overall 0.0012 0.0012 0.0013 0.0037 0.0036 0.0042
-between 0.0003 0.0003 0.0004 0.0004 0.0036 0.0044
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
Sensitivity analysis regarding different sets of parameter values in the calculation of the
indicators, based on random effects regressions.
Base case: δ=1,0; γ1=0.01; γ2=0.05. The mean of I
= = 0.31 and the of mean I+ = 0.15
Alternative 1: δ=0.5; γ1=0.01; γ2=0.05. The mean of I
= = 0.13 and the of mean I+ = 0.18
Alternative 2: δ=1,0; γ1=0.05; γ2=0.25. The mean of I
= = 0.25 and the of mean I+ = 0.19
For each case we assume h1 = 0.10 and h2 = 0.015.
The dependent variable is the growth in contractual wages or additional wages. Additional
wages refer to the sum of annual incidental wages (performance-related, not part of the con-
tract) and extra wages (regular, extra wage component; e.g., a thirteenth month of salary).
Growth in contractual wages is based on the wage for October and is rescaled to a full-time
wage in cases of part-time contracts.
Explanatory variables of interest: I= is the indicator of the contractual wage being equal to
the wage ceiling of a wage-scale. I+ is the indicator of the contractual wage exceeding the
wage ceiling of the highest wage-scale. Control variables: tenure is instrumented with the
deviation between tenure, and the individual job average of tenure and potential experience is
instrumented likewise. Furthermore, we have taken into account all four-year variables, two
dummy variables for the level of education, a dummy for full-time contracts, five dummies
representing the size class of the firm, as well as 22 dummies for the CLA sectors of industry
and a constant. The results of I+ in the public sector are left out since, according to Table
2.5, the incidence of wages above the highest wage-scale is very low.
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highest wage-scale ceiling clearly reduces the steepness of the wage profile over
potential experience. In other words, the group of workers that is paid above
the highest CLA-wage ceiling pulls up the age-wage profile.
Column (3) of Table A2.4 explores how much self-selection out of work
affects the wage profile. The specification includes an attrition dummy mea-
sured at time t+1, which is also interacted with tenure. The results indicate
that the effects of self-selection out of work on the age-wage profile are small;
the cumulative effects in the lower panel of the table are grosso modo equal
to the effects in column (1). In other words, we find no evidence that self-
selection at time t+1 is an important explanatory variable in the increasing
wage profile over potential experience.
2.7 Conclusions
This study investigates the anatomy of older workers’ wages in order to explain
the fact that in the Netherlands, wage profiles continue increasing at older
ages, despite the fact that most workers end up at a wage-scale ceiling sooner
or later. The central research question is whether the wage cushion, defined
as the difference between actual wages and (maximum) contractual wages as
stipulated in collective labour agreements, contributes to the fact that wages
continue increasing at older ages. This wage cushion consists of two parts:
the first comprises additional wages paid above the contractual wage, and the
second consists of the degree to which contractual wages exceed the highest
wage-scale ceiling, as stipulated in the collective labour agreement.
In the public sector, we find no evidence of a wage cushion leading to wages
that continue to increase at older ages. wage-scale ceilings stipulated in collec-
tive agreements turn out to be guiding for older workers’ wages, whereby the
public wage-scale system also includes all types of managerial jobs. Workers
earning a contractual wage equal to a wage-scale ceiling are not compensated
with higher additional wages. Moreover, workers receiving a wage at a wage-
scale ceiling receive even less in additional wages than workers who have not
yet reached a wage ceiling. Apparently, additional wages are not used to
motivate workers who find themselves at the ceiling of their wage-scales.
In the private sector, we do find evidence of a wage cushion leading to
wages that continue to increase at older ages. In contrast to the public sector,
the wage-scale systems in the private sector do not seem to include all types of
higher and better paid (managerial) jobs. So wage-scale ceilings are not restric-
tive, as many workers receive a contractual wage exceeding the highest wage-
scale ceiling. The likelihood of earning such a contractual wage increases with
age. Furthermore, workers earning such a contractual wage receive more in
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additional wages and experience higher contractual wage growth. The growth
of their additional wages is, however, low compared to other workers, possibly
due to the fact that there is less of a need to use additional wages if contractual
wages can be set freely. As a result, in the private sector, the wage cushion
enhances wage differentiation, and wages higher than the highest wage-scale
ceiling contribute to the steepness of the age-wage profile. The result leads
to the natural question on why the private sector has wage-scales with wage
ceilings, but we consider this question beyond the scope of the paper and a
possible topic for future research on labour-market institutions.
In order to draw policy conclusions from our finding that a wage cushion
exists in the Dutch private sector, one should know more about the reasons
behind it. The fact that wages continue increasing at older ages may be
related to firm-specific human capital. Since empirical evidence suggests that
productivity at best remains stable at older ages (Bo¨rsch-Supan and Weiss
(2011) and Van Ours and Stoeldraijer (2011)), firm-specific human capital
that continues increasing at older ages is not a likely explanation. However,
firm investments in firm-specific human capital may go hand in hand with
deferred compensation schemes in order to tie employees to their firms. In
these cases, wages that continue increasing at older ages may be the result of
optimal firm behaviour. Wages that continue increasing at older ages may,
however, also be the result of the strong bargaining positions of older workers
(Euwals et al. (2009)). This may lead to a wage-productivity gap at older
ages, negatively affecting job mobility by older workers.
Although we cannot tell what exactly causes wages to continue increasing
at older ages, our empirical evidence at least suggests that collective wage
bargaining and the collective wage-scale systems cannot be a major cause.
Wages that continue increasing at older ages in the private sector are the re-
sult of a wage cushion—especially that portion of wages that is on top of the
collectively-agreed (maximum) wages. Our results indicate that wage differ-
entiation is greater than that suggested by the uniform wage-setting system
that prevails in the Netherlands, due to the fact that collective labour agree-
ments usually extend to all workers in a sector of industry. So, at least for the
wages of older workers, this may serve as a counterargument to the plea for
more decentralized wage-setting institutions. Wage cushions seem to allow for
wage differentiation between and within age groups, but it remains unsettled
to what degree this wage differentiation allows for heterogeneity across sectors
of industry and/or firms. Future research on linked employer-employee data
should therefore address to which extent heterogeneity of wages and total wage
costs reflects differences in productivity across sectors of industry and firms.
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Appendix A: Collection and merging of wage system information
To investigate the impact of the wage systems on wages, and in particular
the impact of wage ceilings on wages of older workers, we collected the wage
system information of twenty-two Dutch sectors of industry. The twenty-two
sectors are chosen on the basis of their size, in number of workers covered
by a collective agreement, to guarantee a large number of observations in the
empirical analysis. The wage system information is stipulated in the collective
labour agreements. We extract the information from a database of collective
labour agreements from the Dutch Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment.
We extract information on the code of the collective labour agreement, the
SBI1993 and SBI2008 codes, the starting and final dates of the agreement, the
hours of a full-time working week, the number of wage-scales and, for each
wage-scale, the wage floor, the wage ceiling and the number of spinal points.
The wage system information is merged with administrative employment
and income data for all Dutch citizens. The two data sources are merged on
the basis of the collective agreement code.
Appendix B: Calculation of the indicators
We assume a worker receives a contractual wage Wit equal to the wage ceiling
Wmaxj of wage-scale j in cases in which (1) his wage is close to the wage ceiling
of the wage-scale and (2) his real wage growth is close to zero. To calculate
the joint probability of both conditions, one needs to take into account the
fact that the error terms are correlated. Section 3 defines the probability of
the two events separately; the joint probability is defined as follows:
I=it = P
((
Wit−Wmaxj
Wit−Wit−1
)
−
(
δh1
2δh2
)
<
(
Tit
Uit
)
≤
(
Wit−Wmaxj
Wit−Wit−1
)
+
(
δh1
2δh2
))
with
(
Tit
Uit
)
=
(
it+i
it−it−1
)
∼ N
((
0
0
)
,
( (
γ1σ
2
ω1+γ2σ
2
ω2
)
γ2σ
2
ω2
γ2σ
2
ω2 2γ2σ
2
ω2
))
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I+it is calculated as:
I+it = P
(
W ∗it > W
max
j
)
= P
(
Tit ≤
(
Wit−Wmaxj
)−δh1)
with Tit = i+it ∼ N
(
0,
(
γ1σ
2
ω1+γ2σ
2
ω2
))
Appendix C: Additional statistics and regressions
See Tables A2.1, A2.2, A2.3, A2.4 and A2.5
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Table A2.1: Descriptive statistics of indicators I1 and I2
I1 I2
CLA mean sd min max mean sd min max
Private sector
Basic metal industry 0.74 0.41 0 1 0.38 0.31 0 0.79
Metal products industry 0.85 0.33 0 1 0.39 0.32 0 0.83
Coachworks industry 0.89 0.29 0 1 0.45 0.37 0 0.92
Construction install. act. 0.84 0.34 0 1 0.38 0.33 0 0.83
Repair of (motor) vehicles 0.86 0.33 0 1 0.45 0.34 0 0.86
Retail sale (large stores) 0.74 0.23 0 0.87 0.40 0.34 0 0.81
Retail sale (small stores) 0.91 0.23 0 1 0.61 0.37 0 0.92
Clothing and footwear 0.61 0.45 0 1 0.32 0.28 0 0.72
Transport 0.86 0.32 0 1 0.34 0.27 0 0.66
Hotel and catering 0.87 0.29 0 1 0.38 0.33 0 0.83
Temp. employment agencies 0.66 0.43 0 1 0.31 0.29 0 0.71
Temp. employment agencies 0.65 0.35 0 0.90 0.31 0.28 0 0.70
Cleaning 0.73 0.41 0 1 0.34 0.33 0 0.77
Public sector (incl. health care)
Social unempl. relief 0.33 0.03 0 0.34 0.40 0.42 0 0.99
Public administration (munic.) 0.98 0.12 0 1 0.51 0.34 0 0.88
Public administration (munic.) 0.97 0.06 0 1 0.64 0.31 0 0.87
Public administration (region) 0.97 0.10 0 1 0.63 0.37 0 0.96
Public administration (state) 0.97 0.08 0 1 0.56 0.35 0 0.91
Police 0.94 0.16 0 0.99 0.31 0.16 0 0.48
Secondary education 0.97 0.07 0 1 0.33 0.37 0 0.92
Nursing homes disabled 0.96 0.13 0 1 0.49 0.37 0 0.92
Social work activities 0.81 0.36 0 1 0.49 0.36 0 0.93
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001. Based on random
effects regressions, with tenure instrumented with the deviation between tenure and the in-
dividual job average of tenure, and potential experience is instrumented likewise. Dependent
variables: Indicator I1 reflects the proximity of the individual contractual wage to the wage
ceiling of a wage-scale (equation (2.2) in Section 2.3), indicator I2 reflects the proximity of
contractual wage growth to collectively agreed wage growth (equation (2.3) in Section 2.3).
Control variables taken into account are two dummy variables for the level of education,
three time dummies (we use the transformation proposed by Deaton and Paxson (1994),
where all time effects add up to zero: due to these transformations, there are no real time
effects), cohort dummies (year of birth 1946-1950, 1981-1985, and 1986-1987), a dummy for
full-time contracts, five dummies representing the size class of the firm as well as 22 dummies
(not presented) for the CLA sectors of industry and a constant. For the base case we assume
the sensitivity parameters δ = 1, γ1 = 0.01 and γ2 = 0.05. For each CLA-sector we assume
h1 = 0.10 and h2 = 0.015.
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Table A2.2: Descriptive statistics of the indicators I= and I+
I= I+
CLA mean sd min max mean sd min max
Private sector
Basic metal industry 0.28 0.31 0 0.79 0.25 0.42 0 1
Metal products industry 0.33 0.32 0 0.83 0.13 0.33 0 1
Coachworks industry 0.40 0.37 0 0.92 0.08 0.27 0 1
Construction install. act. 0.32 0.33 0 0.82 0.14 0.34 0 1
Repair of (motor) vehicles 0.38 0.35 0 0.85 0.11 0.31 0 1
Retail sale (large stores) 0.30 0.28 0 0.71 0.07 0.25 0 1
Retail sale (small stores) 0.56 0.33 0 0.92 0.03 0.17 0 1
Clothing and footwear 0.18 0.27 0 0.72 0.37 0.46 0 1
Transport 0.29 0.24 0 0.66 0.1 0.29 0 1
Hotel and catering 0.34 0.31 0 0.83 0.03 0.16 0 1
Temp. employment agencies 0.21 0.14 0 0.71 0.04 0.19 0 1
Temp. employment agencies 0.22 0.35 0 0.63 0.08 0.25 0 1
Cleaning 0.26 0.31 0 0.77 0.23 0.40 0 1
Public sector (incl. health care)
Social unempl. relief 0.13 0.14 0 0.33 0.02 0.09 0 1
Public administration (munic.) 0.49 0.35 0 0.88 0.00 0.04 0 1
Public administration (munic.) 0.63 0.31 0 0.87 0.00 0.04 0 1
Public administration (region) 0.61 0.36 0 0.96 0.00 0.03 0 1
Public administration (state) 0.55 0.35 0 0.91 0.00 0.06 0 1
Police 0.24 0.19 0 0.48 0.01 0.10 0 1
Secondary education 0.32 0.36 0 0.92 0.07 0.04 0 1
Nursing homes disabled 0.48 0.37 0 0.92 0.01 0.08 0 1
Social work activities 0.41 0.37 0 0.92 0.00 0.03 0 1
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001. Results for
random effects regressions, with tenure instrumented with the deviation between tenure
and the individual job average of tenure, and potential experience is instrumented likewise.
Dependent variables: I= is the indicator of the contractual wage being equal to the wage
ceiling of a wage-scale (combining the information of I1 and I2). I+ is the indicator of the
contractual wage exceeding the wage ceiling of the highest wage-scale. Control variables
taken into account are two dummy variables for the level of education, three time dummies
(we use the transformation proposed by Deaton and Paxson (1994), where all time effects
add up to zero: due to these transformations, there are no real time effects), cohort dummies
(year of birth 1946-1950, 1981-1985, and 1986-1987), a dummy for full-time contracts, five
dummies representing the size class of the firm as well as 22 dummies (not presented) for
the CLA sectors of industry and a constant. For the base case we assume the sensitivity
parameters δ = 1, γ1 = 0.01 and γ2 = 0.05. For each CLA-sector we assume h1 = 0.10 and
h2 = 0.015.
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2.7 Appendix C
Table A2.4: Regressions explaining the indicators
Private sector Public sector Private sector
I= I= I+
Tenure 0.00799∗∗∗ 0.0129∗∗∗ 0.0000690
(0.000401) (0.000449) (0.000217)
Tenure2 -0.0578∗∗∗ -0.0547∗∗∗ 0.0104∗∗∗
(0.00454) (0.00479) (0.00275)
Tenure3 0.0176∗∗∗ 0.0119∗∗∗ -0.00496∗∗∗
(0.00183) (0.00182) (0.00120)
Tenure4 -0.00174∗∗∗ -0.00112∗∗∗ 0.000639∗∗∗
(0.000236) (0.000225) (0.000162)
Age 0.00395∗∗∗ 0.0162∗∗∗ 0.0252∗∗∗
(0.000255) (0.000304) (0.000203)
Age2 -0.0000383∗∗∗ -0.000108∗∗∗ -0.000232∗∗∗
(0.00000295) (0.00000338) (0.00000240)
Dummy interm. level of education -0.0234∗∗∗ -0.00451∗∗∗ 0.0374∗∗∗
(0.00103) (0.00110) (0.000899)
Dummy high level of seducation -0.123∗∗∗ -0.0109∗∗∗ 0.252∗∗∗
(0.00132) (0.000886) (0.00124)
Observations 1,524,927 1,336,327 2,380,953
Groups 585,358 438,227 860,736
R2 within .005 .033 .021
R2 overall .046 .204 .119
R2 between .062 .305 .126
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses ; * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001. Indicator I=
is the indicator of the contractual wages being at the wage ceiling of a wage-scale and
combines the information of I1 and I2 (Indicator I1 reflecting the proximity of the individual
contractual wage to the wage ceiling of a wage-scale, indicator I2 reflecting the proximity of
contractual wage growth to collectively-agreed wage growth). Indicator I+ is the indicator
of the contractual wages exceeding the wage ceiling of the highest wage-scale. The effects
of age and tenure are obtained from random effects regressions containing age and age2 and
tenure, tenure2, tenure3 and tenure4. Included are dummy variables for intermediate level of
education and high level of education. Included as control variables are four year variables,
a dummy for full-time contracts, five dummies representing the size class of the firm, as well
as dummies for the CLA sectors of industry. The cumulative effects of age and tenure on
the indicators, according to the estimated coefficients, can be found in Table 2.7.
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Chapter 3
Labour Market Effects of Job
Displacement for Prime-Age and
Older Workers1
3.1 Introduction
Displacement may pile the burden of economic adjustments on an unfortunate
minority of workers. Especially for older workers finding new employment after
displacement appears to be a challenge. The labour market position of older
displaced workers is of specific interest due to the ageing population and the
ensuing policy targets to keep older workers in the work force. This paper
investigates to what extent the impact of firm bankruptcy differs between
older and prime-age workers and studies how long tenure in the previous job,
finding work in a different industry than the one from which they lost their
previous job and the local labour market conditions in the industry from which
workers are displaced correlate with these differences.
There are several reasons for a stronger displacement effect among older
workers. On the demand side, older workers may be less attractive to new
employers due to a relatively high wage costs-to-productivity ratio for older
workers. This higher ratio may be the result of deferred compensation schemes
(Lazear, 1981; Daniel and Heywood, 2007; Heywood et al., 2010), and of
1This chapter is joint work with Marloes de Graaf-Zijl and Wiljan van den Berge; an
earlier version of this study has been published as CPB Discussion Paper No.285 (2014).
We thank Anna Salomons, Daniel van Vuuren, Bas ter Weel, seminar participants at the
European Society for Population Economics 2014 conference (Braga, Portugal), participants
at the Utrecht School of Economics seminar (March 2014) and seminar participants at the
”Labour Market for OlderWorkers: Mechanisms and Institutions” conference at the Dutch
Ministry of Social Affairs in 2014 for their helpful comments.
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a strong bargaining position of well-protected older workers that are well-
represented by labour unions who negotiate costly special provisions for older
workers in collective bargaining schemes (De Hek and Van Vuuren, 2011). On
the supply side, older workers generally have higher reservation wages due to
longer benefit entitlements (Van Ours and Vodopivec, 2006) or better options
to retire from the labour market (Ichino et al., 2013), sometimes with generous
early retirement schemes. In addition, many older workers embody substantial
firm-specific human capital, which is forgone when they are displaced (Poletaev
and Robinson, 2008), sector-specific capital which is lost upon displacement if
the worker cannot find new employment in the same sector (Carrington, 1993;
Neal, 1995), or task specific human capital (Gibbons and Waldman, 2004)
that is lost if a worker needs to change occupation. Many older workers end
up in shrinking occupations (Autor and Dorn, 2009; ?), which increases the
probability that they will need to find a new job in another occupation.
Earlier research has established a substantial and persistent effect of dis-
placement on labour-market success. Especially in the U.S., researchers have
been interested in this phenomenon for decades.2 They have shown a severe
and permanent drop in earnings after displacement. The European litera-
ture on displacement is more recent and focuses more on the incidence of
(un)employment instead of just on earnings or wages.3 In general, the U.S.
literature has found that losses are primarily caused by lower wages in post-
displacement jobs, whereas evidence from many European countries finds al-
most no wage losses for those who re-enter employment, but find significantly
lower employment probabilities instead (Hijzen et al., 2010). Differences be-
tween age groups are found in both the U.S. and in Europe4. Some studies
explore the relation between labour-market success after displacement and
long tenure in the previous job (Hijzen et al. (2010), Kuhn (2002)) or chang-
ing industry (Burda and Mertens (2001), Huttunen et al. (2011)), but they do
not analyse how these correlations differ between age groups.
Our study adds a new perspective to the literature by analysing three fac-
tors that vary within and between age groups: job tenure, working in weak
labour markets and switching industries. Using the difference-in-difference
techniques that have been the standard in the literature since the seminal work
2See e.g. Hamermesh (1989) and Fallick (1996) for overviews. Jacobsen et al. (1993) were
the first to use a comparison with non-displaced workers. Most recently several studies by
Kenneth Couch add to the US-literature on displaced workers (Couch and Placzek, 2010;
Couch et al., 2011).
3Important examples of European studies are Burda and Mertens (2001), Kuhn (2002),
Dustmann and Meghir (2005), Hijzen et al. (2010), Tatsiramos (2010), Huttunen et al. (2011)
and OECD (2013).
4E.g. Topel (1990) , Farber (1993), Farber (1997), Couch (1998), Jacobsen et al. (1993),
Eliason and Storrie (2006), Couch and Placzek (2010), OECD (2013), Ichino et al. (2013)
58
3.1 Introduction
of Jacobsen et al. (1993), we determine the effect of firm bankruptcies on em-
ployment participation and wages of the workers involved. We improve on this
method by estimating heterogeneous treatment effects within this difference-
in-difference approach, which allows us to determine to what extent differences
within age groups exist and analyse how these differences vary between age
groups.
Our strategy is to apply a difference-in-difference approach combined with
exact matching. We use extensive administrative linked employer-employee
data for the Netherlands that include all workers, in combination with data
on firm bankruptcies that are drawn from an administrative source as well. We
take a sample of workers who were displaced due to firm bankruptcies in the
period 2000 – 2009 and follow them up to 2011. The size of our dataset allows
us to construct a control group of non-displaced workers using exact matching
techniques, following Ichino et al. (2013). In doing so, we reduce the potential
bias that might result from the selection of the controls (Hijzen et al., 2010;
Huttunen et al., 2011), since the treated and controls have the exact same
observable characteristics. In total we have nearly 45,000 treated and 158,000
controls in the age-group 35-54 years old. We test for heterogeneous treatment
effects by expanding the standard difference-in-difference specification.
Our results indicate that the labour-market outcomes after displacement
are highly contingent on age, especially in terms of employment probabili-
ties. Within the older age group the outcomes are related to job tenure in
the former job, the local labour-market situation in the sector from which
people are displaced and whether people find work in another sector. For
prime-age workers tenure in the job before displacement makes less of a dif-
ference for their outcomes after displacement than it does for older workers.
Likewise, older displaced workers are more sensitive to the situation in the
local labour market in the industry from which they are displaced and expe-
rience stronger negative effects of changing industries after displacement on
their post-displacement wages, probably due to industry-specific human capi-
tal that is lost upon displacement. These results suggest that job and sector
specific factors are important for understanding the more vulnerable position
of older workers after job loss.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 shows how we constructed
the data from various administrative data sources, displays descriptive graphs
and presents our empirical strategy. Section 3.3 discusses the results of our
analyses and section 3.4 presents sensitivity analyses. Section 3.5 concludes.
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3.2 Data and empirical strategy
3.2.1 Data
This paper uses administrative linked employer-employee data in which all
jobs of all Dutch citizens can be followed over time from 1999 until 2011. This
so-called Social Statistical File (SSB) includes information on the exact start
and end date of jobs and the wages earned in those jobs. We merged these
data with information on personal characteristics from municipal registrations
(GBA) and data on jobs involved in firm bankruptcies in the period 2000–2009.
From these data we formed a treatment group of workers who were involved in
firm bankruptcies at some point in time between 2000 and 2009, and a control
group of workers who were not displaced due to firm bankruptcies within the
first 12 months after the displacement date of the worker they are matched to.
Sections 2.2 and 2.3 provide more information about the selection of treatment
and control group.
Employment is defined as having positive wage information, or positive
income from self-employment, in our monthly earnings records. This implies
that the individual worked at least one hour in the private or public sector,
or as a self-employed worker, in that month. We do not distinguish between
employment as dependent employee or as self-employed worker. Nor do we
distinguish between unemployment and inactivity, because we do not have
information about the individual’s job search behaviour.
The data contain yearly information on the wages earned in a specific job.
From this information we constructed monthly real gross wages by combining
the yearly wage information with the start and and date of the job. Many
earlier studies used quarterly earnings that were sensitive to the number of
weeks that a person worked during that quarter. Finding new employment
during a quarter impacted earnings in those studies, and the displaced group
was impacted by this more than the control group of non-displaced workers,
inducing a bias. According to Topel (1990) virtually all of the short-run re-
covery of annual earnings is due to an increase in weeks worked, rather than
to increases in weekly earnings. In this paper we disentangle the employment
probability from the wages earned. In order to do so, we use monthly wages,
corrected for the number of days that a person actually worked in the specific
month. This implies that our wage measure is not sensitive to people find-
ing new employment during the month. The wage measure that we actually
use is the monthly real gross wage relative to the wage 13 months before the
displacement, since this presentation facilitates the interpretation of the esti-
mation coefficients. We choose the 13th month before displacement because
this is before the common dip in the months leading up to displacement that
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was first established by Jacobsen et al. (1993).
3.2.2 The treatment group
Our treatment group consists of workers between 35 and 54 years of age who
were involved in firm bankruptcies at some point in time between 2000 and
2009. We include all workers who exited the firm during the year their firm
went bankrupt or during the year before.5 The reason for doing so lies in the
potential selectivity bias that may result when workers possess private infor-
mation about an impending displacement (Burda and Mertens, 2001). If the
bankruptcy is anticipated, workers with the best outside options might leave
the ship before it sinks and one may end up with a selective sample of workers.
Therefore, it is common to include all workers who exited the firm up to one
year, and in some studies even two years, before bankruptcy as displaced. Tak-
ing a wider window mitigates the problem of early leavers, but increases the
risk that workers are included who moved for reasons other than firm closure.
Dustmann and Meghir (2005) and Eliason and Storrie (2006) tested the effect
of using a 2 year time window. According to Dustmann and Meghir (2005)
the wider window led to weaker results, but the difference is insignificant,
while Eliason and Storrie find that the wider window led to stronger results.
Our dataset treats all employment separations (both dismissals and employee-
initiated separations) at firms where the court has issued a bankruptcy in year
t or year t+ 1 as displaced.
We do not restrict our sample to long-tenured workers, to workers in large
firms, to men or to a certain sector of industry, like some other studies. Instead
we include the broad array of workers who were hit by firm bankruptcies and
estimate the differences between these various groups of workers. The seminal
work of Jacobsen et al. (1993) found strong effects of job displacement that may
to a substantial part be attributed to their focus on long-tenured workers: it
led to more negative results than one would find for the full sample of workers
that were hit by mass layoffs and firm closures (Hijzen et al., 2010). We
therefore include both long and short-tenured workers in our treatment group
and later estimate the differences in the outcomes between both groups. Other
common restrictions on the sample of displaced workers are to exclude workers
from small firms, focus on men or on a certain sector, restrict to prime-age
5Under the Dutch law, a debtor with at least two creditors who has ceased to pay, can
be declared bankrupt under the Bankruptcy Act of 1893. Bankruptcies may be filed at the
request of creditors or of the firm itself and are issued by court. Firm closures not due to
bankruptcies apply almost exclusively to small businesses; among larger businesses almost all
firm closures are due to bankruptcies. Unlike other collective dismissals, workers involved in
a bankruptcy usually receive no compensation such as severance payments or outplacement
services.
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workers (e.g. 20 – 49 is a common restriction). Our sample includes men
and women from all industries and all ages,6 and focuses on the differences
between age groups. We choose to exclude workers older than 55 to be certain
that our results for the old-age group are not impacted by early retirement
or other ways to leave the labour market.7 An alternative retirement channel
for older workers is inflow into disability insurance. However, the inflow into
disability insurance has plummeted in recent decades due to policy reforms.8.
Finally, we exclude workers younger than 35 because they typically include
a large share of people who are still in education and are employed in small
part-time jobs on the side.9
3.2.3 The control group
Our control group was taken from the same dataset as the treatment group.
To create our potential control group, we selected workers who were in work
during the entire month in which the bankruptcy occurred in which a person
from the treatment group was involved. Our control group was not restricted
to the people who remained employed in the months after the treated were
displaced. Hijzen et al. (2010) and Huttunen et al. (2011) have shown that such
a restriction on the control group leads to an upward bias in the results. The
only restrictions that we used when we created our potential control group is
that they were in employment the entire month during which a treated person
was displaced, and that controls are not displaced due to firm bankruptcies
within the first 12 months after the displacement date of the worker they are
matched to.10 Besides this restriction, both displaced and controls are subject
to the same labour-market risks, such as dismissals on individual grounds,
mass layoffs and future firm closures, voluntary quits or job mobility.
Following Ichino et al. (2013), we apply a procedure of exact matching
to find matches for the displaced workers with exactly the same observed
characteristics.11 Matching variables are age in years, sex, industry, education
6The only restriction is the fact that someone was employed the entire year before dis-
placement and the availability of all demographic information.
7In 2006 – 2009 only 1.2 percent of workers aged 50 – 54 was retired (age 55 – 59: 6.2%,
age 60 – 64: 34.5%) (http://statline.cbs.nl)
8The inflow of workers aged 45 – 54 in disability arrangements has come down from 33,200
persons in 2000 to 19,000 in 2004 and 10,100 in 2006 (www.uwv.nl)
9Moreover, unlike collective dismissals, where workers often receive compensation in the
form of a social plan, workers involved in a bankruptcy usually receive no compensation such
as (age and tenure-dependent) severance payments or outplacement services that might bias
our results (Van den Berge, 2016).
10Due to the large number of potential controls relative to the number of treated, this
restriction should not affect our estimates.
11Eliason and Storrie (2006); Hijzen et al. (2010) and Couch and Placzek (2010) use
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level, working hours, region and tenure class.12 For each displaced worker,
a maximum of 5 exactly matching controls was drawn from the data. In
principle, a control person can serve as control for more than one displaced
person, but given the large number of potential controls relative to the number
of treated, the probability that one person appears more than once as a control
are very small.
3.2.4 Descriptive statistics
Table 3.1 presents descriptive statistics of the pre- and post-matching samples
of the treated and controls for the year 2005. Out of nearly 5,000 workers
aged 35 to 54 displaced in 2005 we have been able to find one or more exactly
matching controls for almost 2,000 ’treated’ workers. For these 2,000 workers
that were involved in a firm bankruptcy, a control group of more than 7,000
non-displaced workers was drawn from the entire population of nearly 5.5
million.13 In total for all years we observe displaced workers due to firm
bankruptcies we have 44,688 observations of matched treated and 158,034
observations of matched controls between 35 and 54 years of age, leaving us
with an average of 3.5 controls per treated.
Before the matching procedure the potential control group differed markedly
from the treatment group in terms of age, sex, sector of industry and other
characteristics. After the matching procedure these differences have vanished
to a large extent. The sample of post-matching controls (column 4) resem-
bles the sample of post-matching treated in terms of age, job positions and
sectors of industry. For example, 17% of the matched treated and controls
originate from the financial sector, while only 4% of the pre-matching controls
works in the financial sector. Moreover, 25% of the matched treated and 22%
of the matched controls are female, while 43% of the pre-matching controls
are female. Regarding region of residence there is no selection before or after
matching (not in table).
Note that, although we applied exact matching, the shares of the matched
propensity score matching to determine the effects of job displacement.
12Education is measured in three levels: low (up to primary education), middle (up to
upper secondary education) and high (up to tertiary education). Working hours are measured
in three groups: 0 to 18 hours, 18 to 36 hours and 36 hours or more. For region of residence
we take the twelve Dutch provinces. We matched exact on those with 1–5 years of tenure,
and for those with longer tenures we matched on classes of 5 years until 30 years. Everyone
with more than 30 years of tenure was included in one class.
13Since we only observe education for about two thirds of our sample and to test the
sensitivity of our matching procedure, we have also applied the same procedure without
education and using wages as a proxy for education. Apart from leaving us with a larger
sample, the three matching procedures produce similar results.
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Table 3.1: Summary statistics
Pre-matching Post-matching
Treated Controls Treated Controls
Monthly wage (euros) 2,810.93 2,875.00 3,022.49 3,321.86
(std. dev.) 1,765.14 2,426.86 1,599.87 2,316.04
Tenure (years) 6.45 7.77 10.35 10.64
(std. dev.) 6.45 7.20 6.17 5.65
Age 42.84 43.01 43.05 42.96
(std. dev.) 5.74 5.68 5.85 5.85
Education
Low .12 .06 .09 .07
Middle .68 .57 .70 .72
High .20 .37 .21 .21
Female .31 .43 .25 .22
Part-time .30 .43 .20 .18
Permanent contract .96 .96 .99 .99
Position
Director and major shareholder .02 .02 .03 .03
Temporary agency worker .03 .03 .00 .00
On-call employee .01 .02 .00 .00
Other .94 .92 .97 .97
Sector of industry
Manufacturing .25 .13 .31 .31
Wholesale and retail trade .13 .10 .10 .10
Transport and storage .07 .05 .05 .04
Accommodation and food serving .01 .01 .00 .00
Information and communication .00 .01 .00 .00
Financial institutions .12 .04 .17 .17
Consultancy, research .14 .12 .11 .11
Renting and leasing of tangible
goods
.05 .06 .01 .01
Public administration .00 .09 .00 .00
Education .00 .09 .00 .00
Health and social activities .04 .17 .04 .04
Culture, sport and recreation .01 .01 .00 .00
Other services .02 .01 .02 .01
Other .16 .11 .19 .21
Observations 4,509 13,657,011 1,963 7,144
Notes: The summary statistics refer to 2005. The table only only includes workers between
35 and 54 years of age.
Source: Own calculations using registration data from Statistics Netherlands on displaced
workers.
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treated and the matched controls are close but not always exactly the same.
The shares may diverge because not all sub groups (male vs. female; part-
time vs. full-time, etc.) have the same number of controls. For example,
in the case of sex the divergence is caused by the fact that treated males
are on average matched to more controls than treated females are. We did
not match on wages, and this shows in a divergence between post-matching
treated and controls. The previously mentioned effect may play a role here as
well: the relatively high wages have more controls than low wages. Difference
in the absolute wage levels between treated and controls should not affect
our estimates, since our outcome variable is the wage relative to the wage 13
months before displacement.
Descriptive statistics in Figure 3.1 indicate that the employment proba-
bilities after firm bankruptcies are clearly lower for older workers than for
younger workers. The upper panel of Figure 3.1 shows the change in the em-
ployment probabilities (in percentage points) over the period from 36 months
before up to 72 months after the bankruptcy, relative to 13 months before
the bankruptcy, for treated and controls in the two age groups. The employ-
ment probability in the period between 13 months before displacement up to
displacement is 1 by definition, since we require that workers were employed
the entire year up to displacement. Directly after firm bankruptcy, employ-
ment probabilities plummet by about 51 respectively 57 percentage points for
prime-age and older displaced workers. This means that close to half of those
workers who lost their job in a bankruptcy were able to make a job-to-job tran-
sition. After the recovery period, the probability to be in employment remains
about 22 percentage points below that prior to the bankruptcy for prime-age
workers and about 27 percentage points for older workers. Although the older
control group reduces its employment rate more strongly, the relatively large
gap between the employment rate of the displaced and controls is persistent.
The lower panel of Figure 3.1 shows the change (in percentage points) in
the average wage over the period from 36 months before up to 72 months
after firm bankruptcy, relative to the wage 13 months before displacement,
for treated and controls in the two age groups. Wage profiles of controls are
clearly steeper for prime-age workers than for older workers. In line with many
other studies, we observe a wage dip before displacement.14 The wage dip
before displacement amounts to about 1 respectively 4 percentage points for
14Most other studies in the large literature regarding the earnings effects of job displace-
ment have established the sharp drop in earnings prior to job loss, that was first exhibited
by Jacobsen et al. (1993). Studies that do not find a dip in the wages before displacement
are Couch (2001), Lengermann and Vilhuber (2002) and Schoeni and Dardia (2003). Some
others (Couch and Placzek (2010) and Hildreth et al. (2007)) find upward spikes in earnings
in the year prior to separation.
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Figure 3.1: Descriptive statistics for displaced workers and controls, by age group
(month 0 = displacement).
−
.
6
−
.
5
−
.
4
−
.
3
−
.
2
−
1
0
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 p
oi
nt
 c
ha
ng
e
−36 −18 0 18 36 54 72
month
Employment, age 35−44
−
.
6
−
.
5
−
.
4
−
.
3
−
.
2
−
.
1
0
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 p
oi
nt
 c
ha
ng
e
−36 −18 0 18 36 54 72
month
Employment, age 45−54
−
.
05
0
.
05
.
10
0.
15
.
20
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 p
oi
nt
 c
ha
ng
e
−36 −18 0 18 36 54 72
month
Wages, age 35−44
−
.
05
0
.
05
.
10
.
15
.
20
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 p
oi
nt
 c
ha
ng
e
−36 −18 0 18 36 54 72
month
Wages, age 45−54
Treated Control
Source: Own calculations based on registration data from Statistics Netherlands.
Notes: The x-axis shows the time since displacement (0 = displacement). The y-axis shows
the percentage point change relative to the employment probability or wage 13 months before
displacement.
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prime-age and older displaced workers. After displacement, wages of those in
employment clearly recover over the course of the first year. For older workers
a relatively large wage gap between displaced and control group results, which
remains persistent in the longer run.
3.2.5 Empirical strategy
We use the difference-in-difference techniques that have been the standard in
the literature since the seminal work of Jacobsen et al. (1993). We follow
the recent literature and apply diff-in-diff estimates to the matched sample
(e.g. Eliason and Storrie (2006); Hijzen et al. (2010); Couch and Placzek
(2010); Ichino et al. (2013)). This allows us to estimate the causal effect of
job displacement.15 While displacement due to firm bankruptcies is probably
the most exogenous type of dismissal, we cannot exclude selection bias. Firms
experiencing bankruptcies may differ from surviving firms, not only in firm
characteristics but also in terms of employee characteristics. If confounding
factors indeed influence both the probability to receive treatment and the
potential outcomes of the treated, the estimated treatment effect is biased.
By combining difference-in-difference techniques with matching we reduce the
bias in the estimated treatment effect by assuring that treated and controls
have the same distributions of observable factors. The size of our dataset
allows us to apply exact matching.
We start with a specification that follows Ichino et al. (2013) and focuses on
two age groups of old versus prime-age workers. The basic model specification
is:
Yi,t =
d=6∑
d=−2
αdZiTiD
d
i,t+
d=6∑
d=−2
βdTiD
d
i,t+
d=6∑
d=−2
γdZiD
d
i,t+
d=6∑
d=−2
δdD
d
i,t+ηi+θt+i,t
(3.1)
where Yi,t is the outcome of interest (employment status or wage), i is the
individual worker, t is time measured in months, Zi is an indicator taking
value 1 if a worker is aged 45 - 54 and 0 if a workers is aged 35 - 44, Ti is a
dummy taking 1 if the worker is displaced due to firm bankruptcy and Ddi,t
is a dummy taking 1 for the record in which worker i is observed at d years
distance from (d=0), which is the (actual or fictional) date of displacement.
ηi is the unobserved individual fixed effect, θt captures calendar time effects
(flexibly specified as a set of dummy variables for each calendar year) and i,t
is the individual and time-specific error term. We include 8 year dummies to
15Eichler and Lechner (2002); Origo (2009), referring to techniques developed in Heckman
et al. (1997), give a good overview of the issues involved.
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flexibly estimate how the treatment effect evolves over time. Our base period
is two years before the actual or fictional date of displacement.
To aid the interpretation, we present results as expected values of Yi,t for
a given worker. For example, if we want to know the effect of displacement
for older workers compared to prime-age workers, we calculate the following
expected value (suppressing conditioning on the fixed effects and time trend):
(E(Yi,t|Zi = 1, Ti = 1, Ddi,t = 1)− E(Yi,t|Zi = 1, Ti = 0, Ddi,t = 1))−
(E(Yi,t|Zi = 0, Ti = 1, Ddi,t = 1)− E(Yi,t|Zi = 0, Ti = 0, Ddi,t = 1))
This is equal to:
((δd + γd + βd + αd)− (δd + γd))− ((δd + βd)− (δd)) = αd
We expand upon the standard methodology in the literature by further explor-
ing the treatment effects estimated with equation 3.1. We examine whether
the different outcomes of older and prime age workers after displacement are
related to, for example, their tenure or industry by estimating heterogeneous
treatment effects within the difference-in-difference specification. For instance,
older displaced workers may be more sensitive to longer job tenure, the local
labour- market situation in the sector of economic activity from which they
are displaced16 or changing sectors. Note that these estimates cannot be in-
terpreted as treatment effects, since there is not necessarily a common trend
in the employment probabilities and wages of, for example, the long and short
tenured workers. Rather, the estimates should be interpreted as an exploration
of the reason behind the observed differences between older and prime age
workers in their labour-market situation after displacement. See section 3.5
in the Appendix for more on the calculation of expected values.
3.3 Results
In line with the literature on job displacement, our results from the difference-
in-difference analysis on the matched sample indicate that both employment
probabilities and wages plummet upon displacement, and subsequently re-
cover in the period thereafter (Table 3.2). Although labour-market outcomes
of displaced workers improve over time, they do not reach the level of the coun-
terfactual within our period of observation, neither for older nor for prime-age
16The structural decline in the local labour market is calculated as the moving average
of the employment per region and sector given by ∆E =
Et−1+Et+Et+1
Et−2+Et−1+Et . We distinguish 16
sectors of industry and 12 regions (Dutch provinces).
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workers. The negative effects of displacement are persistent, at least up to six
years after the firm closed down.17
Our results confirm that the effects of job displacement on employment
probabilities are more negative for age group 45–54 (older workers) than for
age group 35–44 (prime-age workers). Panel A of Table 3.2 shows the em-
ployment probabilities for both age groups from one until 6 years after dis-
placement. Compared to the control group, older workers (column 1) see their
employment probabilities deteriorate by 32 percentage points immediately af-
ter displacement. For prime-age workers (column 2) this is 26 percentage
points. The second year after displacement, the older age group still has an
employment rate about 20 percentage points lower than the control group,
while displaced prime-age workers have a 14 percentage point lower employ-
ment rate; these figures decline over the remaining four years to 7 and 6
percentage points, respectively. The difference in treatment effects between
displaced older and prime-age workers is almost 6 percentage points in the
first year and comes down only gradually in subsequent years. The difference
is statistically significant up to five years after displacement, confirming that
older workers suffer stronger and longer-lasting effects from being displaced
than prime-age workers.
In terms of wages older displaced workers are hit harder than prime-age
displaced workers as well (Panel B of Table 3.2). We focus on the real gross
monthly wage (normalised by the level 13 months before displacement) of the
treatment group compared to the control group.
Upon displacement older workers suffer a 7 percentage points wage loss,
while prime-age workers lose about 4 percentage points relative to the control
group.18 For prime-age workers the negative impact declines to about 3 per-
centage points and remains persistent up to six years after displacement. For
older workers the negative impact gradually decreases to about 5 percentage
points, but also remains persistent up to six years after displacement. Hence,
older workers’ wages are hit harder; the difference declines to −2 percent-
17An implicit assumption in diff-in-diff analyses is that there are no spillover effects or
treatment externalities. This means that it is important to assure that the share of displaced
workers is relatively low compared to the overall labour force. Unfortunately, we don’t have
data on the share of all types of dismissals per region and sector. Statistics on the inflow
in unemployment benefits per municipality may however give some indication. In the first
quarter of 2010 the average (weighted by the municipal labour forces) inflow in UB as a
fraction of the relevant municipal labour forces was 1.5%, whereas the variation was limited:
in 95% of the municipalities this fraction remained below 2.2%.
18Keep in mind that the wages of displaced workers might be biased. They might be
biased upwards, because those who do find and accept a job are likely those with the better
prospects. On the other hand, those who accept a job quickly after displacement might be
the ones with low reservation wages.
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age points in year 5 while in year 6 the difference is no longer statistically
significant.19
The persistent gap between age groups might be related to the character-
istics of the age groups. Due to longer job tenure, older workers may embody
substantial firm-specific human capital, which is forgone when they are dis-
placed (Poletaev and Robinson, 2008). In addition, older workers may have
built up industry-specific capital by a long work experience in a specific in-
dustry, and this is lost upon displacement if the worker cannot find new em-
ployment in the same industry (Carrington, 1993; Neal, 1995). Older work-
ers may be especially vulnerable to this effect, since they are more likely to
end up in shrinking occupations (Autor and Dorn, 2009; Bosch and ter Weel,
2013). Wages of older, long-tenured workers may also be relatively high due
to deferred compensation schemes and because tenure-related elements in the
employment protection legislation (i.e., severance payments, notice periods,
lifo-rules) may strengthen their wage bargaining position.
Table 3.3 shows that older workers on average indeed have longer tenure
than the prime-age group. The difference in the share that was displaced from
a declining labour market is small and the share of workers that changes indus-
try after displacement does not differ between older and prime-aged workers.
But even if older workers would not have longer tenure, or were not dis-
placed from declining labour markets more often, they might be affected
stronger by these factors. This would for instance be the case if employers
are more willing to invest in new firm or industry specific capital for prime-
age workers than in older workers because they have more time to recoup their
investment costs.
To provide more insight into the reasons behind the persistent gap be-
tween the age groups, the heterogeneous treatment effect in our difference-in-
difference estimation tests to what extent job tenure and sector characteristics
affect older worker’s employment probabilities and wages after displacement
in comparison to prime-age workers. From now on we refer to this as older
workers’ “sensitivity” to these characteristics. More specifically, we exam-
ine whether older workers are more sensitive to long job tenure, to the local
labour-market situation in the industry from which they are displaced and to
making a transition to another industry.
Table 3.4 presents the effects on the expected values of Yi,t for displaced
older and prime age workers with different characteristics. It compares workers
with long and shorter tenure (with a cut-off at 7 years)20, workers in a declining
19Note that already before displacement there is a gap between older and prime-age dis-
placed workers of approximately 0,5 percentage point (Table A3.1).
20We have estimated the same specification with different cut-offs for tenure and the results
are in line with those presented here.
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Table 3.2: Effects on the expected values of Yi,t for displaced older and prime-age
workers and the difference between them.
Treatment effect
old (45 - 54)
Treatment effect
prime-age (35 - 44)
Difference between
old and prime-age
Panel A: Employment
Year 1 -0.3178∗∗∗ -0.2589∗∗∗ -0.0588∗∗∗
(0.0032) (0.0023) (0.0039)
Year 2 -0.1954∗∗∗ -0.1425∗∗∗ -0.0529∗∗∗
(0.0036) (0.0024) (0.0043)
Year 3 -0.1573∗∗∗ -0.1121∗∗∗ -0.0452∗∗∗
(0.0041) (0.0027) (0.0049)
Year 4 -0.1273∗∗∗ -0.0937∗∗∗ -0.0336∗∗∗
(0.0047) (0.0029) (0.0056)
Year 5 -0.0981∗∗∗ -0.0771∗∗∗ -0.0210∗∗∗
(0.0052) (0.0031) (0.0060)
Year 6 -0.0676∗∗∗ -0.0600∗∗∗ -0.0076
(0.0057) (0.0033) (0.0066)
Panel B: Wages
Year 1 -0.0700∗∗∗ -0.0399∗∗∗ -0.0301∗∗∗
(0.0047) (0.0047) (0.0066)
Year 2 -0.0690∗∗∗ -0.0331∗∗∗ -0.0359∗∗∗
(0.0039) (0.0035) (0.0053)
Year 3 -0.0610∗∗∗ -0.0293∗∗∗ -0.0318∗∗∗
(0.0047) (0.0050) (0.0069)
Year 4 -0.0520∗∗∗ -0.0306∗∗∗ -0.0214∗∗∗
(0.0067) (0.0047) (0.0082)
Year 5 -0.0508∗∗∗ -0.0313∗∗∗ -0.0195∗∗
(0.0061) (0.0058) (0.0084)
Year 6 -0.0461∗∗∗ -0.0323∗∗∗ -0.0138
(0.0068) (0.0068) (0.0096)
Notes: Calculations on the basis of fixed effects estimates of equation 3.1. Calculations
for employment and wages are based on separate regressions. Full results and calculation
method presented in the Appendix. Significance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗∗∗ : 1%. Estimates
are based on 16,742,131 observations for employment and 15,210,215 for wages.
Source: Own calculations using registration data from Statistics Netherlands on displaced
workers.
Table 3.3: Characteristics of older and prime-age workers in the treatment group.
Old (45 – 54) Prime (35 – 44)
Long tenure (≥ 7 years) 0.43 0.29
Declining sectoral-regional labour market 0.68 0.66
Changing sectors 0.23 0.25
Source: Own calculations using registration data from Statistics Netherlands on displaced
workers.
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local labour market with those in a growing local labour market and workers
who find a job in a different (2-digit) sector after displacement with those who
don’t.21
Older workers are impacted more severely by displacement if they had
a long tenure in their previous job. Column 1 shows that the employment
probability of displaced older workers with long tenures is especially low in
the first year after displacement: almost 10 percentage point lower than for
older displaced workers with short tenures. This negative effect comes down
gradually in the subsequent years, remaining significant up to four years after
displacement. For prime age workers (column 2) the differences between long
and short tenured workers are much smaller in the short run and in the longer
run the effect evaporates. Hence, compared to prime-age workers, long tenures
go along with an extra reduction in employment probability of 2 to 3 percent-
age point for older workers. The difference in the wage effect of displacement
between long and short tenured workers is large. This holds for both older and
prime-age workers; the difference between the results for the two age groups
is not statistically significant.
The conditions in the labour market from which older workers are displaced
partly explains their labour-market outcomes too. In accordance with the
observation by Carrington (1993) we find that older workers are more sensitive
to the local sectoral labour market from which they are displaced. If they are
displaced from a declining local labour market, older workers experience a
3.5 percentage point larger loss in their employment probability in the the
first year than if they are displaced from a stable or growing industry. This
difference declines to 1.7 percentage point in the third year and disappears in
the longer run. The adverse impact is concentrated among older workers, since
for prime age workers the impact is small and mostly insignificant. Finding
a match in which older workers can use their (probably relatively obsolete)
specific human capital may be a problem if the whole sector is declining. The
estimated effect of being displaced from a declining labour market on wages is
about −2 percentage point in the second year for both age groups; the effect
fades out in subsequent years.
Our results also support the hypothesis that older workers are more sensi-
tive to switching industries. Older displaced workers who find new employment
in a different industry than the one from which they were displaced suffer a
wage loss of about 8 to 9 percentage points compared to those who found a
job in the same industry. For prime-age workers these effects are about 4 per-
centage points and decline over time. The results indicate that the difference
21Since switching sectors requires having found a new job, it is impossible to estimate the
“effect” for employment probabilities.
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between older workers and prime-age workers are large and increase over time.
In general, our results suggest that job and sector specific factors are impor-
tant for understanding the more vulnerable position of older workers after job
loss.
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3.4 Sensitivity analyses
Identification of the treatment effect of displacement depends on a common
trend between the treatment (displaced) and control group. While this as-
sumption is not testable, we can examine whether it is likely to hold by es-
timating a so-called placebo effect. We impose a placebo “treatment” at 2.5
years before the actual displacement 22 in a simple diff-in-diff equation:
Yi,t = α+ β1 ∗ POSTi + β2 ∗ POSTi ∗ TREATMENTi + ηi + i,t (3.2)
where Yi,t is our outcome variable, POST indicates the period after the placebo
treatment, and ηi controls for fixed differences between treated and controls.
Coefficient β2 is the coefficient of interest and measures the effect of the placebo
treatment. We estimate this equation for periods up to two years after the
placebo treatment, so excluding the actual period after displacement. We use
a sample containing both both older and prime age workers.
Table 3.5 reports coefficient β2 for employment probabilities and wages.
The estimated diff-in-diff parameters for employment are statistically insignif-
icant in the first two periods, which are closest to the placebo treatment,
indicating that prior to displacement the groups of treated and controls are
indeed comparable. Approaching actual displacement we find a statistically
significant but economically very small negative effect. For wages we find no
statistically significant estimates for the first two periods, again indicating
that the groups of treated and controls are indeed very comparable prior to
the treatment. If we move further from the placebo treatment and closer to
the actual treatment, negative effects on wages appear that are statistically
significant. These effects point to the fact that the treatment group experi-
ences a decline in their wage relative to the control group in the period leading
up to actual displacement (see section 3.2.2). The reason is most likely that
firms are typically in financial difficulty before they declare bankruptcy and
this could lead to lower wage growth than would otherwise have been the case.
Though we find some statistically significant effects for the pre-treatment pe-
riod, they are very small and economically insignificant. This suggests that
the common trend assumption is likely to hold.
Finally, we provide some further sensitivity tests. First, we estimate our
main equation separately for men and women. Table 3.6 show the results for
the overall displacement effects for older and prime-age men and women. It is
clear that especially older men lose more in terms of employment probabilities
than older women. For wages, on the other hand, older women generally lose
22The specification is robust to using other periods for the placebo treatment.
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Table 3.5: Diff-in-diff coefficient for placebo treatment (Equation 3.2) of displaced
older and prime age workers.
Employment Wages
Up to 6 months −.0005 .0001
Up to 12 months .0011 −.0025
Up to 18 months .0020∗ −.0043∗∗
Up to 24 months −.0047∗∗∗ −.0085∗∗∗
Notes: Calculations on the basis of fixed effects estimates of equation 3.2; the coefficients
refer to separate estimations for specific distances from the placebo treatment (at 2.5 years
before the actual displacement). All parameters are the result of separate regressions. Sig-
nificance levels: ∗ ∗ ∗ : 0.1%. Estimates are based on 503,312 observations.
Source: Own calculations using registration data from Statistics Netherlands on displaced
workers.
more than older men. So the adaptation process to a job loss runs for older
women more through lower wages than for men, while employment probabili-
ties drop more for older men than for older women. A potential explanation
can be found in the shorter benefit rights for prime-age and older women,
who usually have disrupted careers. In addition, women may be more risk
averse and therefore have lower reservation wages. A lower reservation wage
for women may also be the result of the fact that their income usually makes
up a smaller share of the household income. Alternatively, women in the con-
trol group may retire earlier than men in the control group, which would lead
to higher employment for women in the treatment group relative to the control
group.
In October 2006, the Dutch government introduced a comprehensive re-
form of the system of unemployment benefits. For most unemployed workers
this reform reduced the period of benefit entitlement, sometimes the reduction
was as strong as 22 months, although it did increase the entitlement period for
some other groups by at most 2 months. Previous empirical evidence shows
that this reform increased job finding rates, but led to a decrease in the quality
of the jobs found (De Groot and van der Klaauw, 2014). We have run the same
specifications as above, but now separated those displaced before the reform
from those displaced after the reform. Table 3.7 show the results for the over-
all displacement effects. Our results confirm that employment probabilities of
displaced workers have improved after the reform, especially for the older age
group, at least in the short run. We also observe that the wage reductions of
the prime-age group are larger after the reform. Hence, the disadvantaged po-
sition of the older displaced workers compared to prime-age displaced workers
is mitigated, both in terms of employment opportunities as wages. The inter-
pretation of the long run effects is less clear, since the Dutch labour market
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was hit by the Great Recession in 2009. This means that our results likely
overestimate the actual impact of the reform on wages and underestimate the
impact on employment.23
Finally we test the sensitivity of our results by estimating the treatment
effects separately for different education levels. Table 3.8 shows that higher
educated workers have a slightly lower employment probability than low and
middle educated workers. In terms of wages, the disadvantage for older work-
ers compared to their prime-age counterparts is largest for higher educated
workers, probably because they are prone to have accumulated much firm-
specific human capital.
For all sensitivity checks we also estimated the heterogeneous treatment
effects in the diff-in-diff specification and the results are in line with those
presented. In addition, we have tested the robustness of our main results by
running similar specifications as above with different cut-off points for age,
tenure and other variables.24 The overall picture arising from these tests con-
firms our main results: older workers labour-market position is more negatively
affected by displacement than that of prime-age workers, whereas within age
groups, those with longer tenure tend to be affected more, especially among
the older ones.
23Note that this also partly applies to the short run estimates for those laid off in 2008.
24The results are not reported here, but are available on request.
77
Labour Market Effects of Job Displacement
T
a
b
le
3
.6
:
E
ff
ec
ts
on
th
e
ex
p
ec
te
d
va
lu
es
of
Y
i,
t
fo
r
d
is
p
la
ce
d
ol
d
er
an
d
p
ri
m
e
ag
e
w
or
ke
rs
se
p
ar
at
el
y
es
ti
m
at
ed
fo
r
m
en
a
n
d
w
om
en
.
M
en
W
o
m
en
O
ld
er
a
g
e
(4
5
-
5
4
)
P
ri
m
e
a
g
e
(3
5
-
4
4
)
D
iff
er
en
ce
O
ld
er
a
g
e
(4
5
-
5
4
)
P
ri
m
e
a
g
e
(3
5
-
4
4
)
D
iff
er
en
ce
P
a
n
e
l
A
:
E
m
p
lo
y
m
e
n
t
Y
ea
r
1
−0
.3
3
2
2
∗∗
∗
−0
.2
5
8
6
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
7
3
6
∗∗
∗
−0
.2
8
0
8
∗∗
∗
−0
.2
5
9
6
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
2
1
2
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
0
3
7
)
(0
.0
0
2
7
)
(0
.0
0
4
6
)
(0
.0
0
6
0
)
(0
.0
0
4
2
)
(0
.0
0
7
3
)
Y
ea
r
2
−0
.2
0
1
0
∗∗
∗
−0
.1
4
2
5
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
5
8
5
∗∗
∗
−0
.1
8
1
2
∗∗
∗
−0
.1
4
2
4
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
3
8
9
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
0
4
2
)
(0
.0
0
2
9
)
(0
.0
0
5
1
)
(0
.0
0
6
6
)
(0
.0
0
4
4
)
(0
.0
0
8
0
)
Y
ea
r
3
−0
.1
6
1
2
∗∗
∗
−0
.1
1
2
3
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
4
8
9
∗∗
∗
−0
.1
4
7
6
∗∗
∗
−0
.1
1
1
4
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
3
6
2
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
0
4
8
)
(0
.0
0
3
1
)
(0
.0
0
5
7
)
(0
.0
0
8
3
)
(0
.0
0
5
0
)
(0
.0
0
9
7
)
Y
ea
r
4
−0
.1
3
1
1
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
9
5
7
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
3
5
4
∗∗
∗
−0
.1
1
8
6
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
8
8
3
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
3
0
3
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
0
5
4
)
(0
.0
0
3
4
)
(0
.0
0
6
4
)
(0
.0
1
0
1
)
(0
.0
0
5
7
)
(0
.0
1
1
6
)
Y
ea
r
5
−0
.1
0
4
1
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
7
9
4
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
2
4
7
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
8
1
7
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
7
0
8
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
1
0
9
(0
.0
0
5
8
)
(0
.0
0
3
6
)
(0
.0
0
6
9
)
(0
.0
1
1
1
)
(0
.0
0
6
1
)
(0
.0
1
2
6
)
Y
ea
r
6
−0
.0
7
3
9
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
6
0
1
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
1
3
8
∗
−0
.0
5
0
2
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
5
9
2
∗∗
∗
0
.0
0
9
0
(0
.0
0
6
4
)
(0
.0
0
3
9
)
(0
.0
0
7
5
)
(0
.0
1
2
2
)
(0
.0
0
6
5
)
(0
.0
1
3
8
)
O
b
se
rv
a
ti
o
n
s
1
2
,1
1
2
,4
8
2
1
2
,1
1
2
,4
8
2
1
2
,1
1
2
,4
8
2
4
,6
2
9
,6
4
9
4
,6
2
9
,6
4
9
4
,6
2
9
,6
4
9
P
a
n
e
l
B
:
W
a
g
e
s
Y
ea
r
1
−0
.0
6
5
6
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
3
8
1
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
2
7
5
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
8
2
3
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
4
3
3
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
3
9
0
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
0
5
9
)
(0
.0
0
6
1
)
(0
.0
0
8
5
)
(0
.0
0
6
9
)
(0
.0
0
6
9
)
(0
.0
0
9
7
)
Y
ea
r
2
−0
.0
6
6
1
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
3
9
1
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
2
7
0
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
7
7
6
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
1
9
3
∗∗
−0
.0
5
8
3
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
0
4
5
)
(0
.0
0
3
8
)
(0
.0
0
5
9
)
(0
.0
0
7
9
)
(0
.0
0
7
7
)
(0
.0
1
1
1
)
Y
ea
r
3
−0
.0
5
7
1
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
3
6
3
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
2
0
8
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
7
2
3
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
1
1
8
−0
.0
6
0
5
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
0
5
2
)
(0
.0
0
5
7
)
(0
.0
0
7
7
)
(0
.0
1
0
2
)
(0
.0
1
0
5
)
(0
.0
1
4
7
)
Y
ea
r
4
−0
.0
5
0
9
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
3
8
0
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
1
2
9
−0
.0
5
4
3
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
1
1
4
−0
.0
4
2
9
∗∗
(0
.0
0
7
7
)
(0
.0
0
5
1
)
(0
.0
0
9
2
)
(0
.0
1
3
2
)
(0
.0
1
0
5
)
(0
.0
1
6
9
)
Y
ea
r
5
−0
.0
5
3
6
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
4
0
5
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
1
3
1
−0
.0
3
9
6
∗∗
−0
.0
0
6
7
−0
.0
3
2
9
(0
.0
0
6
1
)
(0
.0
0
6
5
)
(0
.0
0
8
9
)
(0
.0
1
7
2
)
(0
.0
1
2
3
)
(0
.0
2
1
2
)
Y
ea
r
6
−0
.0
4
9
0
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
4
2
7
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
0
6
4
−0
.0
3
4
2
∗∗
−0
.0
0
4
6
−0
.0
2
9
6
(0
.0
0
7
2
)
(0
.0
0
7
7
)
(0
.0
1
0
6
)
(0
.0
1
6
9
)
(0
.0
1
3
5
)
(0
.0
2
1
7
)
O
b
se
rv
a
ti
o
n
s
1
1
,0
1
8
,2
8
7
1
1
,0
1
8
,2
8
7
1
1
,0
1
8
,2
8
7
4
,1
9
1
,9
2
8
4
,1
9
1
,9
2
8
4
,1
9
1
,9
2
8
N
o
te
s
:
C
a
lc
u
la
ti
o
n
s
o
n
th
e
b
a
si
s
o
f
fi
x
ed
eff
ec
ts
es
ti
m
a
te
s
o
f
eq
u
a
ti
o
n
3
.3
.
C
a
lc
u
la
ti
o
n
s
fo
r
em
p
lo
y
m
en
t,
w
a
g
es
a
n
d
a
d
d
it
io
n
a
l
va
ri
a
b
le
s
a
re
b
a
se
d
o
n
se
p
a
ra
te
re
g
re
ss
io
n
s.
S
ig
n
ifi
ca
n
ce
le
v
el
s:
∗:
1
0
%
∗∗
:
5
%
∗∗
∗:
1
%
.
78
3.4 Sensitivity analyses
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3.5 Conclusions
This paper analysed the effect of firm bankruptcies on the employment prob-
abilities and wages of the workers involved. Our results support findings in
the literature that displaced workers experience substantial and persistent ef-
fects on employment probabilities and wages. The size of these employment
and wage effects are contingent on age. Displaced older workers face worse
employment prospects than displaced prime-age workers and displaced older
workers who do find a job typically experience larger wage losses than dis-
placed prime-age workers. This picture is clear from descriptive statistics,
and remains after comparing the outcomes of displaced workers to a control
group of workers with exactly the same observed characteristics, who were not
involved in firm bankruptcies.
Our result are probably a lower bound of the actual treatment effect, since
a placebo test shows that wages start to decline more than a year before
the actual job loss, while we used the 13th month before displacement as
the reference point for the wage loss. Comparing to a point further in the
past would likely lead to a smaller underestimation, but this would imply a
restriction on the treatment and control groups regarding the employment
duration before displacement. Imposing such a restriction could lead to an
overestimation of the actual result, since long-tenured workers suffer stronger
effects.
The results clearly show heterogeneity of the displacement effect within
the group of older workers. Older workers with job tenure shorter than seven
years have much better prospects than those with longer tenure. High-tenured
displaced older workers experience a 5 percentage-points larger drop in em-
ployment probabilities and 4 percentage-point larger declines in their relative
wages in the first two years after displacement than short-tenured displaced
older workers. This difference remains persistent for wages. For prime-age
workers tenure in the job before displacement makes less of a difference for
their outcomes after displacement. In general they have shorter tenure as well.
These results suggest that factors related to long tenures (for example accumu-
lated firm specific human capital, high wages due to deferred compensation
schemes or strong bargaining positions of well protected older workers) are
an important explanation for the more severe consequences for older workers
upon bankruptcy of their firm.
Labour-market outcomes of older workers are also related to the condi-
tion of the local labour market in the industry from which they are displaced.
Workers displaced from industries in which the local labour market was struc-
turally declining have worse employment probabilities and wage prospects. In
the first two years after displacement employment probabilities and relative
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wages for older workers displaced from declining industries are respectively
around 4 and 3 percentage points below those of older workers displaced from
better performing industries, whereas the wage effect persists in the long run.
In general, older workers are not more often displaced from declining indus-
tries than prime-age workers, but within the group of older workers the ones
displaced from declining industries perform worse. Prime-age workers are less
sensitive to the situation in the local labour market in the industry from which
they were displaced. Our results suggest that job and sector specific factors
are important for understanding the more vulnerable position of older workers
after job loss.
The latter conclusion is also supported by our finding that switching in-
dustries is related to the wage effect job loss. Older displaced workers who
find new employment in a different sector than the one from which they were
displaced suffer wage losses that are almost 10 percentage points stronger than
those who find work in the same industry. This holds for prime-age workers as
well, but to a lesser extent. Older workers switch to other industries almost as
often as prime-age workers, but they suffer stronger wage losses after making
this transition.
Theoretically, we can explain the more severe outcomes of older workers
after displacement from relatively high labour costs, which result from delayed
compensation schemes, higher wages due to the strong bargaining position of
well-protected older workers or costly special provisions for older workers in
collective bargaining schemes. Alternatively, the wage-to-productivity ratio
may be higher for displaced older workers due to firm-specific, industry specific
or task specific human capital, which is lost upon displacement, especially in
case of long job tenure and when switching industries. Also, the wage-to-
productivity ratio might be higher due to declining productivity with age. On
the other hand supply side arguments may play a role as well. Older workers
have longer benefit entitlements, which causes higher reservations wages and
they have more options to retire from the labour market. Our results confirm
that job tenure and switching industries are important, which supports the
firm and industry specific capital argument. But a substantial part of the
difference between age groups remains after controlling for these factors. This
suggests that other factors may also play a role.
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Appendix A: Calculation of expected values
To aid in the interpretation of our results, we calculate expected values of our
outcome variables at different points of interest. The baseline specification is:
Yi,t =
d=6∑
d=−2
αdZiTiD
d
i,t+
d=6∑
d=−2
βdTiD
d
i,t+
d=6∑
d=−2
γdZiD
d
i,t+
d=6∑
d=−2
δdD
d
i,t+ηi+θt+i,t
(3.1)
where Yi,t is the outcome of interest (employment status or wage), i is the
individual worker, t is time measured in years, Zi is an indicator taking value
1 if a worker is aged 45 - 54 and 0 if a workers is aged 35 - 44, Ti is a dummy
taking 1 if the worker is displaced due to firm bankruptcy and Ddi,t is a dummy
taking 1 for the record in which worker i is observed at d years distance from
the (actual or fictional) date of displacement. ηi is the unobserved individual
fixed effect, θt captures calendar time effects (specified as a set of dummie
variables for each year) and i,t is the individual and time-specific error term.
This is associated with the following expected values:
E(Yi,t|Zi = 0, Ti = 0, Ddi,t = 1) =δd
E(Yi,t|Zi = 0, Ti = 1, Ddi,t = 1) =δd + βd
E(Yi,t|Zi = 1, Ti = 0, Ddi,t = 1) =δd + γd
E(Yi,t|Zi = 1, Ti = 1, Ddi,t = 1) =δd + βd + γd + αd
For example, if we want to know the effect of displacement for older workers
compared to prime-age workers, we calculate the following expected value
(suppressing conditioning on the fixed effects and time trend):
(E(Yi,t|Zi = 1, Ti = 1, Ddi,t = 1)− E(Yi,t|Zi = 1, Ti = 0, Ddi,t = 1))−
(E(Yi,t|Zi = 0, Ti = 1, Ddi,t = 1)− E(Yi,t|Zi = 0, Ti = 0, Ddi,t = 1))
This is equal to:
((δd + γd + βd + αd)− (δd + γd))− ((δd + βd)− (δd)) = αd
We do the same for the diff-in-diff specification with heterogeneous treatment
effects. The expanded specification is:
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Yi,t =
d=6∑
d=−2
κdWiZiTiD
d
i,t +
d=6∑
d=−2
αdZiTiD
d
i,t +
d=6∑
d=−2
µdWiTiD
d
i,t+
d=6∑
d=−2
φdWiZiD
d
i,t +
d=6∑
d=−2
βdTiD
d
i,t +
d=6∑
d=−2
γdZiD
d
i,t +
d=6∑
d=−2
λdWiD
d
i,t+
d=6∑
d=−2
δdD
d
i,t + ηi + θt + i,t
(3.3)
where Wi is a dummy variable that differs in its interpretation in the various
specifications: it either represents long tenure, displacement from a declining
local labour market or changes sectors after displacement. All other variables
are defined as before. In the same fashion as above, we can compute ex-
pected values of Yi,t. The expected values associated with this equation are
the following:
E(Yi,t|Wi = 0, Zi = 0, Ti = 0, Ddi,t = 1) =δd
E(Yi,t|Wi = 0, Zi = 0, Ti = 1, Ddi,t = 1) =δd + βd
E(Yi,t|Wi = 0, Zi = 1, Ti = 0, Ddi,t = 1) =δd + γd
E(Yi,t|Wi = 0, Zi = 1, Ti = 1, Ddi,t = 1) =δd + βd + γd + αd
E(Yi,t|Wi = 1, Zi = 0, Ti = 0, Ddi,t = 1) =δd + λd
E(Yi,t|Wi = 1, Zi = 0, Ti = 1, Ddi,t = 1) =δd + βd + λd + µd
E(Yi,t|Wi = 1, Zi = 1, Ti = 0, Ddi,t = 1) =δd + γd + λd + φd
E(Yi,t|Wi = 1, Zi = 1, Ti = 1, Ddi,t = 1) =δd + βd + γd + αd + λd + µd + φd + κd
For example, if we want to know the average “effect” of longer tenure (Wi = 1)
for older (Zi = 1) displaced (Ti = 1) workers, we have to compute the following
expected value:
E(Yi,t|Wi = 1, Zi = 1, Ti = 1, Ddi,t = 1)−E(Yi,t|Wi = 0, Zi = 1, Ti = 1, Ddi,t = 1)
This is equal to:
(δd+βd+γd+αd+λd+µd+φd+κd)− (δd+βd+γd+αd) = λd+µd+φd+κd
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The expected values for prime-age workers are:
E(Yi,t|Wi = 1, Zi = 0, Ti = 1, Ddi,t = 1)−E(Yi,t|Wi = 0, Zi = 0, Ti = 1, Ddi,t = 1)
This is equal to:
(δd + βd + λd + µd)− (δd + βd) = λd + µd
Subtracting this from the “effect” of longer tenure for older workers, we get
a measure that indicates the difference between older workers and prime-aged
workers regarding the extent to which longer tenure affects the employment
probabilities or wages:
(λd + µd + φd + κd)− (λd + µd) = φd + κd
where φd captures the difference between older workers with longer tenure
and older workers with shorter tenure and κd captures the difference be-
tween treated older workers with longer tenure and treated older workers with
shorter tenure. Together they determine the difference between older workers
and prime-age workers in how tenure affects the employment probabilities (or
wages).
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Appendix B: Full estimation results of the main specifications.
See TableA3.1
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Chapter 4
Flexible Wages or Flexible Workers?
A Decomposition of Wage Bill
Adjustment by Dutch Firms,
2006–20131
4.1 Introduction
Rising unemployment during The Great Recession has led to renewed interest
in wage rigidity. Downward wage rigidity can occur for a variety of reasons.
Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) argued that it is optimal for firms to pay wages
above the market-clearing level to give workers an incentive to provide high
effort, with the quasi-rent workers lose if they get fired possibly preventing
them from shirking. Insider-outsider theories state that unions and collec-
tive bargaining generate wages that exceed the market-clearing level and that
such wages respond little to adverse labour market situations (Lindbeck and
Snower (1986)). Smoothing wages over the business cycle may also be optimal
because firms can diversify firm-specific risks, while risk-averse workers can
not (Teulings and Bovenberg (2009)).
Though smoothing wages over time may be optimal from some perspec-
tives, it has large implications for employment volatility. In a negative demand
shock, there is a trade-off between the responsiveness of wages and reduction
in employment. In a basic labour demand-supply framework with an inelastic
labour supply, a leftward shift of the labour demand curve due to a demand
1The author thanks Danie¨l van Vuuren and Leon Bettendorf, participants of the labour-
health seminar series at Tilburg University (December 2015) and the EALE-conference in
Ghent (September 2016) for their useful comments on earlier versions of this paper.
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shock leads to unemployment if wages do not fall (Pessoa and Van Reenen
(2014)). Moreover, search and matching models require wages that are un-
responsive to current labour-market conditions to generate the volatility in
job-finding rates and unemployment that are observed in the data across the
business cycle (Hall (2005), Shimer (2004), Shimer (2005)). On the other
hand, wages in new job matches often do show volatility.2
Recent research indeed suggests that both nominal and real wages are
downwardly rigid in many European countries (Babecky´ et al. (2012), Knoppik
and Beissinger (2009), Holden and Wulfsberg (2014)). Still, studies of wage
rigidity have their limitations. Firstly, measurement of wage rigidity is often
restricted to the wages of workers who have remained working at a firm for
two consecutive years (stayers), but firms may partly offset the downwardly
rigid wages of stayers by using job turnover to adjust their average wages.
Secondly, studies of downward wage rigidity often focus on the lower end of
the distribution of wage changes, for example by comparing the left hand side
of the actual distribution of wage changes with that of a symmetric, theoretical
distribution representing a situation without downward wage rigidity (Dickens
et al. (2007), Goette et al. (2007)). However, firms may compensate for rigid
downward wages through moderate wage growth at the middle and higher
segments of their wage change distribution; therefore, the relationship between
downward wage rigidity and changes in employment is not clear-cut (Elsby
(2009), Stu¨ber and Beissinger (2012)). Studies of the United States confirm
that wage stickiness is highly heterogeneous between groups of workers, both
between stayers and movers (Pissarides (2009)) and among percentile groups
(Robin (2011)). Thirdly, most studies of wage rigidity focus on contractual
wages, so micro-econometric studies of wage rigidity generally do not reveal
to what extent firms use other wage components to adjust their wage bills.
Given these limitations of wage-rigidity studies, analysing how firms respond
to adverse shocks requires considering how wages of non-stayers, wages at the
middle and higher ends of the wage-change distribution, and wage components
other than contractual wages all react.
Little is known, however, about the strategies firms use to reduce their
labour costs in response to adverse sales shocks, nor about the possible im-
pediments firms face to such adjustments. Adjustment of employment at the
extensive margin may, for example, be limited by employment-protection leg-
islation and rules concerning the use of temporary contracts. At the intensive
margin, institutions such as partial unemployment insurance and regulation of
2With a modification based on fixed matching costs, the canonical search and matching
model can generate both cyclical unemployment volatility and wage flexibility in new matches
(Pissarides (2009)).
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working hours play a role. Whether adjustment takes place in terms of wages
or in terms of employment is quite important, since unemployment and job
insecurity are costly to individual workers leading to large losses in income,
skills and human capital, as well as a lower state of well-being (Origo and
Pagani (2009), Clark et al. (2010)). Especially for older workers, the cost of
losing a job is high; their probability of finding a new job after displacement is
substantially lower and their wage drop (if they do find a new job) larger than
for prime-age workers Deelen et al. (2014a). Given the lack of clarity of how
firms adjust wages and employment (and, as a result, labour productivity) to
adverse shocks, the answer has to come from empirical research.
Empirical studies typically aim to explain the development of either em-
ployment or wages. This study takes a wider perspective, focussing on the
way firms adjust their wage bills (the sum of all wages paid by a firm) in times
of declining demand. I study adjustments to wages and job flows simultane-
ously and from a firm perspective, using an extensive, administrative linked
employer-employee panel dataset for the Netherlands, which contains wages
and participation data for all workers. Firm characteristics are, however, typ-
ically not available across the whole sample. I focus on a sample of firms with
25 workers or more for which data concerning year-to-year changes in sales are
available. This data-set comprises more than 75,000 firm-year observations,
which are based on 12.3 million job-year observations.
The study has two parts: (1) decomposition and (2) regression analysis.
In the first part, changes in the contractual wage bills of firms are decomposed
into items related to price (hourly wages) and volume (hours worked, number
of jobs), distinguishing between stayers and workers entering and exiting the
firm. I also considered overtime pay and incidental wages. I analyse the impact
of adverse sales shocks of various sizes on this decomposition by estimating
the asymmetry in the responses by firms to falling or growing sales. The
decompositions are examined through various variables, such as sales growth
(by group) and the share of open-term contracts. The results of these decom-
positions are accompanied by additional detailed information regarding job
flows, wages and hours worked by groups of workers and types of contract.
The decomposition-analysis discloses how firms choose their mix of wage mit-
igation and employment reduction in response to adverse sales growth. One
limitation arises, however, that comparing decompositions of two groups of
firms does not take into account the differences in observed characteristics.
The second part of the analysis comprises multivariate regressions which
relate wage changes, job flows or employment growth to a number of firm
characteristics. Again, the unit of observation is the firm. The analyses gen-
erally focus on firm-year observations for which sales decrease, or even decline
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sharply, since this is when adjustments typically occur.
The main findings of the paper are the following. The decomposition anal-
ysis shows that employment reduction is by far the most important channel
for contracting wage bills, indicating downward wage rigidity. In this regard,
firms use not only increased exits but also reduced entries, probably to avoid
firing costs. A striking result is that the contractual wage growth of stayers
is only somewhat lower at firms hit by an adverse shock, compared to firms
with increasing sales, and wage changes remain positive on average. Over the
years, however, wage growth has decelerated across the board. I find no indi-
cation that job flows are used as a vehicle to reduce the average wage; wages of
entrants do not lag further behind those of stayers when sales growth is more
adverse. Hence, contractual wages have minor importance for wage-bill ad-
justment in adverse times for both stayers and entrants. Contractual working
hours provide some downward flexibility, as do overtime pay and incidental
wages, but the magnitude of the effect is small.
Regression analysis confirms that, in the short run, stayers’ wage growth is
only somewhat responsive to negative sales shocks. By contrast, employment
growth is quite sensitive to firm characteristics, especially with larger nega-
tive sales shocks are larger. Employment loss, however, does not hit a random
group of workers: given a severe negative shock in sales, employment losses are
larger at firms with higher percentages of immigrants, short-tenured workers,
temporary contracts, non-regular job-types and part-time jobs. Moreover, I
find a significant negative relationship between firms’ degree of downward wage
rigidity and their employment growth, suggesting that employment reduction
would be significantly lower if wages were more downwardly flexible. These
findings point to a segmented labour market, where, on the one hand, employ-
ment adjustments predominantly affect workers in a relatively weak labour
market position, whereas ongoing workers are assured that wage increases will
not be jeopardised by sales shocks suffered by their firms.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 4.2 describes
the methodology. Section 4.3 discusses the data and the institutional features
of the Dutch labour market. The results of the decomposition analysis are pre-
sented in subsection 4.4.1. Estimated relationships among job flows, wage or
employment growth and firm characteristics are presented in subsection 4.4.2,
and subsection 4.4.3 discusses the results. Section 4.5 concludes.
4.2 Methodology
The first part of the analysis, the decomposition of firms’ changing wage bills,
is inspired by Fuss (2009), which decomposed wage-bill changes at the firm
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level into components due to wage changes and components due to flows of
employment. That study used administrative, matched employer–employee
data of individual earnings merged with firms’ annual accounts for Belgium
from 1997 to 2001. Fuss’ results agreed with what one would expect from a
downwardly rigid wage environment (which stems, among other things, from
the Belgian system of full automatic indexation under which the base-wage
of all workers is adjusted to inflation). On average, Fuss finds that wage-bill
contractions result essentially from employment cuts in spite of wage increases.
The contractual wage bill is the sum of the monthly contractual wages of
firm i. By contractual wage I mean, the base wage, excluding overtime pay
and performance-related pay, such as incidental pay, extra pay and bonuses.
At time t, firm i employs Ji,t workers (indexed by j), earning a monthly con-
tractual wage wji,t. The changes in the wage bill are scaled on the average
wage bill over both years, following Davis and Haltiwanger (1992). As a first
step, Equation 4.1 simply decomposes the growth rate of the wage bill W˚Bi,t
into a component related to the change in the average monthly contractual
wage and a component related to the change in the number of workers.
◦
WBi,t =
ΣJi,twji,t − ΣJi,t−1wji,t−1
0.5(ΣJi,twji,t + ΣJi,t−1wji,t−1)
=
Jt−1(w¯t − w¯t−1) + (Jt − Jt−1)w¯t
0.5(ΣJi,twji,t + ΣJi,t−1wji,t−1)
(4.1)
Out of the Ji,t workers that firm i employs at time t, Si,t are stayers, workers
employed by firm i in both t and (t−1), and Ni,t are entrants, employed by
firm i at t but not yet employed by this firm at (t−1). Out of the Ji,t−1 workers
that firm i employs at time (t−1), Ei,t−1 are exiters, employed by firm i at
(t−1) but not at t, and Si,t−1 stayers. The change in the wage bill of a firm is
equal to the sum of the wages of stayers and entrants in year t minus the sum
of the wages of stayers and exiters in year (t-1):
◦
WBi,t =
(ΣJi,t∈Si,twji,t + ΣJi,t∈Ni,twji,t)
0.5(ΣJi,twji,t + ΣJi,t−1wji,t−1)
−
(ΣJi,t−1∈Si,t−1wji,t−1 + ΣJi,t−1∈Ei,t−1wji,t−1)
0.5(ΣJi,twji,t + ΣJi,t−1wji,t−1)
(4.2)
Replacing the sum of contractual wages of each group (S, N or E) by the
number of workers in that group times their average contractual wage and
rewriting the equation gives the decomposition of the change in the contrac-
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tual wage bill (equation 4.3). The first component reflects the contribution
from the change in the average contractual monthly wage of stayers, while
the second component represents the contribution from the net change in em-
ployment. The third and fourth components relate to the contribution of job
flows. For example, if exiters are replaced by an equal number of lower-waged
entrants, the change in net employment is zero, but job flows negatively con-
tribute to the change in the wage bill lowering the average wage level. More
specifically, the third component reflects new entrants and their wages, rel-
ative to those of stayers. Since the average wage of newly hired workers is
below that of stayers, the component is negative: hiring new workers reduces
wage-bill growth. Analogously, the last component reflects the contribution of
workers exiting the firm and their wages, relative to the wages of stayers. Since
the average wage of exiters is below that of stayers, workers leaving increases
wage-bill growth.3
◦
WBi,t =
(Nt − Et−1)w¯St + St(w¯St − w¯St−1) +Nt(w¯Nt − w¯St )− Et−1(w¯Et−1 − w¯St )
0.5(ΣJi,twji,t + ΣJi,t−1wji,t−1)
(4.3)
Since the contractual monthly wage (w) is equal to the contractual number
of working hours per month (H) times the contractual hourly wage (wh), the
wage-bill change can be further decomposed in terms of number of jobs, hours
worked and the hourly wages of stayers, entrants and exiters (equation 4.4).
The first component is again the contribution of the net change in employ-
ment, valued at the average wage of stayers in year t. The contribution of
stayers is split into one component for the change in hourly wage (the second
component in equation 4.4) and one for the change in the average working
hours of stayers (the third component in equation 4.4). The fourth and fifth
components depict the job-flow contributions of hourly wages by non-stayers,
while the last two components represent job-flow contributions of hours worked
by non-stayers. The tables in the results section contain six items, since the
last two components are presented as a single component, ‘hours worked, non-
stayers’. Besides the contractual wage bill, wider definitions of the wage bill
are also considered on top of this: one including overtime pay and another
including incidental and extra pay.
3Wages of stayers are used as a common benchmark for the wages of both entrants and
exiters. Direct comparison between wages of entrants and exiters would only be possible
for firms that featured both entrants and exiters in a particular year. Note that these
components compensate ‘overshooting’ by the second component, which is caused by the
fact that the change in net employment is valued at the average wage of stayers in year t.
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◦
WBi,t =
(Nt − Et−1)w¯St + ΣS(whSt − whSt−1)HSt + ΣS(HSt −HSt−1)whSt−1
0.5(ΣJi,twji,t + ΣJi,t−1wji,t−1)
+
(w¯hNt − w¯hSt )NtH¯Nt − (w¯hEt−1 − w¯hSt )Et−1H¯Et−1
0.5(ΣJi,twji,t + ΣJi,t−1wji,t−1)
+
(H¯Nt − H¯St )Ntw¯hSt − (H¯Et−1 − H¯St )Et−1w¯hSt
0.5(ΣJi,twji,t + ΣJi,t−1wji,t−1)
(4.4)
Having computed the decomposition of the change in wage bill for each
firm-year combination, the next step is to assess to what extent wage-bill ad-
justments are symmetric between favourable and adverse states. I define a
firm-year combination as an adverse state if the firm’s sales decreased com-
pared to the year before, whereas a firm-year combinations in which sales of a
firm increase or remain constant are termed favourable.4 The analysis focusses
on the way firms adapt to an exogenous shock in sales.5 I therefore analyse
the impact of an adverse sales shock on firms’ wage-change decompositions
by estimating the asymmetry between firm-year observations with falling and
growing sales (or, alternatively, between severe and more moderate negative
sales shocks). To estimate this asymmetry, for each item of the decomposition
a Student’s t-test is performed for the hypothesis that there is no difference in
the mean between the two states. In this regard, the next simple equation is
estimated using maximum likelihood—for sake of consistency with the method
used by Fuss (2009)—, taking into account common year effects γt:
∆xki,t = αk + βk.dumki,t + γkt + ki,t (4.5)
where k = 1, ..., 6, since equation 4.5 is estimated separately for each item of
equation 4.46
4Parsimonious regressions in Table A4.1 in Appendix A illustrate that wage-bill con-
traction is strongly correlated with sales reduction. As a robustness check, in Table B4.1
in Appendix B, I use the wage-bill change instead of sales growth to distinguish between
favourable (positive wage-bill growth) and adverse (negative wage-bill growth) states.
5Although reversed causality cannot be fully excluded (for example, high wages may lead
to overpriced products, inducing low sales), sales reduction may to a large extent be consid-
ered an exogenous shock, perhaps even more so since the observed period is characterized
by reduced demand.
6The tables in the results section refer to the items ∆xki,t as the contributions to the
gross contractual wage-bill growth by the change in:
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The second part of the paper relates employment growth, job flows and
wage growth to an extensive set of firm characteristics, applying linear and
logistic regression analyses. Again the firm is the unit of observation. As with
the decomposition analysis, the regression analysis focusses on the adjustment
in cases of adverse sales shocks. Indicators for nominal and real downward
wage rigidity have been included as explanatory variables in the regressions to
analyse the relation between downward wage rigidity and employment growth
(see Appendix C for more detailed information on the indicators of wage rigid-
ity).
4.3 Data and institutional features of the Dutch labour market
4.3.1 Data
This paper uses administrative, linked employer–employee data for the Nether-
lands covering the period 2006–2013. Data from the Social Statistical Datasets
(SSD), containing wages, hours worked and other characteristics for all jobs
in the Netherlands, have been merged with workers’ personal characteristics
and firm data (see Appendix C for more detailed information on the creation
of the dataset and the applied selections).
Data regarding wages and hours worked are available for all workers in
all firms, an improvement compared to Fuss (2009), whose data do not cover
all Belgian firms. Moreover, the data here contain exact information on the
start and end date of all jobs; however, dismissals and voluntary exits can not
be distinguished. Firm-level data such as that concerning sales, however, are
generally only available for a subset of firms.
I choose to restrict the sample to workers aged 23 to 65. The main reason to
exclude workers younger than 23 is that the Dutch mandatory youth minimum
wage follows a steep profile: from the age of 15 to 23, the minimum wage
increases yearly by 15 to 17%. Hence, workers on a youth minimum wage
see automatic wage increases by two-digit percentages. As a result, youth
workers in some sectors also face a higher probability of dismissal as their
birthday approaches (Kaba´tek (2015)). The inclusion of young workers in my
data could thus mask a possible downward adjustment of stayers’ wages in
1) net employment: (Nt − Et−1)w¯St /D
2) hourly wage, stayers: ΣS(w
hS
t − whSt−1)HSt /D
3) hourly wage, entrants: (w¯hNt − w¯hSt )NtH¯Nt /D
4) hourly wage, exiters: (w¯hEt−1 − w¯hSt )Et−1H¯Et−1/D
5) hours worked, stayers: ΣS(H
S
t −HSt−1)whSt−1/D
6) hours worked, non-stayers: (H¯Nt − H¯St )Ntw¯hSt − (H¯Et−1 − H¯St )Et−1w¯hSt /D,
where D = denominator 0.5(ΣJi,twji,t + ΣJi,t−1wji,t−1).
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response to a negative shock. Workers aged over 65 are also excluded from the
data; working after the mandatory retirement age is possible, but contracts
generally require renegotiation. Hence, these age groups may experience large
individual wage changes for reasons that are not the primary focus of this
paper.
For each set of two subsequent years, wage-bill changes are decomposed
for all private-sector firms that exist in October of both years. In the main
analysis, firm-year combinations are excluded that are characterised by firm
dynamics, such as mergers and acquisitions. A robustness check explores how
including such combinations affects the results. Summarized, I focus in this
study on wages paid to workers aged 23 to 65 in ongoing, private-sector firms
which are not subject to firm dynamics.
4.3.2 Descriptive statistics
The period observed in this study, 2007–2013, is characterised by two ma-
jor economic contractions. Macro-economic growth plummeted from 1.7% in
2008 to -3.8% in 2009 and dropped below zero again in 2012 (-1.1%) and 2013
(-0.2%) (CPB (2016)). Graph 4.1 in Appendix A presents yearly kernel densi-
ties for several key variables, based on the data used in this study that refers
to firms with 25 or more workers. Sales growth (depicted in the graph in the
first row, left) starts to falter in 2008 and then drops sharply in 2009; not only
does the distribution shift to the left but the left tail of the distribution is also
very fat. Sales growth improves over the following years, dropping again in
2012 and 2013, although not as much as in 2009. The other variables show a
similar pattern, although the temporary improvement in sales in 2010 is not
followed immediately by wage and job growth; in fact 2010 is the weakest
year. Furthermore, the densities of contractual wage-bill growth and partic-
ularly growth in the gross monthly wages of stayers (respectively: first row,
right; second row, left) are, strikingly, much more compressed than those of
sales. In adverse years (2010, 2013), the left tail is thin, suggesting wages are
downwardly rigid. Employment growth (second row, right) strongly recovers
in 2011, thereby returning to the levels found before the first dip. The job
exit rate (third row, left) is highest in years characterised by high employment
growth. The job enter rate (third row, right) is much more dispersed than
the exit rate. Note that the exit rate reflects both voluntary quitting, which
increases in times of employment growth, and dismissals, which increase in
adverse times; the data do not allow distinction between these two types of
exits.
Table 4.1 presents descriptive statistics for all private-sector firms that
exist in two subsequent years and are not subject to firm dynamics (e.g.,
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Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics
Mean SD Q1 Median Q3
Growth in contractual wage bill (in %) -0.4 21.7 -6.0 1.6 8.4
Employment growth (in %) -3.8 27.6 -8.3 0.0 5.8
# Jobs 118.6 528.8 31.0 46.0 85.0
# Working hours per month per worker 147.1 24.2 137.8 153.4 163.4
Share exiters (t−1) (in %) 19.0 17.1 8.1 13.8 23.1
Share entrants (t) (in %) 16.6 16.4 5.9 12.5 21.9
Share aged 60-65 among exiters (t−1) (in %) 10.2 17.3 0.0 0.0 14.3
Share aged 55-64 among exiters (t−1) (in %) 5.6 11.3 0.0 0.0 7.7
Average age stayers (t−1) 41.1 4.3 38.5 41.4 43.9
Age exiters /age stayers (t−1) 96.9 14.3 88.5 96.1 1.0
Age entrants /age stayers (t) 85.6 13.8 77.4 85.5 93.6
∆ Log wage stayers (hourly); permanent contract 2.4 7.8 -0.1 2.6 5.3
∆ Log wage stayers (hourly); temporary contract 4.0 17.5 -1.3 3.3 8.4
∆ Log hours worked stayers; permanent contract 0.2 7.8 -1.9 -0.0 1.8
∆ Log hours worked stayers; temporary contract -0.7 16.5 -3.9 0.0 3.7
Log wage exiters - log wage stayers (hourly) -10.7 21.6 -22.4 -11.0 0.1
Log wage entrants - log wage stayers (hourly) -14.6 22.0 -26.7 -14.8 -3.5
Log hours exiters - log hours stayers -9.5 24.1 -15.6 -3.7 3.0
Log hours entrants - log hours stayers -7.6 24.9 -12.7 -0.9 4.4
∆ Log overtime hours -0.05 2.24 -0.26 0.00 0.17
∆ Log share part-time jobs -0.0 10.2 -3.3 -0.0 3.1
Share stayers. permanent (t) (in %) 70.4 25.1 61.1 78.1 88.2
Share stayers. temporary (t) (in %) 13.0 18.0 1.6 6.6 17.4
Share exiters. permanent (t−1) (in %) 11.0 11.7 4.0 7.9 13.8
Share exiters. temporary (t−1) (in %) 8.0 14.3 0.0 3.1 8.3
Share entrants. permanent (t) (in %) 6.8 10.1 0.0 3.5 8.8
Share entrants. temporary (t) (in %) 9.8 14.4 0.0 4.9 12.9
# Firm-year observations 124,551
# Worker-year observations (*mln) 15.5
Notes: The data concern pooled annual observations for 2006–2013. The sample comprises
all private sector firms employing 25 workers existing in two subsequent years and not sub-
ject to firm dynamics (mergers etc.). The statistics present the (unweighted) mean, standard
deviation and quantiles of pooled firm-year observations. The variables partly concern (un-
weighted) averages per firm (for example in case of ∆log wage stayers) or the difference
between averages per firm (for example in case of ’log wage exiters - log wage stayers’).
Source: Own calculations using registration data from Statistics Netherlands.
mergers) and employ 25 or more workers. The growth in contractual wage
bill exceeds employment growth at all quartiles, consistent with the generally
positive growth in the wages of stayers. Job flows are substantial: on average
19.0% of workers leave a firm every year, while 16.6% are newly hired workers,
typically relatively young. The wage growth of stayers on temporary contracts
shows more variation than those on permanent contracts. Wages of newly
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hired workers, and to a lesser extent those of exiters, are typically below those
of stayers. Whilst most newly hired workers enter the firm on temporary
contracts, workers on this type of contract have a much higher probability
of exiting the firm. Appendix C provides more detailed information on the
creation of this dataset and the applied selections.
4.3.3 Institutional features of the Dutch labour market
Institutions partly determine the room firms have to adjust employment and
wages. After some OECD statistics on the relevant trends, this sub-section
concisely overviews the institutional background in the Netherlands. Tem-
porary employment as a share of dependent employment has increased from
16.6% in 2006 to 20.5% in 2013, much higher than the average share in the
EU-28 (13.7% in 2013). The chances of moving from a temporary job to an
open-ended contract are moderate. Also, the share of self-employed workers
has increased from 12.8% in 2003 to 15.9% in 2013. The employment rate of
those aged 55–64 year has increased sharply, from 47.7% in 2006 to 59.2% in
2013, in reaction to changes in the costs of early retirement and an increase in
the statutory retirement age. Part-time work is exceptionally common in the
Netherlands, with almost four out of ten jobs on part-time contracts, more
than twice the EU-28 and OECD average. For women, this rate is six out
of ten, with the average number of working hours rising with the attained
level of education (low-educated and highly educated women work 23 and 32
hours each week, respectively (Portegijs and Brakel (2016))). Another trend is
increasing labour-market polarisation, with high- and low-wage occupations si-
multaneously expanding at the expense of middle-wage occupations, although
the trend’s magnitude in the Netherlands is smaller than in other countries
(Berge and Ter Weel (2015)).
Partial labour-market reforms were implemented during the 1990s: em-
ployment protection regulations for regular contracts remained more or less
unchanged, while rules concerning the use of temporary contracts were re-
laxed. In 1999, the ‘Flexibility and Security Law’ aimed to increase employ-
ers’ flexibility to use temporary employment, while at the same time increasing
protections for flexible workers as their contracts progress. The discrepancy
in employment protection between regular and temporary contracts is large,
according to the OECD- employment protection legislation (EPL)index; pro-
tection of regular jobs is high by international comparison, principally due to
procedural inconveniences. Although firms can choose among several routes
for dismissal, in any case they have to apply the last-in, first-out rule (within
10-year age brackets to distribute dismissals more evenly over the workforce).7
7The Dutch employment-protection regime has changed since the observed period. In the
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To cope with the crisis, firms could make use of a part-time unemployment
benefit regulation from April 2009 until the end of 2010. At its maximum ex-
tent, 40,000 workers made use of the regulation, remaining to work on average
60% of their original working hours for three quarters of a year. The perceived
effect of the arrangement is limited: Hijzen and Venn (2011) found that the
part-time unemployment benefit regulation saved five to six thousand full-time
jobs.
Unemployment benefits (UB) during the first two months of unemployment
amount to 75% of the pre-unemployment salary (capped for high salaries) and
70% afterwards. Compared internationally, the replacement ratio (benefit
level/average gross wage) is fairly high. The eligibility requirement is that
one has worked at least 26 out of the previous 36 weeks. The duration of UB
depends on the number of years worked, with a maximum benefit duration
in the observed period of 38 months, which is long from an international
perspective.
Regarding wage setting, a system of collective wage bargaining, vital roles
for social partners and a relatively high minimum wage are the most relevant
institutions in the Netherlands. Collective labour agreements which have been
negotiated at the enterprise level can be extended to the entire sector if the
firm concluding the contract employs at least 60% of the workers in the sector.
Due to this extension policy, union coverage is high, although union density
is low. Collective labour agreements typically contain pay scales that guide
yearly wage increases. The Dutch statutory minimum wage level for adults
is one of the highest in the OECD area, in terms of net wage, gross wage
and labour costs. Social partners (representatives of employers and labour
unions) and the government consult each other regularly on the Social Eco-
nomic Council. Since 1982, there is a system of ‘controlled decentralization’ in
which the government does not intervene directly in wages directly; whereas
government and social partners coordinate wage negotiations centrally, the
actual negotiations concerning wage differentiation and the terms of employ-
ment are conducted on a decentralised basis. In the Spring Agreement 2009,
the social partners and the government centrally agreed upon a contractual
wage increase of 1% for 2009 and 0% for 2010. Half a year earlier, they had
observed period, the Netherlands had a dual employment protection system. Large firms
often went to court to dismiss workers, owing severance payments that increased with age
and years of tenure. Smaller firms mostly applied for authorization at the public employ-
ment service (PES). This route was generally free of severance payment, but included a term
of notice, so the procedure took longer. However, this route also often involved mandated
’social plans’, which may include some kind of severance payment anyway, as well as ar-
rangements regarding work-to-work mediation. A third, fast-growing, route was dismissal
by mutual consent, where employer and employee agree on dismissal terms. This route has
the advantage for the employer of offering more freedom to choose which employee to dismiss.
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agreed upon a wage increase of 3.5% for 2009, but the deteriorated forecasts
published by the CPB Netherlands bureau for Economic Policy Analysis in-
duced a quick new agreement, which only concerned new collective labour
agreements. There were no changes to existing collective labour agreements
(CLAs) (Harteveld (2012)).
4.4 Results and discussion
4.4.1 Results of decomposition
The decomposition analysis explores how firms adjust their wage bills to ad-
just to adverse sales shocks compared to situations of positive sales growth.
In Table 4.2, the first four columns refer to the decomposition of firms’ growth
in contractual wage bills. The upper panel of the table shows the decomposed
items, which sum to the growth in the contractual wage bill displayed in the
first line of the lower panel. The second and third lines of the lower panel
present growth in the wage bill according to broader definitions of the wage
bill. Column 1 and 2 refer to firms-year combinations that are characterised by
positive and negative sales growth, respectively; the figures are the unweighted
averages over firms. Column 3 presents for each item separately the βˆ, the esti-
mated difference between ‘adverse times’ (sales falling) and ‘good times’ (sales
increasing), according to equation 4.5, reflecting an asymmetrical response be-
tween favourable and adverse periods. Columns 5–10, discussed subsequently,
explore the heterogeneity of wage-bill adjustments over percentile groups of
sales growth.
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4.4 Results and discussion
The lower panel shows that enterprises with increasing sales grew their
contractual wage bill by 3.30% on average, while firms with decreasing sales
had wage bills that declined by 4.42%. The asymmetry between the favourable
and adverse state is -6.33% (which is the estimated β for the dummy-variable
in equation 4.5), or somewhat larger if overtime pay, incidental wages and
extra pay are taken into account.
Considering the decomposition in more detail, all βˆ’s in column 3 differ
significantly from zero, confirming that firms’ wage-bill adjustment is asym-
metric between adverse and favourable times, but the decomposed items are
evidently not equally important. ‘Change in net employment’ is by far the
most important channel for wage-bill adjustment in adverse times. Hours
worked are hardly reduced, indicating that firms only use the extensive mar-
gin to downwardly adjust their wage bills. In good times, on the other hand,
the item ‘change in net employment’ is small; firms thus may increase their
labour productivity through corporate restructuring and/or adopting techno-
logical change instead of expanding their employment.8
A striking result is that growth in the hourly wages of stayers remains
positive in adverse times, reduced only slightly (from 2.27 to 1.84) compared
to more favourable times. Hence, employment reduction contributes about 20
times more to the reduction in wage bills than reduction in the wage of stayers
(the β respectively being equal to -6,99 and -0,35). This finding matches the
existence of relatively high downward real-wage rigidity in the Netherlands
(especially among workers who are older, more highly educated or on open-
end contracts and/or full-time contracts) as measured by Deelen and Verbeek
(2015). Hence, mitigating the hourly wages of stayers is not an important
channel to reduce wage bills during adverse demand shocks.
Regarding the intensive margin, changes in the working hours of stayers do
mitigate the wage bill in adverse times compared to good times, but only in a
limited way. Similar to the growth in the hourly wage of stayers, the growth in
working hours remains positive, albeit smaller than when sales increase. The
positive contribution of ‘hours worked by non-stayers’ reflects the fact that
exiters, and to a lesser extent entrants, work in jobs with fewer hours than
stayers; βˆ is negative, but mainly because there are more exiters in adverse
times. Overall, for entrants and exiters taken together, adjustments to working
hours have a minor effect on the wage bill.
Job flows could be another channel to adjust the wage bill, especially if
firms reduce wages of new hires or dismiss high-waged workers during adverse
8Note that the contribution by ‘net change in employment’ is calculated using the monthly
wage level of stayers; insofar as wages and hours worked of non-stayers are below those of
stayers, this affects the decomposition items ‘hourly wage, entrants’, ‘hourly wages, exiters’
and ‘hours worked, non-stayers’.
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periods. What happens to the wages of entrants or exiters cannot be seen
directly from the decomposition table. The complementary information in
Table A4.2 in Appendix A shows that entrants’ wages are generally lower
than those of stayers, in line with steep wage profiles over tenure, but the data
give no indication that firms offer especially low starting wages during adverse
times. The item ‘hourly wage, entrants’ in the decomposition is less negative
in adverse times, mainly because of the reduced volume of cheap entrants.
The magnitude of the item ‘hourly wage, exiters’ in the decomposition is
more positive in adverse times: increased exit of low-paid workers contributes
positively to the decomposition of changes in the wage bill.9
To see how firms adjust to more adverse circumstances, the right-hand side
of Table 4.2 explores the heterogeneity of wage-bill adjustments over percentile
groups of sales growth. The decomposition is presented for the high end (P75–
P100) of the sales growth distribution, the middle part (P25–P75) and the low
end (P1–P25), the latter referring to a severe downward shock in sales. βˆ in
column 6 refers to P25–P75 compared to P75–P100, whereas βˆ in column 9
refers to P1–P25 compared to P25–P75. Results show that during a relatively
severe shock, the change in net employment still remains the main channel for
downward wage-bill adjustment. Growth in the contractual working hours of
stayers slows but remains positive. Changes in the contractual wage of stayers
mitigate the wage-bill change by only 0.32 to 1.82 percentage-points. Hence,
the growth in the hourly contractual wage of stayers is scarcely lower at the
lower end of the sales distribution for stayers on both permanent and tem-
porary contracts (Table A4.2), probably because collective labour agreements
put a floor on contractual wage growth. Besides, as the lower panel shows,
firms cut overtime pay and incidental wages during adverse sales shocks.
Exits and entries respond differently to sales; the share of newly hired
workers decreases roughly linearly when sales deteriorate, while exits show
a U-shaped pattern. Exits are subject to two opposite effects which cannot
be disentangled from the data: voluntary job-switches are more abundant
when the economy is robust, whereas firms dismiss more workers and renew
fewer temporary contracts when business deteriorates. Comparing the upper
(P75–P100) and the lower (P1–P25) end of the sales distribution, Table A4.2
shows that the average share of entries decreases more than the share of exits
increases. Hence, reduced entries are an important means to reduce wage bills
when sales decline since the firm has more control over entries than over the
entirety of exits and no dismissal costs are involved.
9Exiters also have lower wages than stayers, although in bad times more highly paid
workers tend leave the firm, as Table A4.2 shows, that the share of older workers among
exiters rises, probably into early retirement. That said, whereas the wage differential between
exiters and entrants reduces in bad times, the number of exiters is higher.
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Although firms at the lower end of the sales-growth distribution hire sub-
stantially fewer new workers, the complementary information does not suggest
that firms apply extra reductions in starting wages. Wages of entrants are be-
low those of stayers (i.e., log wage entrants - log wage stayers is positive) but
this difference becomes smaller when sales growth is lower (i.e., the estimated
β comparing these states is positive). The exact effect is difficult to assess,
however, because the composition of the group of stayers itself and therefore
its average wage is affected by inflows and outflows. Since the last-in, first-out
rule is applied within 10-year age brackets, dismissals reduce the share of older
workers, who generally earn higher wages. However, the findings suggest that,
even at the lower end of the sales distribution, contractual wages are not an
important means to adjust the wage bill, with respect to neither stayers nor
new hires.
One might suppose that in the short run, adjustment could predominantly
run through employment, but that firms will adjust wages downward if sales
growth remains adverse over a longer period. Therefore, I analyse to what
extent the decomposition results are sensitive to the persistence of an adverse
sales shock. To do so, I repeat the decomposition analysis for the (smaller)
sample of firms for which data on sales growth are available for both the year
of observation (t) and the year before, (t−1). I split this sample into three
groups: first, firms with positive sales growth in the year of observation (t);
second, firms with sales decrease in (t) and sales growth in (t−1); and third,
firms with sales decrease in both (t) and (t−1). βˆ in column 3 of Table 4.3
refers to the asymmetry between the second and first groups of firms, while
βˆ in column 6 refers to the asymmetry between the third and first groups of
firms. In case of a protracted sales decrease (Table 4.3, column 5), the wage-bill
contraction is more than twice as high as when sales drop after a year of sales
growth (column 2). Even so, the wage increase of stayers is still positive and
only slightly lower. Hours worked by stayers reduce only slightly. Reductions
in overtime pay, incidental and extra pay contribute to wage-bill reduction, but
to a limited extent and not by much more then after a one-time drop in sales.
Even if these items are reduced strongly, their impact is still limited because
they represent only a small part of the wage bill (for example, in 2009/2010
the average amount of overtime, incidental and extra pay amounted to about
5% of the amount received as contractual wages. Hence, these data support
the picture that firms only choose employment reduction as a means to reduce
their wage bills, even if their sales remain depressed for a prolonged period.
Even if I repeat the same decomposition analysis for the sub-sample of firms for
which data on sales growth are available for both the year of observation and
for year (t−1) and (t−2), no additional wage mitigation is found on average
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for sales drops of three years in a row compared to two years, whereas the
reduction in employment is substantially larger in this case.10
Employment reduction is far more important for firms that have a share of
open-term contracts below the median and hence a higher share of temporary
contracts. The more flexible firms in terms of their contract types use net
employment to a greater extent to adjust their wage bills. Of course, firms
will have tailored the mix of contract types to their needs, given the specific
environments in which they operate. Firms with a higher share of open-term
contracts are more inclined to cut down on incidental and extra pay, but there
is no large difference regarding contractual wages. The hourly wages and hours
worked by stayers are only slightly reduced, remaining positive for such firms
in adverse periods.
10I repeat the decomposition analysis for the sub-sample of firms for which data on sales
growth are available for both the year of observation and years (t−1) and (t−2). Out of
this sample, I compare three groups: first, firms with positive sales growth in the year of
observation (t) whereas sales growth in (t−1) and (t−2) may be positive or negative, 20,360
observations; second, firms with decreasing sales in (t) and (t−1) and positive sales growth
in (t−2), 3,082 firms; third: firms with decreasing sales in both (t), (t−1) and (t−2), 4,939
observations. The βˆ describing the asymmetry between groups 2 and 1 amounts to −5.77
for gross wage-bill growth, −5.98 for the net change in employment and −0.31 for the hourly
wage of stayers. The βˆ describing the asymmetry between groups 3 and 1 amounts to −8.75
for gross wage-bill growth, −10.15 for the net change in employment and −0.36 for the hourly
wage of stayers.
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4.4 Results and discussion
These differences by contract type are consistent with those over sectors of
economic activity. The business services and Horeca (hotel/restaurant/cafe´)
sectors, where job flows (the share of both entrants to and exiters from the
workforce) are two-to-three times larger compared to manufacturing, construc-
tion and goods trade, have a considerable flexible, non-core workforce (see the
decomposition results by sector of economic activity in Table A4.3 in Appendix
A). Several features suggest that these sectors have a segmented labour mar-
ket.11 First, compared to other sectors, the share of temporary contracts
among entrants and exiters is much higher in the business services and Horeca
sectors and the wage level of non-stayers falls further short to that of stay-
ers. Second, the share of older workers among exiters is remarkably low in
these sectors. In the Horeca sector, the age of both entrants and exiters is
remarkably low compared to stayers. Wage changes for stayers are relatively
high in the business services sector, which might indicate that insiders in this
segmented labour market have strong bargaining positions.
Despite some variation by sector of economic activity, the conclusion that
wages of stayers continue to grow in bad times and is almost as much as in
favourable times continues to stand for all sectors. Moreover, where wage
changes are already moderate with positive sales growth, as in the transport
and communications and Horeca sectors, there seems to be less room to reduce
wage changes when sales deteriorate, suggesting downward wage rigidity. The
mandatory minimum wage may put a floor on wage increases in these sectors.
Moreover, pay scales in collective labour agreements create strong guidelines
for wage changes in sectors with low- and middle-income jobs. High-wage jobs,
however, are often paid above the maximum of the highest pay scales, offering
more room to adjust contractual wages (Deelen and Euwals (2014))
wage-bill growth has varied largely over years (Table A4.4). In 2007–
2008, firms facing drops in sales reduced their wage bills on average by 0.76%,
whereas in 2008–2009 the average reduction was 5.66%; the number of firms
facing fewer sales rose by almost 50%. wage-bill contraction by these firms
found its trough in the next year, 2009–2010. Overtime pay and incidental
wages offered some downward flexibility, -0.50 percentage-points in 2008–2009.
Notably, hourly wage growth of stayers generally has come down between
2007 and 2012. In 2011–2012 the change in hourly wages of stayers even
became negative, although this was almost fully offset by a positive growth
in hours worked. It has already been established that firms offer not much
lower contractual wage growth in adverse conditions than in favourable peri-
ods. Over the years, however, the wage growth of stayers has been gradually
11Tables with complementary information by sectors of industry and by year are available
upon request.
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reduced across the board, possibly due to a relatively high level of coordina-
tion. In the Netherlands, the outcomes of the consultations of the Dutch social
partners serve as important guidelines for wage bargaining at the enterprise
and sector levels.
4.4.2 Regression analysis of wages, job flows and employment
While the decomposition analysis in the last subsection provides insight into
the balance between the elements of wage-bill change, this analysis only al-
lows exploration of variations over a single dimension, such as the share of
open-term contracts (see Table 4.4); if decompositions of two groups of firms
are compared, the differences in observed characteristics are not considered.
Therefore, I use a multivariate regression analysis to examine the relative im-
portance of various covariates. Again, the unit of observation is the firm, while
the covariates often concern the shares of certain groups of workers in the firm
(in percentages) or dummy variables related to categorical variables.
The regressions explain variables underlying the results of decomposition,
such as the wage growth of stayers, employment growth and job flows. I focus
on these underlying variables rather than on the decomposed items themselves,
because the latter may be impacted by, for example, both wages and the size of
the group of workers, which would make the results more difficult to interpret.
The regressions elucidate the role of labour-market rigidities and firm char-
acteristics.12 Since the main interest here is the balance between the adjust-
ments to wages and to employment, I include employment growth as a covari-
ate in the wage-growth regressions, while I include wage-growth and indicators
for downward wage rigidity in the regressions for job flows and employment.
To address reverse-causality issues, other explanatory variables are mostly
measured at year t−1, whereas the dependent variables refer to changes in
year t relative to t−1 and an instrumental variable is used for the shares of
migrant workers per firm (as explained in Appendix C). However, although
the dataset is quite rich, some variables may still be lacking; therefore, I can-
not exclude the possibility that omitted-variable bias plays a role in the results.
Table 4.5 offers results for both wage and employment growth, highlighting
the most relevant covariates that illustrate variation over sales shocks.13 Col-
12OLS is applied, but SUR regressions give very comparable results. Table A4.8 explores
Random Effects and Fixed Effects estimations as alternatives to the OLS regressions used
in the main analysis. The results are described in the note underneath that table.
13Other covariates are often similar over the sales growth samples. These covariates merely
reflect variations in productivity or bargaining positions and are less relevant with respect
to adjustments to sales shocks. For example, higher training expenditures, a higher share
of highly educated workers and larger firm size are typically associated with higher wage
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umn 1 presents results for the sub-sample of firm-year observations for which
sales increased. Columns 2 and 3 show regressions on samples with increas-
ingly adverse sales growth, observations respectively below the median and
below the 10th percentile of the sales-growth distribution. Hence, the third
column contains the fewest observations, comprising those firms that experi-
enced a severe downturn. Columns 4, 5 and 6, concern employment growth in
the same fashion.
Concerning the wage growth of stayers, a comparison of ‘average’ (column
2) and severe (column 3) negative sales shocks reveals that most covariates are
strikingly similar. Wage growth of stayers hardly responds to the magnitude of
firms’ sales decreases, with a small and insignificant coefficient for sales growth.
Although sales may impact wage growth partly through other covariates, such
as the business result (profit rate) and whether the firm ceases to exist during
the following year, these effects are also small. The low sensitivity of stayers’
wages to sales growth is consistent with the findings of the decomposition
analysis in Tables 4.2 and 4.3.
growth. The full results can be found in Tables A4.5 and A4.6 in Appendix A.
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Wage growth of stayers is generally weakly related to the firms’ share of
open-term contracts (consistent with the findings of the decomposition anal-
ysis in Table 4.4); apparently, higher job security does not translate into a
stronger wage bargaining position, probably partly because variables concern-
ing the workforce composition (such as level of education, migrant-status, age)
cover the group with open-term contracts to a large extent. A large share of
long-tenured jobs is generally associated with lower wage growth, consistent
with wage-profiles flattening over tenure. During sharp downturns, workers
on open-ended and long-tenured contracts seem to trade their job security
for a slightly lower wage increase. Seniority-related employment protection
rights, such as last-in, first-out dismissal rules and tenure-based severance pay
and notice periods not only imply high dismissal costs for employers but also
discourage voluntary job mobility among highly protected workers, who lose
their rights when they enter a new job.
At the enterprise level, CLAs are positively associates with growth in the
hourly wage of stayers, which may indicate that collective bargaining at the
enterprise level increases bargaining power compared to workers having no
CLA. CLAs at the sector level, either directly or through extension of contracts
at the enterprise level, do not lead to apparent higher wage growth.14
Regarding the share of immigrants at firms, I find some negative effects,
except for severe downturns.15 A higher share of immigrants originating from
countries that became part of the EU in 2004 or 2007 is associated with lower
wage growth. Since these workers immigrated recently (after the accession
of their countries in 2004 or 2007), they are entitled to limited UB duration
and employment protection, so their bargaining power is low. Moreover, their
reservation wage may be lower, perhaps for example because their dependents
live in their country of origin where their earnings have higher purchasing
power. Also, a higher share of immigrants from non-western countries is asso-
ciated with lower wages at a firm.
14OECD (2004) states: ‘It is unclear how much emphasis should be placed on ranking
organisational structures of collective bargaining in terms of their implications for macroe-
conomic performance. That structural orientation has informed a rich body of research,
as exemplified by the influential study of Calmfors and Driffill (1988) and the literature it
stimulated. However, the great difficulty encountered by researchers attempting to identify
robust associations between differences in bargaining organisation and differences in macroe-
conomic performance suggest that quite different organisational forms may be capable of
similar performance.’
15The theoretical literature is inconclusive about the effect of migration on wages and
employment. If the skill-mix of migrants is similar to that of native workers, no effect is
expected. If their skill-mix does not match that of natives, the effects of migration on wages
and employment depend on the flexibility of the economy to change its output mix and on
its openness to international trade Dustmann and Meghir (2005).
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The picture is altogether different regarding employment growth. The large
and highly significant coefficients for the growth rate of sales in columns 5 and
6 of Table 4.5 indicate that changes in net employment are quite sensitive
to sales growth, especially for firms with declining sales. The profit rate and
whether the firm ceases to exist in the subsequent year also have large impacts.
The worse the state of the firm, the more strongly its response in terms of job
loss, whereas firms display no identified increase in the responsiveness of wages.
Type of contract, of course is one important determinant of the amount
of employment adjustment; open-term contracts, regular job types and full-
time jobs are associated with more employment growth or less job loss. This
sensitivity of employment reduction to the share of non-core contract types is
particularly high among firms facing severe downturns in sales.
Firms with CLAs concluded at the sector level are associated with less
employment growth or more employment loss compared to firms without a
CLA. This may indicate that wage agreements concluded at a higher level
of centralization fit individual firms less well, leading these firms to reduce
employment as they cannot adjust wages under the terms of the sector CLA.
A higher share of migrant workers, especially from western countries, is
accompanied by significantly lower job growth or more job reduction.16. Es-
pecially conditional on a large sales drop, employment reduction of firms is
very sensitive to the share of workers with a migration background.
Last but not least, I find a strong, negative relationship between the in-
cidence of downward wage rigidity at firms and their employment growth.17
Wage rigidity indicators were derived from the stayers’ distribution of wage
changes, see variable description in Appendix C. A higher share of jobs at a
firm for which wage growth clumps around zero (nominal wage rigidity) or
around inflation expectations (real wage rigidity), causes a spike in the wage
growth distribution and a higher wage-rigidity indicator. The negative re-
lationship between downward wage rigidity and employment growth is even
more distinct in cases of strong sales shocks. This finding clearly indicates
that nominal and real downward wage rigidity come at a cost in terms of em-
ployment: if wages were more downwardly flexible, there would be fewer job
losses during demand shocks. To indicate the magnitude: if the average share
16This group includes the four largest immigrant groups to the Netherlands: those from
Suriname, the Netherlands Antilles, Turkey and Morocco
17I control for the growth in the hourly wages of stayers: in general, there is a positive
relationship between wage and employment growth in firms, so more favourable conditions
are matched by both more jobs and higher wage growth. Conditional on that, I find a
negative effect of the indicators of downward wage rigidity on employment growth; a larger
spike in the wage-growth distribution at zero or at the expected inflation rate is associated
with less employment growth. See Table A4.6 in Appendix A.
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of workers with a wage freeze increases by one percentage-point, employment
growth is reduced by 0.35 percentage-points with sales growth below the me-
dian, whereas employment growth is reduced by 0.65 percentage-points during
a severe (below P10) negative shock in sales.18
As employment growth results from changes in job flows, Table 4.6 explores
the sensitivity of employment growth and the share of entrants and exiters in
the workforce to sales shocks.19 The left three columns refer to sales below
the median, while the right three columns refer to the first decile of the sales
growth distribution. Note that the coefficients for employment are equal to
the difference between the coefficients for the share of entrants and the share
of exiters. Exits show more variation than entries over the presented firm
characteristics. A higher share of open-ended and regular contracts merely
leads, as expected, to less outflow of workers. CLAs at the sector level are
clearly associated with more outflow of workers. Also, the effect of a high
share of immigrants from other western countries runs mainly through more
exits. Finally, the negative effect of wage rigidity on employment runs fully
through a response in terms of exits, most probably dismissals.
To summarize, most covariates show little impact on wage growth in cases
of an average or severe negative sales shocks: insofar wage growth is miti-
gated, this effect is small and holds across the board. By contrast, employment
growth is quite sensitive to firm characteristics20 and to the magnitude of the
sales shock. Employment reduction is clearly higher with a larger share of
migrant workers or workers on a temporary or having a non-regular job type.
Hence, employment reduction in bad times predominantly hits groups of work-
ers with a relatively weak labour-market positions, predominantly through
increased exits: immigrants, employees on temporary contracts, non-regular
job-types and part-time jobs, predominantly through increased exits. Also,
downward wage rigidity is strongly associated with more exits and less em-
ployment, especially after a severe shock in sales.21 These findings point to
18For this exercise, wage freezes are defined as a monthly wage growth between -0.1% and
+0.1%; among firms with decreasing sales, on average 6.4% of their workers have a wage
freeze (sd 0.1424). The indicator of nominal downward wage rigidity has a high correlation
(0.85) with a firm’s share of wage freezes. The mentioned effects of a 1 percentage-point
impulse in the share of workers having wage freezes are thus calculated as 0.85 times the
estimated coefficient in Table 4.5.
19Table A4.7 presents the full regression results.
20The firm characteristics themselves are generally fairly stable, however, over the various
regression samples. See Table B4.3 in Appendix B
21Similar regressions for incidental wage growth, growth in hours worked by stayers and
the wages of entrants compared to those of stayers, provide no indication–agreeing with the
findings of the decomposition analysis–that any of these are used as important adjustment
mechanisms to severe sales shocks.
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a segmented labour market, where, on the one hand, employment adjustment
predominantly affects workers with relatively weak labour-market position,
while, on the other hand, ongoing workers can be assured that sales shocks
suffered by the firm will not strongly affect their increasing wages.
4.4.3 Discussion
One of the main findings of this paper is that firms in the Netherlands down-
wardly adjust wage bills predominantly by reducing employment. In the short
run, the contractual wage growth of continuing workers is rather insensitive
to whether the sales of the firm for which they work increase or (sharply) de-
crease. Over the longer run, however, wage growth has decelerated across the
board. This may be due to a high level of coordination, as outcomes of con-
sultations of the Dutch social partners serve as important guidelines for wage
bargaining at the enterprise and sector levels in the Netherlands. This model
of ‘controlled decentralisation’ has the merit that stayers’ wage increases are
moderate and predictable and labour-market unrest is avoided. One likely
rationale is that employers are afraid to harm the workers’ motivation. On
a recent survey (Dalen and Henkens (2015)) employers mentioned this factor
as a main argument against the demotion (reducing an employee’s rank and
salary) of older workers. A positive relationship between effort and the wage
level is acknowledged by empirical studies of, among others, Fehr and Falk
(1999) and Bewley (1999); the latter finds that good morale (related to fair-
ness) among a firm’s workforce has positive effect on profits by increasing the
workers’ productivity and effort, while wage cuts decrease morale.
The first possible drawback of the model of ‘controlled decentralisation’
is that wage growth at some firms may be more moderate than necessary,
which can be undesirable from a macro-economic point of view in case of
low spending. The second possible drawback may be that wage flexibility
is limited; wage-bill adjustments are then largely provided by job reduction,
which affects a non-random group of workers. This is consistent with the
results of an international survey of employers (ECB (2009)), which showed
that Dutch firms stand out in their strong reliance on the destruction of flexible
jobs to adjust their wage bills in periods of adverse sales growth.
Deelen and Verbeek (2015) observe relatively high downward real wage
rigidity is in the Netherlands, concentrated among workers who are relatively
older, highly educated, or on open-term contracts and have full-time jobs.
These are also the groups that are best-represented by labour unions. Re-
cently, the Social Economic Council advised enlarging the support for collec-
tive labour agreements by involving groups that are underrepresented among
the union membership (SER (2013)).
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4.5 Conclusions
This chapter offers insight into how Dutch firms adjust their wage bill dur-
ing downturns. wage-bill changes were firstly decomposed and secondly job
flows, employment and wage growth were regressed on job and firm charac-
teristics. I used extensive, administrative linked employer–employee data for
the Netherlands for the period 2006-2013.
The first part decomposes wage-bill changes into components related to
changes in hourly wages, hours worked and number of jobs, separated for
stayers and workers entering and exiting the firm. I find that job destruction
is, by far, the most important channel for wage-bill contraction, suggesting
that wages are downwardly rigid. In this regard, not only increased exits but
also reduced entries are used, probably to prevent firing costs. Compared to
firms with growing sales, increases in the hourly contractual wages of stayers
is only somewhat lower in firms hit by an adverse shock in sales, presumably
because collective labour agreements put a floor on contractual wage growth
for all firms. On average, employment reduction contributes about 20 times
more to wage-bill reduction than wage reductions of stayers. Over the years,
however, wage growth has been reduced across the board, probably due to a
relatively high level of coordination. Job flows have not served as an important
mechanism to reduce the average wage; there is no indication that entrants’
wages are reduced extra below those of stayers during periods of adverse sales
growth. Contractual working hours provide some downward flexibility of rel-
atively small magnitude compared to the overall wage bill, as do overtime pay
and incidental wages.
In the second part of this study, regressions relating changes in wages and
employment to firm characteristics confirmed that the wage growth of stayers
is not very responsive to the size of sales decreases. By contrast, the response
of employment growth is quite sensitive to both firm characteristics and the
magnitude of negative sales shocks. Employment losses are concentrated in
firms with a higher share of immigrants, short-tenured workers, younger as well
as older workers, employees on temporary contracts, non-regular job types and
part-time jobs.
Moreover, I found a significant negative relation between downward wage
rigidity and employment growth in firms. This suggests that more downwardly
flexible wages would significantly lower the reduction in employment caused
by adverse shocks.
These findings point to a segmented labour market, where, on the one
hand, employment adjustment predominantly affects workers with a relatively
weak labour-market position, while continuing workers can be assured, on the
other hand, that their wage increase will not be jeopardised by sales shocks
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suffered by the firm at which they work. This segmentation could, however,
result from rational behaviour by employers, given the institutional context.
More research is therefore needed to assess the relationship between labour-
market outcomes and the nature of the labour-market institutions, such as
those involved in employment protection and wage formation.
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Appendix A: Additional tables and graphs
wage-bill contraction is strongly correlated with sales reduction: the parsimo-
nious regressions in Table A4.1 indicate that for firms with decreasing sales a
drop in sales of 10% is associated with a reduction of the contractual wage bill
by on average 3% − 4% (columns 3 and 4). The wage-bill reduction is even
larger if sales were also decreasing in the year before. In contrast, for firms
with growing sales (columns 1 and 2) the correlation between sales growth and
wage-bill growth is rather low.
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Figure 4.1: Kernel density graphs firms ≥ 25 workers, by year
0
1
2
3
4
5
D
en
si
ty
−.4 −.3 −.2 −.1 0 .1 .2 .3 .4
sales growth
sales growth
0
1
2
3
4
5
D
en
si
ty
−.2 −.1 0 .1 .2
growth contractual wage bill
growth contractual wage bill
0
5
10
15
20
D
en
si
ty
−.1 −.05 0 .05 .1
growth monthly wage stayers
growth monthly wage stayers
0
1
2
3
4
5
D
en
si
ty
−.2 −.1 0 .1 .2
employment growth
employment growth
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
D
en
si
ty
0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5
job exit rate
job exit rate
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
D
en
si
ty
0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5
job entry rate
job entry rate
2007 2008 2009 2010
2011 2012 2013
Source: Own calculations based on registration data from Statistics Netherlands.
125
Flexible Wages or Flexible Workers?
T
a
b
le
A
4
.1
:
R
el
at
io
n
sh
ip
b
et
w
ee
n
sa
le
s
gr
ow
th
an
d
co
n
tr
ac
tu
al
w
ag
e-
b
il
l
gr
ow
th
fo
r
va
ri
ou
s
su
b
-s
am
p
le
s
D
ep
en
d
en
t
va
ri
a
b
le
:
∆
S
≥
0
∆
S
≥
0
∆
S
<
0
∆
S
<
0
∆
S
<
0
∆
S
<
0
S
a
m
p
le
:
≥
2
5
w
o
rk
er
s
≥
2
5
w
o
rk
er
s
≥
2
5
w
o
rk
er
s
≥
2
5
w
o
rk
er
s
a
ll
fi
rm
si
ze
s
a
ll
fi
rm
si
ze
s
G
ro
w
th
ra
te
sa
le
s
(t
)
0
.0
1
3
5
∗∗
∗
0
.0
1
1
4
∗∗
∗
0
.3
5
1
8
∗∗
∗
0
.3
3
7
5
∗∗
∗
0
.4
0
3
3
∗∗
∗
0
.3
7
8
2
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
0
2
6
)
(0
.0
0
4
8
)
(0
.0
2
0
8
)
(0
.0
3
9
9
)
(0
.0
1
8
8
)
(0
.0
3
6
7
)
G
ro
w
th
ra
te
sa
le
s
(t
)2
−0
.0
0
1
7
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
0
1
1
∗
0
.0
5
7
9
−0
.1
2
1
6
0
.1
6
7
3
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
4
8
5
(0
.0
0
0
3
)
(0
.0
0
0
5
)
(0
.0
3
6
9
)
(0
.0
7
1
2
)
(0
.0
3
2
1
)
(0
.0
6
4
0
)
G
ro
w
th
ra
te
sa
le
s
(t
-1
)
0
.0
0
5
7
∗∗
0
.1
3
5
6
∗∗
∗
0
.1
2
3
1
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
0
2
0
)
(0
.0
1
6
7
)
(0
.0
1
5
1
)
F
ir
m
si
ze
2
5
-9
9
0
.0
6
5
3
∗∗
∗
0
.0
7
0
6
∗∗
∗
0
.0
2
4
5
∗∗
∗
0
.0
2
4
2
∗∗
−0
.0
0
7
2
∗∗
−.
0
0
7
3
(0
.0
0
4
2
)
(0
.0
0
5
6
)
(0
.0
0
5
1
)
(0
.0
0
8
7
)
(0
.0
0
2
2
)
(0
.0
0
4
5
)
F
ir
m
si
ze
1
0
0
-4
9
9
0
.0
5
1
5
∗∗
∗
0
.0
5
5
4
∗∗
∗
0
.0
1
4
9
∗∗
0
.0
1
7
4
−0
.0
1
7
0
−0
.0
1
4
0
(0
.0
0
4
4
)
(0
.0
0
5
8
)
(0
.0
0
5
4
)
(0
.0
0
9
2
)
(0
.0
0
3
0
)
(0
.0
0
5
6
)
F
ir
m
si
ze
≥
5
0
0
−0
.0
3
2
1
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
3
1
1
∗∗
(0
.0
0
6
0
)
(0
.0
1
0
0
)
Y
ea
r
2
0
0
8
0
.0
0
7
4
∗∗
0
.0
1
3
0
∗∗
0
.0
1
4
3
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
0
2
6
)
(0
.0
0
4
2
)
(0
.0
0
3
9
)
Y
ea
r
2
0
0
9
−0
.0
2
3
2
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
2
8
8
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
1
7
2
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
2
3
6
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
1
4
5
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
2
4
0
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
0
3
3
)
(0
.0
0
3
9
)
(0
.0
0
4
0
)
(0
.0
0
7
2
)
(0
.0
0
3
7
)
(0
.0
0
6
9
)
Y
ea
r
2
0
1
0
−0
.0
5
2
0
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
6
1
3
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
4
8
5
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
3
1
2
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
4
8
9
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
3
3
3
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
0
2
9
)
(0
.0
0
4
3
)
(0
.0
0
4
2
)
(0
.0
0
7
0
)
(0
.0
0
3
9
)
(0
.0
0
6
6
)
Y
ea
r
2
0
1
1
−0
.0
1
3
8
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
1
6
4
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
2
0
2
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
2
2
3
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
1
6
3
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
2
6
0
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
0
2
6
)
(0
.0
0
3
4
)
(0
.0
0
4
3
)
(0
.0
0
7
6
)
(0
.0
0
3
9
)
(0
.0
0
7
1
)
Y
ea
r
2
0
1
1
−0
.0
1
4
4
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
1
7
8
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
1
5
3
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
2
4
2
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
1
2
4
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
2
8
2
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
0
3
0
)
(0
.0
0
3
6
)
(0
.0
0
4
1
)
(0
.0
0
7
5
)
(0
.0
0
3
7
)
(0
.0
0
6
9
)
In
te
rc
ep
t
−0
.0
1
2
6
∗∗
−0
.0
0
2
2
0
.0
0
1
0
−0
.0
0
0
2
0
.0
3
4
0
∗∗
∗
0
.0
3
4
8
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
0
4
4
)
(0
.0
0
5
7
)
(0
.0
0
6
0
)
(0
.0
1
0
5
)
(0
.0
0
3
6
)
(0
.0
0
7
2
)
N
3
8
,1
0
8
1
5
,0
4
2
2
7
,5
3
8
8
,4
2
0
4
3
,7
8
7
1
1
,7
2
4
N
o
te
s
:
E
x
cl
u
d
ed
fr
o
m
th
e
sa
m
p
le
a
re
th
e
fi
rs
t
a
n
d
h
ig
h
es
t
p
er
ce
n
ti
le
o
f
th
e
sa
le
s
g
ro
w
th
d
is
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
a
s
w
el
l
a
s
fi
rm
-y
ea
r
co
m
b
in
a
ti
o
n
s
su
b
je
ct
to
fi
rm
d
y
n
a
m
ic
s
(e
.g
.
m
er
g
er
s,
et
c.
).
S
ec
to
rs
o
f
in
d
u
st
ry
d
u
m
m
ie
s
a
re
n
o
t
in
cl
u
d
ed
in
th
is
sp
ec
ifi
ca
ti
o
n
;
th
e
co
effi
ci
en
ts
w
o
u
ld
b
e
in
si
g
n
ifi
ca
n
t
a
n
d
th
o
se
fo
r
sa
le
s
u
n
a
ff
ec
te
d
.
O
L
S
es
ti
m
a
ti
o
n
is
u
se
d
,
b
u
t
a
n
R
E
-s
p
ec
ifi
ca
ti
o
n
g
iv
es
v
er
y
si
m
il
a
r
re
su
lt
s.
R
o
b
u
st
st
a
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
in
p
a
re
n
th
es
es
.
S
ig
n
ifi
ca
n
ce
le
v
el
s:
∗
:
5
%
∗∗
:
1
%
∗∗
∗
:
0
.1
%
.
S
o
u
rc
e
:
O
w
n
ca
lc
u
la
ti
o
n
s
u
si
n
g
re
g
is
tr
a
ti
o
n
d
a
ta
fr
o
m
S
ta
ti
st
ic
s
N
et
h
er
la
n
d
s
126
T
a
b
le
A
4
.2
:
C
om
p
le
m
en
ta
ry
in
fo
fo
r
T
ab
le
4.
2,
th
e
d
ec
om
p
os
it
io
n
b
y
sa
le
s
gr
ow
th
gr
ou
p
s
∆
S
≥
0
∆
S
<
0
βˆ
P
7
5
-P
1
0
0
βˆ
P
2
5
-P
7
5
βˆ
P
1
-P
2
5
G
ro
w
th
in
co
n
tr
a
ct
u
a
l
w
a
g
e
b
il
l
(i
n
%
)
3
.3
0
-4
.4
2
-9
.3
4
∗∗
∗
4
.6
9
-4
.7
9
∗∗
∗
1
.1
2
-1
0
.2
8
∗∗
∗
-7
.4
8
G
ro
w
th
in
#
o
f
jo
b
s
0
.2
5
-7
.4
8
-1
0
.3
5
∗∗
∗
1
.3
6
-4
.7
5
∗∗
∗
-1
.7
1
-1
1
.7
6
∗∗
∗
-1
0
.7
9
S
h
a
re
ex
it
er
s
(t
−1
)
1
6
.9
0
1
8
.4
6
1
.5
9
∗∗
∗
1
8
.6
3
-0
.3
4
∗∗
∗
1
5
.8
8
2
.8
3
∗∗
∗
2
0
.3
5
S
h
a
re
en
tr
a
n
ts
(t
)
1
7
.0
5
1
3
.3
2
-4
.2
4
∗∗
∗
1
9
.4
8
-2
.8
1
∗∗
∗
1
4
.6
7
-4
.1
8
∗∗
∗
1
3
.0
5
S
h
a
re
a
g
ed
6
0
-6
5
a
m
o
n
g
ex
it
er
s
(t
−1
)
9
.8
8
1
0
.8
9
-0
.1
0
n
.s
.
9
.5
9
0
.2
8
n
.s
.
1
0
.4
8
-0
.6
1
∗∗
∗
1
0
.6
9
S
h
a
re
a
g
ed
5
5
-5
9
a
m
o
n
g
ex
it
er
s
(t
−1
)
5
.3
1
5
.7
7
0
.2
7
∗∗
∗
5
.3
0
0
.0
1
n
.s
.
5
.3
8
0
.2
8
∗∗
6
.0
0
A
v
er
a
g
e
a
g
e
st
ay
er
s
(t
−1
)
4
0
.8
5
4
1
.4
2
-0
.0
1
n
.s
.
4
0
.5
5
-0
.0
0
n
.s
.
4
1
.2
0
-0
.0
2
∗∗
4
1
.4
3
A
g
e
ex
it
er
s
to
a
g
e
st
ay
er
s
(t
−1
)
9
6
.8
1
9
7
.2
5
0
.1
8
n
.s
.
9
7
.2
6
-0
.7
4
∗∗
∗
9
6
.6
4
0
.1
4
∗∗
∗
9
7
.5
6
A
g
e
en
tr
a
n
ts
to
a
g
e
st
ay
er
s
(t
)
8
5
.7
4
8
4
.4
4
-0
.7
0
∗∗
∗
8
6
.7
7
-1
.3
7
∗∗
∗
8
4
.6
7
0
.1
6
n
.s
.
8
4
.7
4
∆
L
o
g
w
a
g
e
st
ay
er
s
(h
o
u
rl
y
),
p
er
m
a
n
en
t
2
.5
6
2
.1
1
-0
.3
0
∗∗
∗
2
.7
5
-0
.2
3
∗∗
∗
2
.2
9
-0
.2
4
∗∗
∗
2
.1
3
∆
L
o
g
w
a
g
e
st
ay
er
s
(h
o
u
rl
y
),
te
m
p
o
ra
ry
4
.1
9
3
.5
9
-0
.4
6
∗∗
4
.5
7
-0
.6
9
∗∗
∗
3
.7
9
-0
.2
6
n
.s
.
3
.5
9
∆
L
o
g
h
o
u
rs
w
o
rk
ed
st
ay
er
s,
p
er
m
a
n
en
t
0
.3
5
-0
.0
2
-0
.1
5
∗∗
0
.3
8
-0
.2
3
∗∗
∗
0
.2
7
-0
.0
7
n
.s
.
-0
.2
1
∆
L
o
g
h
o
u
rs
w
o
rk
ed
st
ay
er
s,
te
m
p
o
ra
ry
-0
.7
0
-1
.0
2
-0
.1
5
n
.s
.
-0
.6
4
-0
.1
7
n
.s
.
-0
.7
6
-0
.2
1
n
.s
.
-1
.2
3
L
o
g
h
.w
a
g
e
ex
it
er
s
-
L
o
g
h
.w
a
g
e
st
ay
er
s
-1
0
.3
2
-9
.6
0
0
.6
3
∗∗
-1
0
.4
5
0
.3
6
n
.s
.
-1
0
.0
3
0
.5
5
∗∗
-9
.5
1
L
o
g
h
.w
a
g
e
en
tr
a
n
ts
-
L
o
g
h
.w
a
g
e
st
ay
er
s
-1
4
.5
4
-1
3
.5
3
0
.9
9
∗∗
∗
-1
4
.3
7
0
.2
2
n
.s
.
-1
4
.5
1
1
.2
6
∗∗
∗
-1
2
.8
7
L
o
g
h
o
u
rs
ex
it
er
s
-
L
o
g
h
o
u
rs
st
ay
er
s
-8
.5
3
-7
.4
1
0
.8
5
∗∗
∗
-8
.3
4
0
.2
9
n
.s
.
-8
.6
0
1
.1
6
∗∗
∗
-6
.4
7
L
o
g
h
o
u
rs
en
tr
a
n
ts
-
L
o
g
h
o
u
rs
st
ay
er
s
-5
.5
9
-6
.9
3
-1
.0
3
∗∗
∗
-5
.2
3
-0
.6
7
∗∗
∗
-6
.2
2
-0
.9
4
∗∗
∗
-7
.0
0
∆
L
o
g
ov
er
ti
m
e
h
o
u
rs
0
.0
4
-0
.1
6
-0
.1
7
∗∗
∗
0
.1
1
-0
.1
2
∗∗
∗
-0
.0
3
-0
.1
6
∗∗
∗
-0
.2
2
∆
L
o
g
S
h
a
re
p
a
rt
-t
im
e
jo
b
s
0
.0
7
-0
.2
0
0
.0
1
n
.s
.
0
.1
9
-0
.1
7
∗
-0
.0
5
0
.0
9
n
.s
.
-0
.2
9
S
h
a
re
st
ay
er
s,
p
er
m
a
n
en
t
(t
)
7
1
.0
5
7
4
.7
0
3
.3
0
∗∗
∗
6
8
.4
9
2
.2
5
∗∗
∗
7
3
.4
9
3
.2
8
n
.s
.
7
4
.9
3
S
h
a
re
st
ay
er
s,
te
m
p
o
ra
ry
(t
)
1
1
.8
9
1
1
.9
8
0
.8
2
∗∗
∗
1
2
.0
4
0
.3
5
∗∗
∗
1
1
.8
4
1
.0
1
∗∗
∗
1
2
.0
1
S
h
a
re
ex
it
er
s,
p
er
m
a
n
en
t
(t
−1
)
9
.7
6
1
1
.0
0
1
.2
5
∗∗
∗
1
0
.3
3
-0
.1
6
∗
9
.4
4
2
.2
1
∗∗
∗
1
2
.2
0
S
h
a
re
ex
it
er
s,
te
m
p
o
ra
ry
(t
−1
)
7
.1
4
7
.4
6
0
.5
2
∗∗
∗
8
.3
0
-0
.0
9
n
.s
.
6
.4
3
0
.7
8
∗∗
∗
8
.1
5
S
h
a
re
en
tr
a
n
ts
,
p
er
m
a
n
en
t
(t
)
6
.8
1
5
.3
4
-1
.5
5
∗∗
∗
7
.7
3
-1
.3
8
∗∗
∗
5
.8
6
-1
.3
9
∗∗
∗
5
.2
9
S
h
a
re
en
tr
a
n
ts
,
te
m
p
o
ra
ry
(t
)
1
0
.2
4
7
.9
8
-2
.6
8
∗∗
∗
1
1
.7
4
-1
.4
7
∗∗
∗
8
.8
1
-2
.8
1
∗∗
∗
7
.7
6
N
o
te
s
:
D
a
ta
re
fe
r
to
a
ll
p
ri
va
te
se
ct
o
r
fi
rm
s
w
it
h
a
t
le
a
st
2
5
em
p
lo
y
ee
s
fo
r
w
h
ic
h
∆
sa
le
s
is
av
a
il
a
b
le
;
fi
rm
-y
ea
r
co
m
b
in
a
ti
o
n
s
w
it
h
fi
rm
d
y
n
a
m
ic
s
(m
er
g
er
s
et
c.
)
a
re
ex
cl
u
d
ed
fr
o
m
th
e
sa
m
p
le
.
∆
S
=
ch
a
n
g
e
in
sa
le
s,
P
1
-P
2
5
,
P
2
5
-P
7
5
a
n
d
P
7
5
-P
1
0
0
a
re
su
b
sa
m
p
le
s
o
f
fi
rm
s
b
a
se
d
o
n
th
e
y
ea
rl
y
p
er
ce
n
ti
le
d
is
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
o
f
th
e
ch
a
n
g
e
in
sa
le
s.
∆
W
B
2
in
cl
u
d
es
co
n
tr
a
ct
u
a
l
a
s
w
el
l
a
s
ov
er
ti
m
e
p
ay
,
∆
W
B
3
in
cl
u
d
es
in
ci
d
en
ta
l
a
n
d
ex
tr
a
w
a
g
e
o
n
to
p
o
f
th
is
.
βˆ
is
th
e
es
ti
m
a
ti
o
n
re
su
lt
fo
r
eq
u
a
ti
o
n
4
.5
,
a
p
p
li
ed
to
th
e
w
a
g
e
b
il
l
a
n
d
ea
ch
o
f
it
s
it
s
co
m
p
o
n
en
ts
se
p
a
ra
te
ly
:
co
lu
m
n
3
re
fe
rs
to
∆
S
<
0
co
m
p
a
re
d
to
∆
S
≥
0
;
co
lu
m
n
6
to
P
2
5
-P
7
5
co
m
p
a
re
d
to
P
7
5
-P
1
0
0
;
co
lu
m
n
9
re
fe
rs
to
P
1
-P
2
5
co
m
p
a
re
d
to
P
2
5
-P
7
5
.
S
ig
n
ifi
ca
n
ce
le
v
el
s:
∗:
5
%
∗∗
:
1
%
∗∗
∗:
0
.1
%
.
S
o
u
rc
e
:
O
w
n
ca
lc
u
la
ti
o
n
s
u
si
n
g
re
g
is
tr
a
ti
o
n
d
a
ta
fr
o
m
S
ta
ti
st
ic
s
N
et
h
er
la
n
d
s
127
T
a
b
le
A
4
.3
:
D
ec
om
p
o
si
ti
on
of
w
ag
e-
b
il
l
ch
an
ge
s
20
07
–2
01
3
b
y
se
ct
or
s
of
ec
on
om
ic
ac
ti
v
it
y
M
a
n
u
fa
ct
u
ri
n
g
C
o
n
st
ru
ct
io
n
G
o
o
d
s
T
ra
d
e
H
o
re
ca
T
ra
n
sp
o
rt
C
o
m
m
.
B
u
si
n
es
s
se
rv
ic
es
∆
S
<
0
βˆ
∆
S
<
0
βˆ
∆
S
<
0
βˆ
∆
S
<
0
βˆ
∆
S
<
0
βˆ
∆
S
<
0
βˆ
C
o
n
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
to
g
ro
ss
co
n
tr
a
ct
u
a
l
w
a
g
e-
b
il
l
ch
a
n
g
e
b
y
:
-n
et
ch
a
n
g
e
in
em
p
lo
y
m
en
t
−6
.0
1
−5
.0
9
∗∗
∗
−6
.5
5
−4
.2
5
∗∗
∗
−4
.9
3
−4
.2
9
∗∗
∗
−6
.1
9
−8
.0
4
∗∗
∗
−7
.6
5
−7
.9
4
∗∗
∗
−1
4
.0
1
−1
3
.1
9
∗∗
∗
-h
o
u
rl
y
w
a
g
e,
st
ay
er
s
2
.1
6
−0
.2
6
∗∗
∗
1
.6
5
−0
.1
4
1
.7
2
−0
.4
6
∗∗
∗
1
.6
2
−0
.3
3
1
.5
1
−0
.2
2
1
.8
2
−0
.5
5
∗∗
∗
-h
o
u
rl
y
w
a
g
e,
en
tr
a
n
ts
−0
.7
2
0
.4
5
∗∗
∗
−0
.9
7
0
.2
3
∗∗
−1
.5
1
0
.4
9
∗∗
∗
−3
.8
4
0
.7
9
∗∗
−1
.3
6
0
.5
0
∗∗
∗
−3
.1
7
0
.7
3
∗∗
∗
-h
o
u
rl
y
w
a
g
e,
ex
it
er
s
1
.1
8
0
.2
3
∗∗
1
.2
0
0
.3
1
∗
1
.5
4
0
.0
7
3
.7
3
0
.1
5
1
.7
0
0
.2
4
4
.3
3
0
.7
2
∗∗
∗
-h
o
u
rs
w
o
rk
ed
,
st
ay
er
s
0
.3
2
−0
.1
5
∗∗
∗
0
.3
6
−0
.2
4
∗
0
.4
4
−0
.0
7
0
.2
8
−0
.1
4
0
.8
1
−0
.2
6
0
.2
7
−0
.2
0
∗∗
-h
o
u
rs
w
o
rk
ed
,
n
o
n
-s
ta
y
er
s
+
0
.2
3
0
.0
2
0
.1
8
0
.0
5
0
.4
8
0
.0
7
0
.7
2
0
.6
0
0
.4
9
0
.3
2
∗∗
1
.1
8
0
.5
1
G
ro
ss
w
a
g
e-
b
il
l
ch
a
n
g
e
(i
n
%
):
-c
o
n
tr
a
ct
u
a
l
−2
.8
3
−4
.7
9
∗∗
∗
−4
.1
4
−4
.4
9
∗∗
∗
−2
.2
5
−4
.5
8
∗∗
∗
−3
.6
6
−6
.8
8
∗∗
∗
−4
.5
1
−7
.3
7
∗∗
∗
−9
.5
6
−1
1
.4
6
∗∗
∗
-c
o
n
tr
.
+
ov
er
ti
m
e
p
ay
−3
.1
4
−5
.1
3
∗∗
∗
−4
.3
4
−5
.8
5
∗∗
∗
−2
.4
2
−4
.7
8
∗∗
−3
.7
5
−6
.9
9
∗∗
∗
−4
.9
8
−7
.7
9
∗∗
∗
−9
.6
7
−1
1
.6
0
∗∗
∗
-i
d
em
+
in
ci
d
.
&
ex
tr
a
p
ay
−2
.9
6
−5
.6
5
∗∗
∗
−4
.3
0
−5
.9
8
∗∗
∗
−2
.4
4
−5
.7
7
∗∗
∗
−3
.7
2
−6
.8
2
∗∗
∗
−5
.1
0
−8
.1
9
∗∗
∗
−9
.7
3
−1
1
.9
0
∗∗
∗
#
fi
rm
s
∆
S
≥
0
1
2
,7
7
5
3
,8
8
0
1
1
,0
8
2
9
7
5
4
,6
9
2
9
,5
0
5
#
fi
rm
s
∆
S
<
0
9
,7
4
1
3
,2
6
9
8
,7
7
2
7
0
8
3
,0
7
1
6
,9
6
6
#
w
o
rk
er
s
(1
)
1
.7
0
.5
1
.4
0
.2
0
.9
1
.9
#
w
o
rk
er
s
(2
)
1
.5
0
.4
1
.1
0
.1
0
.8
1
.6
N
o
te
s
:
D
a
ta
re
fe
r
to
a
ll
p
ri
va
te
se
ct
o
r
fi
rm
s
w
it
h
a
t
le
a
st
2
5
em
p
lo
y
ee
s
fo
r
w
h
ic
h
∆
sa
le
s
is
av
a
il
a
b
le
,
w
h
er
ea
s
fi
rm
-y
ea
r
co
m
b
in
a
ti
o
n
s
w
it
h
fi
rm
d
y
n
a
m
ic
s
(m
er
g
er
s
et
c.
)
a
re
le
ft
o
u
t
o
f
th
e
d
a
ta
.
∆
S
=
ch
a
n
g
e
in
sa
le
s.
∆
W
B
2
in
cl
u
d
es
co
n
tr
a
ct
u
a
l
a
s
w
el
l
a
s
ov
er
ti
m
e
p
ay
,
∆
W
B
3
in
cl
u
d
es
in
ci
d
en
ta
l
a
n
d
ex
tr
a
w
a
g
e
o
n
to
p
o
f
th
is
.
βˆ
is
th
e
es
ti
m
a
ti
o
n
re
su
lt
fo
r
eq
u
a
ti
o
n
4
.5
,
a
p
p
li
ed
to
th
e
w
a
g
e
b
il
l
a
n
d
ea
ch
o
f
it
s
it
s
co
m
p
o
n
en
ts
se
p
a
ra
te
ly
a
n
d
re
fe
rs
to
∆
S
<
0
co
m
p
a
re
d
to
∆
S
≥
0
.
T
h
e
re
la
ti
o
n
sh
ip
b
et
w
ee
n
th
e
it
em
s
o
f
th
e
d
ec
o
m
p
o
si
ti
o
n
a
n
d
eq
u
a
ti
o
n
4
.4
is
ex
p
la
in
ed
in
fo
o
tn
o
te
6
.
#
w
o
rk
er
s
(1
)
=
#
w
o
rk
er
s
in
fi
rm
s
∆
S
≥
0
(m
ln
);
#
w
o
rk
er
s
(2
)
=
#
w
o
rk
er
s
fi
rm
s
∆
S
<
0
(m
ln
).
S
ig
n
ifi
ca
n
ce
le
v
el
s:
∗:
5
%
∗∗
:
1
%
∗∗
∗:
0
.1
%
.
S
o
u
rc
e
:
O
w
n
ca
lc
u
la
ti
o
n
s
u
si
n
g
re
g
is
tr
a
ti
o
n
d
a
ta
fr
o
m
S
ta
ti
st
ic
s
N
et
h
er
la
n
d
s
128
T
a
b
le
A
4
.4
:
D
ec
om
p
o
si
ti
on
of
w
ag
e-
b
il
l
ch
an
ge
s
20
07
–2
01
3,
b
y
y
ea
r
2
0
0
6
-2
0
0
7
2
0
0
7
-2
0
0
8
2
0
0
8
-2
0
0
9
2
0
0
9
-2
0
1
0
2
0
1
0
-2
0
1
1
2
0
1
1
-2
0
1
2
2
0
1
2
-2
0
1
3
∆
S
<
0
βˆ
∆
S
<
0
βˆ
∆
S
<
0
βˆ
∆
S
<
0
βˆ
∆
S
<
0
βˆ
∆
S
<
0
βˆ
∆
S
<
0
βˆ
C
o
n
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
to
g
ro
ss
co
n
tr
a
ct
u
a
l
w
a
g
e-
b
il
l
ch
a
n
g
e
b
y
:
-n
et
ch
a
n
g
e
in
em
p
l.
−6
.2
9
−7
.7
8
∗∗
∗
−5
.6
8
−6
.7
5
∗∗
∗
−8
.7
6
−8
.3
8
∗∗
∗ −
1
0
.9
0
−7
.9
1
∗∗
∗
−7
.8
8
−8
.7
3
∗∗
∗
−6
.5
3
−8
.2
3
∗∗
∗
−6
.3
5
−7
.2
4
∗∗
∗
-h
.
w
a
g
e,
st
ay
er
s
1
.7
3
−0
.2
0
4
.0
9
−0
.2
0
∗∗
∗
3
.1
9
−0
.5
5
∗∗
∗
2
.4
9
−0
.3
0
∗∗
2
.0
3
−0
.4
0
∗∗
∗
−2
.0
5
−0
.3
5
∗∗
∗
1
.2
6
−0
.4
8
∗∗
∗
-h
.
w
a
g
e,
en
tr
a
n
ts
−1
.9
1
0
.5
0
∗∗
∗
−2
.0
2
0
.4
2
∗∗
∗
−1
.1
9
1
.0
4
∗∗
∗
−1
.3
2
0
.4
9
∗∗
∗
−2
.1
8
0
.5
0
∗∗
∗
−1
.6
3
0
.6
5
∗∗
∗
−1
.3
6
0
.7
1
∗∗
∗
-h
.
w
a
g
e,
ex
it
er
s
2
.1
1
0
.5
2
∗∗
2
.4
2
0
.3
4
∗∗
2
.3
1
0
.1
6
2
.1
6
0
.4
4
∗∗
2
.8
1
0
.5
3
∗∗
1
.2
6
0
.3
1
∗∗
∗
1
.3
9
0
.1
4
-h
o
u
rs
,
st
ay
er
s
1
.5
4
−0
.1
6
∗∗
∗
0
.0
9
−0
.1
1
−1
.2
2
−0
.1
1
∗∗
∗
−1
.0
2
−0
.3
3
∗∗
−0
.0
9
−0
.1
0
3
.9
5
−0
.1
2
0
.2
7
−0
.2
3
∗∗
∗
-h
o
u
rs
,
n
o
n
-s
ta
y
er
s
+
0
.4
7
0
.0
1
.
0
.3
4
0
.2
0
0
.0
1
0
.0
0
0
.8
4
0
.3
9
∗∗
0
.7
3
0
.1
9
1
.0
1
0
.5
3
∗∗
∗
0
.4
5
0
.0
3
G
ro
ss
w
a
g
e-
b
il
l
ch
a
n
g
e
(i
n
%
):
-c
o
n
tr
a
ct
u
a
l
−2
.3
4
−7
.0
6
∗∗
∗
−0
.7
6
−6
.1
0
∗∗
∗
−5
.6
6
−7
.8
3
∗∗
∗
−7
.7
5
−7
.2
3
∗∗
∗
−4
.5
7
−8
.0
1
∗∗
∗
−3
.9
8
−7
.2
3
∗∗
∗
−4
.3
4
−7
.0
8
∗∗
∗
-c
o
n
tr
.+
ov
er
ti
m
e
p
ay
−2
.5
9
−7
.2
8
∗∗
∗
−1
.1
8
−6
.3
1
∗∗
∗
−6
.1
3
−8
.1
3
∗∗
∗
−7
.7
2
−7
.5
9
∗∗
∗
−4
.7
1
−8
.1
2
∗∗
∗
−4
.1
4
−7
.3
9
∗∗
∗
−4
.4
6
−7
.2
8
∗∗
∗
-i
d
em
+
in
c.
/
ex
tr
a
p
ay
−2
.4
0
−7
.1
9
∗∗
∗
−1
.3
2
−6
.4
3
∗∗
∗
−6
.1
6
−8
.3
4
∗∗
∗
−7
.6
2
−7
.6
0
∗∗
∗
−4
.7
2
−8
.0
6
∗∗
∗
−4
.1
0
−7
.3
2
∗∗
∗
−4
.3
5
−7
.4
6
∗∗
∗
#
fi
rm
s
∆
S
≥
0
8
,5
9
3
7
,5
6
2
3
,7
6
6
5
,6
6
3
8
,0
5
6
4
,9
5
2
4
,4
0
5
#
fi
rm
s
∆
S
<
0
3
,0
0
2
4
,3
8
8
6
,5
3
8
4
,8
1
2
4
,2
3
6
5
,0
5
1
4
,5
7
8
#
w
o
rk
er
s
(1
)
1
.3
1
.2
0
.6
0
.9
1
.3
0
.7
0
.7
#
w
o
rk
er
s
(2
)
0
.4
0
.7
1
.1
0
.9
0
.8
0
.9
0
.7
N
o
te
s
:
D
a
ta
re
fe
r
to
a
ll
p
ri
va
te
se
ct
o
r
fi
rm
s
w
it
h
a
t
le
a
st
2
5
em
p
lo
y
ee
s
fo
r
w
h
ic
h
∆
sa
le
s
is
av
a
il
a
b
le
,
w
h
er
ea
s
fi
rm
-y
ea
r
co
m
b
in
a
ti
o
n
s
w
it
h
fi
rm
d
y
n
a
m
ic
s
(m
er
g
er
s
et
c.
)
a
re
le
ft
o
u
t
o
f
th
e
d
a
ta
.
∆
S
=
ch
a
n
g
e
in
sa
le
s.
∆
W
B
2
in
cl
u
d
es
co
n
tr
a
ct
u
a
l
a
s
w
el
l
a
s
ov
er
ti
m
e
p
ay
,
∆
W
B
3
in
cl
u
d
es
in
ci
d
en
ta
l
a
n
d
ex
tr
a
w
a
g
e
o
n
to
p
o
f
th
is
.
βˆ
is
th
e
es
ti
m
a
ti
o
n
re
su
lt
fo
r
eq
u
a
ti
o
n
4
.5
,
a
p
p
li
ed
to
th
e
w
a
g
e
b
il
l
a
n
d
ea
ch
o
f
it
s
it
s
co
m
p
o
n
en
ts
se
p
a
ra
te
ly
a
n
d
re
fe
rs
to
∆
S
<
0
co
m
p
a
re
d
to
∆
S
≥
0
.
T
h
e
re
la
ti
o
n
sh
ip
b
et
w
ee
n
th
e
it
em
s
o
f
th
e
d
ec
o
m
p
o
si
ti
o
n
a
n
d
eq
u
a
ti
o
n
4
.4
is
ex
p
la
in
ed
in
fo
o
tn
o
te
6
.
#
w
o
rk
er
s
(1
)
=
#
w
o
rk
er
s
in
fi
rm
s
∆
S
≥
0
(m
ln
);
#
w
o
rk
er
s
(2
)
=
#
w
o
rk
er
s
fi
rm
s
∆
S
<
0
(m
ln
).
S
ig
n
ifi
ca
n
ce
le
v
el
s:
∗:
5
%
∗∗
:
1
%
∗∗
∗:
0
.1
%
.
A
ls
a
ro
b
u
st
n
es
s
ch
ec
k
th
e
d
ec
o
m
p
o
si
ti
o
n
fo
r
2
0
0
9
-2
0
1
0
h
a
s
b
ee
n
re
p
ea
te
d
fo
r
a
sa
m
p
le
in
cl
u
d
in
g
w
o
rk
er
s
a
g
ed
1
8
-2
2
.
In
th
a
t
ca
se
th
e
re
su
lt
s
fo
r
βˆ
fo
r
2
0
0
9
-2
0
1
0
(i
n
th
e
sa
m
e
o
rd
er
a
s
in
th
e
ta
b
le
)
a
re
th
e
fo
ll
ow
in
g
:
-8
,4
3
;
-0
.2
9
;
0
.6
4
;
0
.4
9
;
-0
.4
4
;
0
.4
9
;
-7
.5
5
;
-7
.9
2
;
-7
.9
4
.
S
o
u
rc
e
:
O
w
n
ca
lc
u
la
ti
o
n
s
u
si
n
g
re
g
is
tr
a
ti
o
n
d
a
ta
fr
o
m
S
ta
ti
st
ic
s
N
et
h
er
la
n
d
s
129
T
a
b
le
A
4
.5
:
R
eg
re
ss
io
n
s
of
th
e
gr
ow
th
ra
te
of
th
e
h
ou
rl
y
w
ag
e
of
jo
b
-s
ta
ye
rs
b
y
sa
le
s
gr
ow
th
gr
ou
p
s
20
06
–2
01
3
D
ep
en
d
en
t
va
ri
a
b
le
:
H
o
u
rl
y
w
a
g
e
H
o
u
rl
y
w
a
g
e
H
o
u
rl
y
w
a
g
e
H
o
u
rl
y
w
a
g
e
H
o
u
rl
y
w
a
g
e
H
o
u
rl
y
w
a
g
e
>
se
ct
o
r
m
ea
n
S
a
m
p
le
-
sa
le
s
g
ro
w
th
:
≥
0
<
0
<
0
<
P
5
0
<
P
2
5
<
P
1
0
E
st
im
a
ti
o
n
te
ch
n
iq
u
e:
O
L
S
O
L
S
P
ro
b
it
O
L
S
O
L
S
O
L
S
S
ta
te
o
f
b
u
si
n
e
ss
G
ro
w
th
ra
te
sa
le
s
(t
)
0
.0
1
8
8
∗∗
∗
0
.0
0
2
8
0
.1
4
5
5
∗∗
0
.0
0
2
1
0
.0
0
0
6
0
.0
0
4
8
(0
.0
0
2
7
)
(0
.0
0
3
1
)
(0
.0
7
0
5
)
(0
.0
0
3
1
)
(0
.0
0
4
2
)
(0
.0
0
7
1
)
G
ro
w
th
ra
te
sa
le
s,
sq
u
a
re
d
(t
)
−0
.0
0
9
4
∗∗
∗
0
.0
0
1
7
0
.0
6
9
9
0
.0
0
1
3
0
.0
0
0
3
0
.0
0
2
3
(0
.0
0
2
0
)
(0
.0
0
2
0
)
(0
.0
4
6
1
)
(0
.0
0
2
0
)
(0
.0
0
2
5
)
(0
.0
0
3
6
)
G
ro
w
th
ra
te
sa
le
s
(t
−1
)
0
.0
0
4
7
∗∗
∗
0
.0
0
3
7
∗∗
∗
0
.1
5
9
7
∗∗
∗
0
.0
0
4
4
∗∗
∗
0
.0
0
3
6
∗∗
0
.0
0
1
0
(0
.0
0
1
3
)
(0
.0
0
1
4
)
(0
.0
3
1
6
)
(0
.0
0
1
3
)
(0
.0
0
1
6
)
(0
.0
0
2
2
)
D
u
m
m
y
m
is
si
n
g
o
b
s.
:
G
ro
w
th
sa
le
s
(t
−1
)
0
.0
0
0
7
−0
.0
0
1
3
−0
.0
2
7
0
−0
.0
0
0
6
−0
.0
0
0
5
−0
.0
0
1
6
(0
.0
0
0
8
)
(0
.0
0
1
0
)
(0
.0
2
1
2
)
(0
.0
0
0
9
)
(0
.0
0
1
3
)
(0
.0
0
2
0
)
R
ef
.
g
ro
u
p
:
b
u
si
n
es
s
re
su
lt
(t
−1
)
<
0
−
−
−
−
−
−
B
u
si
n
es
s
re
su
lt
(t
−1
)≥
0
0
.0
0
2
2
∗∗
∗
0
.0
0
3
8
∗∗
∗
0
.0
7
6
5
∗∗
∗
0
.0
0
4
0
∗∗
∗
0
.0
0
3
3
∗∗
∗
0
.0
0
2
7
(0
.0
0
0
8
)
(0
.0
0
0
8
)
(0
.0
1
9
2
)
(0
.0
0
0
8
)
(0
.0
0
1
0
)
(0
.0
0
1
7
)
R
ef
.
g
ro
u
p
:
co
n
ti
n
u
in
g
fi
rm
(t
)
−
−
−
−
−
−
D
u
m
m
y
fi
rm
ce
a
se
s
to
ex
it
s
n
ex
t
y
ea
r
(t
)
0
.0
0
2
2
0
.0
0
3
1
0
.1
0
8
3
∗∗
∗
0
.0
0
1
7
0
.0
0
1
1
−0
.0
0
0
6
(0
.0
0
1
6
)
(0
.0
0
2
0
)
(0
.0
3
9
8
)
(0
.0
0
1
8
)
(0
.0
0
2
4
)
(0
.0
0
3
8
)
D
u
m
m
y
en
d
o
f
fi
rm
o
u
t
o
f
o
b
se
rv
ed
p
er
io
d
(t
)
0
.0
0
4
5
∗∗
∗
0
.0
0
6
7
∗∗
∗
0
.2
4
8
4
∗∗
∗
0
.0
0
5
9
∗∗
∗
0
.0
0
4
9
∗∗
∗
0
.0
0
4
5
∗∗
(0
.0
0
1
1
)
(0
.0
0
1
1
)
(0
.0
2
3
8
)
(0
.0
0
1
1
)
(0
.0
0
1
5
)
(0
.0
0
2
1
)
S
h
a
re
o
f
w
o
rk
er
s
su
b
je
ct
to
p
a
rt
-t
im
e
U
B
(t
−1
)
−0
.0
1
3
6
−0
.0
1
9
9
∗
−0
.0
0
0
7
−0
.0
1
5
9
0
.0
0
3
1
−0
.0
0
1
1
(0
.0
0
9
1
)
(0
.0
1
1
7
)
(0
.1
6
6
3
)
(0
.0
1
0
7
)
(0
.0
0
8
5
)
(0
.0
1
4
1
)
D
u
m
m
y
m
is
si
n
g
o
b
s.
:
S
h
a
re
p
a
rt
-t
im
e
U
B
(t
−1
)
0
.0
6
8
0
∗∗
∗
0
.0
6
8
7
∗∗
∗
−0
.1
8
5
1
∗∗
∗
0
.0
6
8
9
∗∗
∗
0
.0
6
9
2
∗∗
∗
0
.0
6
9
5
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
0
1
6
)
(0
.0
0
2
0
)
(0
.0
3
9
1
)
(0
.0
0
1
8
)
(0
.0
0
2
4
)
(0
.0
0
3
7
)
130
T
a
b
le
A
4
.5
C
o
n
ti
n
u
e
d
fr
o
m
p
re
v
io
u
s
p
a
g
e
D
ep
en
d
en
t
va
ri
a
b
le
:
H
o
u
rl
y
w
a
g
e
H
o
u
rl
y
w
a
g
e
H
o
u
rl
y
w
a
g
e
H
o
u
rl
y
w
a
g
e
H
o
u
rl
y
w
a
g
e
H
o
u
rl
y
w
a
g
e
>
se
ct
o
r
m
ea
n
S
a
m
p
le
-
sa
le
s
g
ro
w
th
:
≥
0
<
0
<
0
<
P
5
0
<
P
2
5
<
P
1
0
E
st
im
a
ti
o
n
te
ch
n
iq
u
e:
O
L
S
O
L
S
P
ro
b
it
O
L
S
O
L
S
O
L
S
T
y
p
e
o
f
jo
b
S
h
a
re
o
f
o
p
en
-t
er
m
co
n
tr
a
ct
s
(t
−1
)
−0
.0
0
1
7
−0
.0
0
2
7
−0
.0
2
6
7
−0
.0
0
2
9
−0
.0
0
4
5
∗
−0
.0
0
8
5
∗∗
(0
.0
0
1
5
)
(0
.0
0
1
9
)
(0
.0
3
8
3
)
(0
.0
0
1
8
)
(0
.0
0
2
7
)
(0
.0
0
3
9
)
S
h
a
re
o
f
re
g
u
la
r
jo
b
s
(t
−1
)
−0
.0
1
1
4
∗∗
∗
0
.0
0
2
7
0
.0
0
6
0
0
.0
0
0
2
0
.0
0
2
0
0
.0
0
3
4
(0
.0
0
3
4
)
(0
.0
0
3
3
)
(0
.0
6
2
5
)
(0
.0
0
3
2
)
(0
.0
0
4
2
)
(0
.0
0
6
6
)
S
h
a
re
o
f
fu
ll
-t
im
e
jo
b
s
(t
−1
)
0
.0
7
2
0
∗∗
∗
0
.0
5
5
5
∗∗
∗
0
.9
5
7
5
∗∗
∗
0
.0
5
9
1
∗∗
∗
0
.0
5
6
8
∗∗
∗
0
.0
5
5
3
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
0
3
6
)
(0
.0
0
3
9
)
(0
.0
6
2
3
)
(0
.0
0
3
8
)
(0
.0
0
5
5
)
(0
.0
0
6
7
)
S
h
a
re
o
f
jo
b
s
h
ir
ed
fr
o
m
T
W
A
’s
(t
−1
)
−0
.0
0
0
4
∗∗
0
.0
0
0
7
∗∗
∗
0
.0
2
8
3
0
.0
0
0
7
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
0
0
4
−0
.0
0
2
9
(0
.0
0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
0
2
)
(0
.0
2
5
4
)
(0
.0
0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
2
4
)
(0
.0
0
4
1
)
S
h
a
re
o
f
h
ir
ed
se
lf
-e
m
p
lo
y
ed
(t
−1
)
0
.0
0
1
4
∗∗
∗
0
.0
0
0
9
−0
.0
0
0
3
0
.0
0
0
7
0
.0
0
1
3
0
.0
0
1
7
(0
.0
0
0
3
)
(0
.0
0
0
7
)
(0
.0
2
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
0
6
)
(0
.0
0
1
2
)
(0
.0
0
3
8
)
D
u
m
m
y
m
is
si
n
g
o
b
s.
:
S
h
a
re
T
W
A
(t
−1
)
−0
.0
0
2
4
−0
.0
0
2
5
0
.0
0
9
6
−0
.0
0
0
4
0
.0
0
0
8
0
.0
0
9
8
(0
.0
0
3
8
)
(0
.0
0
4
4
)
(0
.1
0
8
4
)
(0
.0
0
4
3
)
(0
.0
0
5
8
)
(0
.0
0
7
2
)
C
o
ll
e
c
ti
v
e
la
b
o
u
r
a
g
re
e
m
e
n
t
C
L
A
en
te
rp
ri
se
le
v
el
(t
−1
)
0
.0
0
5
8
∗∗
∗
0
.0
0
6
0
∗∗
∗
0
.0
7
2
8
∗∗
0
.0
0
6
9
∗∗
∗
0
.0
0
6
0
∗∗
∗
0
.0
0
6
1
∗
(0
.0
0
1
5
)
(0
.0
0
1
9
)
(0
.0
3
6
3
)
(0
.0
0
2
0
)
(0
.0
0
2
0
)
(0
.0
0
3
5
)
C
L
A
se
ct
o
r
le
v
el
,
n
o
ex
te
n
si
o
n
(t
−1
)
−0
.0
0
2
4
−0
.0
0
0
5
0
.0
1
8
3
−0
.0
0
0
9
0
.0
0
0
2
0
.0
0
4
0
(0
.0
0
1
5
)
(0
.0
0
1
4
)
(0
.0
3
4
5
)
(0
.0
0
1
3
)
(0
.0
0
1
9
)
(0
.0
0
3
1
)
C
L
A
en
te
rp
ri
se
ex
te
n
d
ed
to
se
ct
o
r
le
v
el
(t
−1
)
−0
.0
0
0
8
0
.0
0
0
9
−0
.0
0
9
9
0
.0
0
0
7
0
.0
0
2
2
∗
0
.0
0
2
2
(0
.0
0
0
7
)
(0
.0
0
0
9
)
(0
.0
2
0
3
)
(0
.0
0
0
8
)
(0
.0
0
1
2
)
(0
.0
0
2
0
)
R
ef
.
g
ro
u
p
:
n
o
co
ll
ec
ti
v
e
la
b
o
u
r
a
g
re
em
en
t
(C
L
A
)
−
−
−
−
−
−
C
L
A
u
n
k
n
ow
n
(t
−1
)
0
.0
0
5
3
∗
0
.0
0
2
9
0
.1
8
5
7
∗∗
0
.0
0
4
3
0
.0
0
7
5
∗
0
.0
0
3
5
(0
.0
0
3
0
)
(0
.0
0
5
1
)
(0
.0
8
4
2
)
(0
.0
0
4
4
)
(0
.0
0
4
3
)
(0
.0
0
7
4
)
C
o
m
p
o
si
ti
o
n
o
f
th
e
la
b
o
u
r
fo
rc
e
S
h
a
re
o
f
m
a
le
w
o
rk
er
s
(t
−1
)
−0
.0
4
0
0
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
2
6
6
∗∗
∗
−0
.5
4
1
4
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
2
8
0
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
2
3
4
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
2
1
6
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
0
2
7
)
(0
.0
0
3
2
)
(0
.0
5
6
5
)
(0
.0
0
3
1
)
(0
.0
0
4
5
)
(0
.0
0
5
9
)
131
T
a
b
le
A
4
.5
C
o
n
ti
n
u
e
d
fr
o
m
p
re
v
io
u
s
p
a
g
e
D
ep
en
d
en
t
va
ri
a
b
le
:
H
o
u
rl
y
w
a
g
e
H
o
u
rl
y
w
a
g
e
H
o
u
rl
y
w
a
g
e
H
o
u
rl
y
w
a
g
e
H
o
u
rl
y
w
a
g
e
H
o
u
rl
y
w
a
g
e
>
se
ct
o
r
m
ea
n
S
a
m
p
le
-
sa
le
s
g
ro
w
th
:
≥
0
<
0
<
0
<
P
5
0
<
P
2
5
<
P
1
0
E
st
im
a
ti
o
n
te
ch
n
iq
u
e:
O
L
S
O
L
S
P
ro
b
it
O
L
S
O
L
S
O
L
S
S
h
a
re
o
f
w
o
rk
er
s
a
g
ed
2
3
-3
5
(t
−1
)
0
.0
0
5
9
∗
0
.0
0
3
9
0
.3
9
9
3
∗∗
∗
0
.0
0
3
8
0
.0
0
5
9
0
.0
0
0
8
(0
.0
0
3
2
)
(0
.0
0
3
9
)
(0
.0
7
7
8
)
(0
.0
0
3
7
)
(0
.0
0
5
1
)
(0
.0
0
8
1
)
R
ef
.
g
ro
u
p
:
S
h
a
re
o
f
w
o
rk
er
s
a
g
ed
3
6
-5
0
(t
−1
)
−
−
−
−
−
−
S
h
a
re
o
f
w
o
rk
er
s
a
g
ed
5
1
-6
5
(t
−1
)
0
.0
0
5
3
0
.0
0
9
2
∗∗
0
.1
0
9
2
0
.0
0
7
6
∗
0
.0
1
5
1
∗∗
∗
0
.0
0
7
3
(0
.0
0
4
1
)
(0
.0
0
4
3
)
(0
.0
9
5
2
)
(0
.0
0
4
2
)
(0
.0
0
5
8
)
(0
.0
0
9
6
)
S
h
a
re
o
f
jo
b
te
n
u
re
≥
1
0
y
ea
rs
(t
−1
)
−0
.0
0
3
3
∗
−0
.0
0
4
6
∗∗
−0
.2
0
2
1
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
0
4
7
∗∗
−0
.0
0
7
5
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
0
9
3
∗∗
(0
.0
0
1
9
)
(0
.0
0
2
0
)
(0
.0
4
7
3
)
(0
.0
0
1
9
)
(0
.0
0
2
5
)
(0
.0
0
4
0
)
R
ef
.
g
ro
u
p
:
D
u
tc
h
w
o
rk
er
s
−
−
−
−
−
−
S
h
a
re
o
f
im
m
ig
ra
n
ts
a
ft
er
E
U
-e
n
la
rg
em
en
t
(t
−1
)
−0
.0
2
8
2
∗
−0
.0
2
6
2
−0
.0
8
6
6
−0
.0
3
8
6
∗∗
−0
.0
2
4
5
−0
.0
6
0
5
(0
.0
1
4
5
)
(0
.0
1
9
0
)
(0
.3
2
8
3
)
(0
.0
1
8
8
)
(0
.0
2
3
1
)
(0
.0
3
8
7
)
S
h
a
re
o
f
im
m
ig
ra
n
ts
o
th
er
w
es
te
rn
co
u
n
tr
ie
s
−0
.0
0
2
0
0
.0
0
4
0
0
.0
9
6
8
0
.0
0
0
3
0
.0
0
3
1
−0
.0
0
2
1
(0
.0
0
5
0
)
(0
.0
0
6
1
)
(0
.1
0
8
1
)
(0
.0
0
5
8
)
(0
.0
0
9
1
)
(0
.0
1
2
5
)
S
h
a
re
o
f
o
th
er
n
o
n
-w
es
te
rn
im
m
ig
ra
n
ts
(t
−1
)
−0
.0
1
4
3
∗∗
−0
.0
2
6
5
∗∗
∗
−0
.3
5
0
8
∗
−0
.0
2
3
3
∗∗
−0
.0
3
2
3
∗∗
−0
.0
2
8
4
(0
.0
0
6
5
)
(0
.0
1
0
3
)
(0
.1
9
8
0
)
(0
.0
0
9
2
)
(0
.0
1
5
6
)
(0
.0
1
8
9
)
T
ra
in
in
g
,
e
d
u
c
a
ti
o
n
a
n
d
c
o
n
tr
a
c
tu
a
l
w
a
g
e
R
a
ti
o
tr
a
in
in
g
ex
p
en
d
it
u
re
s
fi
rm
/
sa
le
s
(t
−1
)
0
.1
2
4
8
∗∗
∗
0
.1
5
8
4
∗∗
∗
3
.1
3
3
0
∗∗
∗
0
.1
4
0
2
∗∗
∗
0
.1
1
5
9
∗∗
0
.0
4
1
1
(0
.0
3
9
1
)
(0
.0
4
3
9
)
(1
.1
4
2
1
)
(0
.0
4
0
6
)
(0
.0
4
9
6
)
(0
.0
4
3
4
)
S
h
a
re
lo
w
ed
u
ca
te
d
w
o
rk
er
s
(t
−1
)
−0
.0
3
3
9
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
4
2
0
∗∗
∗
−0
.7
3
5
9
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
4
0
8
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
4
4
1
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
4
0
5
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
0
2
4
)
(0
.0
0
3
0
)
(0
.0
5
4
9
)
(0
.0
0
2
9
)
(0
.0
0
3
9
)
(0
.0
0
6
2
)
S
h
a
re
m
ed
iu
m
ed
u
ca
te
d
w
o
rk
er
s
(t
−1
)
−0
.0
2
2
3
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
2
7
5
∗∗
∗
−0
.5
0
9
1
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
2
7
0
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
3
0
0
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
2
6
4
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
0
2
0
)
(0
.0
0
2
5
)
(0
.0
5
0
4
)
(0
.0
0
2
4
)
(0
.0
0
3
3
)
(0
.0
0
4
8
)
R
ef
.
g
ro
u
p
:
S
h
a
re
h
ig
h
ed
u
ca
te
d
w
o
rk
er
s
(t
−1
)
−
−
−
−
−
−
S
h
a
re
w
o
rk
er
s
w
it
h
lo
w
w
a
g
e
(t
−1
)
−0
.0
1
4
5
−0
.0
2
9
8
∗∗
0
.2
7
0
7
∗
−0
.0
2
7
5
∗∗
−0
.0
3
0
9
∗∗
−0
.0
1
1
7
132
T
a
b
le
A
4
.5
C
o
n
ti
n
u
e
d
fr
o
m
p
re
v
io
u
s
p
a
g
e
D
ep
en
d
en
t
va
ri
a
b
le
:
H
o
u
rl
y
w
a
g
e
H
o
u
rl
y
w
a
g
e
H
o
u
rl
y
w
a
g
e
H
o
u
rl
y
w
a
g
e
H
o
u
rl
y
w
a
g
e
H
o
u
rl
y
w
a
g
e
>
se
ct
o
r
m
ea
n
S
a
m
p
le
-
sa
le
s
g
ro
w
th
:
≥
0
<
0
<
0
<
P
5
0
<
P
2
5
<
P
1
0
E
st
im
a
ti
o
n
te
ch
n
iq
u
e:
O
L
S
O
L
S
P
ro
b
it
O
L
S
O
L
S
O
L
S
(0
.0
0
9
2
)
(0
.0
1
3
0
)
(0
.1
6
2
1
)
(0
.0
1
2
3
)
(0
.0
1
3
6
)
(0
.0
1
6
7
)
S
h
a
re
w
o
rk
er
s
w
it
h
m
ed
iu
m
w
a
g
e
(t
−1
)
−0
.0
2
3
8
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
3
6
7
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
4
9
6
−0
.0
3
4
7
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
3
7
0
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
2
0
8
∗
(0
.0
0
6
7
)
(0
.0
0
9
7
)
(0
.1
2
4
9
)
(0
.0
0
9
2
)
(0
.0
1
0
2
)
(0
.0
1
2
1
)
R
ef
.
g
ro
u
p
:S
h
a
re
w
o
rk
er
s
w
it
h
h
ig
h
w
a
g
e
(t
−1
)
−
−
−
−
−
−
A
v
er
a
g
e
h
o
u
rl
y
w
a
g
e
o
f
th
e
fi
rm
(t
−1
)
−0
.0
0
2
2
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
0
3
4
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
0
8
9
−0
.0
0
3
3
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
0
3
5
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
0
2
4
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
0
0
5
)
(0
.0
0
0
7
)
(0
.0
0
7
4
)
(0
.0
0
0
6
)
(0
.0
0
0
7
)
(0
.0
0
0
8
)
S
td
.
d
ev
.o
f
h
o
u
rl
y
w
a
g
e
in
th
e
fi
rm
(t
−1
)
−0
.0
0
0
4
∗
−0
.0
0
0
1
−0
.0
0
5
0
−0
.0
0
0
1
0
.0
0
0
1
−0
.0
0
0
4
(0
.0
0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
0
3
)
(0
.0
0
4
1
)
(0
.0
0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
0
3
)
(0
.0
0
0
4
)
D
u
m
m
y
m
is
si
n
g
o
b
s.
:
tr
a
in
in
g
ex
p
en
d
it
u
re
s
(t
−1
)
0
.0
0
1
8
0
.0
0
2
7
0
.0
4
4
5
0
.0
0
1
2
0
.0
0
0
3
−0
.0
0
5
5
(0
.0
0
3
9
)
(0
.0
0
4
4
)
(0
.1
0
7
8
)
(0
.0
0
4
2
)
(0
.0
0
5
7
)
(0
.0
0
7
0
)
O
th
e
r
fi
rm
ch
a
ra
c
te
ri
st
ic
s
R
ef
.
g
ro
u
p
:
lo
w
S
h
a
re
o
f
in
ci
d
en
ta
l
w
a
g
e
(t
−1
)
−
−
−
−
−
−
In
te
rm
ed
ia
te
S
h
a
re
o
f
in
ci
d
en
ta
l
w
a
g
e
(t
−1
)
0
.0
0
1
3
∗
0
.0
0
0
9
0
.0
4
5
3
∗∗
0
.0
0
0
9
0
.0
0
0
4
0
.0
0
1
4
(0
.0
0
0
8
)
(0
.0
0
0
9
)
(0
.0
2
0
6
)
(0
.0
0
0
8
)
(0
.0
0
1
2
)
(0
.0
0
1
9
)
H
ig
h
S
h
a
re
o
f
in
ci
d
en
ta
l
w
a
g
e
(t
−1
)
0
.0
0
0
9
−0
.0
0
1
2
0
.0
6
2
6
∗∗
−0
.0
0
0
7
−0
.0
0
1
0
0
.0
0
0
2
(0
.0
0
0
9
)
(0
.0
0
1
1
)
(0
.0
2
5
2
)
(0
.0
0
1
1
)
(0
.0
0
1
5
)
(0
.0
0
2
3
)
R
ef
.
g
ro
u
p
:
fi
rm
si
ze
2
5
-
9
9
w
o
rk
er
s
(t
−1
)
−
−
−
−
−
−
F
ir
m
si
ze
1
0
0
-
5
0
0
w
o
rk
er
s
(t
−1
)
0
.0
0
2
8
∗∗
∗
0
.0
0
1
4
∗
0
.0
1
1
3
0
.0
0
1
8
∗∗
−0
.0
0
0
1
0
.0
0
0
1
(0
.0
0
0
7
)
(0
.0
0
0
7
)
(0
.0
1
8
4
)
(0
.0
0
0
7
)
(0
.0
0
1
0
)
(0
.0
0
1
7
)
F
ir
m
si
ze
≥
5
0
0
w
o
rk
er
s
(t
−1
)
0
.0
0
8
6
∗∗
∗
0
.0
0
7
4
∗∗
∗
0
.1
1
1
4
∗∗
∗
0
.0
0
7
3
∗∗
∗
0
.0
0
5
7
∗∗
∗
0
.0
0
9
0
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
0
1
5
)
(0
.0
0
1
8
)
(0
.0
4
0
9
)
(0
.0
0
1
7
)
(0
.0
0
1
9
)
(0
.0
0
3
2
)
R
ef
.
g
ro
u
p
:
#
es
ta
b
li
sh
m
en
ts
1
(t
−1
)
−
−
−
−
−
−
133
T
a
b
le
A
4
.5
C
o
n
ti
n
u
e
d
fr
o
m
p
re
v
io
u
s
p
a
g
e
D
ep
en
d
en
t
va
ri
a
b
le
:
H
o
u
rl
y
w
a
g
e
H
o
u
rl
y
w
a
g
e
H
o
u
rl
y
w
a
g
e
H
o
u
rl
y
w
a
g
e
H
o
u
rl
y
w
a
g
e
H
o
u
rl
y
w
a
g
e
>
se
ct
o
r
m
ea
n
S
a
m
p
le
-
sa
le
s
g
ro
w
th
:
≥
0
<
0
<
0
<
P
5
0
<
P
2
5
<
P
1
0
E
st
im
a
ti
o
n
te
ch
n
iq
u
e:
O
L
S
O
L
S
P
ro
b
it
O
L
S
O
L
S
O
L
S
#
es
ta
b
li
sh
m
en
ts
2
-
5
0
(t
−1
)
−0
.0
0
2
6
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
0
1
7
∗∗
−0
.0
6
0
4
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
0
1
7
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
0
1
4
−0
.0
0
2
5
(0
.0
0
0
6
)
(0
.0
0
0
7
)
(0
.0
1
6
4
)
(0
.0
0
0
6
)
(0
.0
0
0
9
)
(0
.0
0
1
6
)
H
ig
h
#
es
ta
b
li
sh
m
en
ts
≥
5
0
(t
−1
)
−0
.0
1
3
7
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
1
0
0
∗∗
∗
−0
.3
0
9
2
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
0
8
7
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
0
5
4
∗
−0
.0
1
0
9
∗
(0
.0
0
3
6
)
(0
.0
0
2
7
)
(0
.0
7
8
3
)
(0
.0
0
2
7
)
(0
.0
0
3
2
)
(0
.0
0
6
0
)
R
ef
.
g
ro
u
p
:
D
u
tc
h
ow
n
er
sh
ip
(t
−1
)
−
−
−
−
−
−
U
K
/
U
S
ow
n
er
sh
ip
(t
−1
)
−0
.0
0
1
0
−0
.0
0
2
5
∗
−0
.1
4
4
7
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
0
0
1
0
.0
0
0
2
0
.0
0
1
4
(0
.0
0
1
2
)
(0
.0
0
1
4
)
(0
.0
3
6
9
)
(0
.0
0
1
3
)
(0
.0
0
1
9
)
(0
.0
0
3
2
)
F
o
re
ig
n
ow
n
er
sh
ip
,
n
o
U
K
/
U
S
(t
−1
)
−0
.0
0
0
9
0
.0
0
1
2
−0
.0
2
1
6
0
.0
0
2
0
0
.0
0
2
5
0
.0
0
3
6
(0
.0
0
1
0
)
(0
.0
0
1
3
)
(0
.0
2
8
6
)
(0
.0
0
1
2
)
(0
.0
0
1
6
)
(0
.0
0
2
6
)
O
w
n
er
sh
ip
u
n
k
n
ow
n
(t
−1
)
−0
.0
2
5
7
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
1
6
9
∗∗
∗
−0
.5
5
1
2
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
1
7
2
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
0
8
2
0
.0
0
6
1
(0
.0
0
4
4
)
(0
.0
0
5
4
)
(0
.1
4
3
7
)
(0
.0
0
4
7
)
(0
.0
0
7
8
)
(0
.0
3
3
0
)
R
ef
.
g
ro
u
p
:
n
o
n
-e
x
p
o
rt
in
g
fi
rm
(t
−1
)
−
−
−
−
−
−
E
x
p
o
rt
in
g
fi
rm
(t
−1
)
0
.0
0
1
4
0
.0
0
2
4
0
.0
4
2
7
0
.0
0
2
4
0
.0
0
5
0
∗∗
0
.0
0
4
9
(0
.0
0
1
3
)
(0
.0
0
1
5
)
(0
.0
3
3
2
)
(0
.0
0
1
5
)
(0
.0
0
2
1
)
(0
.0
0
3
2
)
E
x
p
o
rt
u
n
k
n
ow
n
(t
−1
)
0
.0
0
4
7
∗∗
∗
0
.0
0
2
8
∗∗
0
.0
4
2
8
0
.0
0
2
8
∗∗
0
.0
0
3
7
∗∗
0
.0
0
7
4
∗∗
(0
.0
0
1
2
)
(0
.0
0
1
4
)
(0
.0
2
9
0
)
(0
.0
0
1
3
)
(0
.0
0
1
8
)
(0
.0
0
2
9
)
S
e
c
to
rs
o
f
e
c
o
n
o
m
ic
a
c
ti
v
it
y
a
n
d
y
e
a
rs
M
in
er
a
l
ex
tr
a
ct
io
n
se
ct
o
r
(t
)
0
.0
0
7
5
−0
.0
0
1
8
0
.0
3
4
3
0
.0
0
0
6
0
.0
1
0
7
0
.0
1
4
9
(0
.0
0
6
9
)
(0
.0
0
8
3
)
(0
.3
2
6
3
)
(0
.0
0
7
6
)
(0
.0
1
5
8
)
(0
.0
1
5
9
)
M
a
n
u
fa
ct
u
ri
n
g
se
ct
o
r
(t
)
0
.0
0
3
1
0
.0
0
5
5
−0
.1
3
1
6
0
.0
0
7
6
0
.0
1
7
4
0
.0
0
1
4
(0
.0
0
5
5
)
(0
.0
0
6
2
)
(0
.2
7
6
8
)
(0
.0
0
6
1
)
(0
.0
1
3
4
)
(0
.0
0
5
3
)
R
ef
.
g
ro
u
p
:
en
er
g
y
a
n
d
w
a
te
r
se
ct
o
r
(t
)
−
−
−
−
−
−
C
o
n
st
ru
ct
io
n
se
ct
o
r
(t
)
0
.0
0
0
2
0
.0
0
3
2
−0
.0
4
5
6
0
.0
0
5
9
0
.0
1
4
0
−0
.0
0
3
0
(0
.0
0
5
6
)
(0
.0
0
6
3
)
(0
.2
7
8
3
)
(0
.0
0
6
2
)
(0
.0
1
3
6
)
(0
.0
0
6
2
)
G
o
o
d
s
tr
a
d
e
se
ct
o
r
(t
)
0
.0
0
0
5
0
.0
0
0
6
−0
.2
8
2
3
0
.0
0
2
9
0
.0
1
3
3
0
.0
0
0
4
134
T
a
b
le
A
4
.5
C
o
n
ti
n
u
e
d
fr
o
m
p
re
v
io
u
s
p
a
g
e
D
ep
en
d
en
t
va
ri
a
b
le
:
H
o
u
rl
y
w
a
g
e
H
o
u
rl
y
w
a
g
e
H
o
u
rl
y
w
a
g
e
H
o
u
rl
y
w
a
g
e
H
o
u
rl
y
w
a
g
e
H
o
u
rl
y
w
a
g
e
>
se
ct
o
r
m
ea
n
S
a
m
p
le
-
sa
le
s
g
ro
w
th
:
≥
0
<
0
<
0
<
P
5
0
<
P
2
5
<
P
1
0
E
st
im
a
ti
o
n
te
ch
n
iq
u
e:
O
L
S
O
L
S
P
ro
b
it
O
L
S
O
L
S
O
L
S
(0
.0
0
5
5
)
(0
.0
0
6
2
)
(0
.2
7
6
8
)
(0
.0
0
6
1
)
(0
.0
1
3
5
)
(0
.0
0
5
5
)
H
o
re
ca
se
ct
o
r
(t
)
0
.0
0
0
7
0
.0
0
0
8
−0
.3
4
0
6
0
.0
0
3
0
0
.0
1
1
2
−0
.0
0
1
7
(0
.0
0
5
7
)
(0
.0
0
6
4
)
(0
.2
8
1
3
)
(0
.0
0
6
2
)
(0
.0
1
3
7
)
(0
.0
0
7
0
)
T
ra
n
sp
o
rt
a
n
d
co
m
m
u
n
ic
a
ti
o
n
se
ct
o
r
(t
)
−0
.0
0
0
3
0
.0
0
5
1
−0
.0
3
6
5
0
.0
0
6
2
0
.0
1
8
0
0
.0
0
6
6
(0
.0
0
5
6
)
(0
.0
0
6
3
)
(0
.2
7
8
1
)
(0
.0
0
6
2
)
(0
.0
1
3
6
)
(0
.0
0
5
9
)
B
u
si
n
es
s
se
rv
ic
es
se
ct
o
r
(t
)
0
.0
0
4
6
0
.0
0
4
9
−0
.3
0
1
4
0
.0
0
7
3
0
.0
1
6
4
0
.0
0
1
2
(0
.0
0
5
5
)
(0
.0
0
6
3
)
(0
.2
7
7
4
)
(0
.0
0
6
1
)
(0
.0
1
3
5
)
(0
.0
0
5
5
)
R
ef
.
va
ri
a
b
le
:
y
ea
r
2
0
0
8
−
−
−
−
−
−
D
u
m
m
y
y
ea
r
2
0
0
9
−0
.0
0
7
5
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
0
9
5
∗∗
∗
0
.0
8
7
7
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
0
9
9
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
0
9
6
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
1
3
0
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
0
1
2
)
(0
.0
0
1
2
)
(0
.0
2
5
9
)
(0
.0
0
1
2
)
(0
.0
0
1
7
)
(0
.0
0
2
9
)
D
u
m
m
y
y
ea
r
2
0
1
0
0
.0
5
1
8
∗∗
∗
0
.0
5
3
0
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
0
7
0
0
.0
5
3
4
∗∗
∗
0
.0
5
4
9
∗∗
∗
0
.0
5
1
6
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
0
1
4
)
(0
.0
0
1
7
)
(0
.0
3
6
8
)
(0
.0
0
1
7
)
(0
.0
0
2
2
)
(0
.0
0
3
3
)
D
u
m
m
y
y
ea
r
2
0
1
1
0
.0
4
8
1
∗∗
∗
0
.0
4
7
8
∗∗
∗
−0
.1
5
9
6
∗∗
∗
0
.0
4
8
4
∗∗
∗
0
.0
4
9
6
∗∗
∗
0
.0
4
7
5
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
0
1
2
)
(0
.0
0
1
5
)
(0
.0
3
6
3
)
(0
.0
0
1
5
)
(0
.0
0
1
9
)
(0
.0
0
3
1
)
D
u
m
m
y
y
ea
r
2
0
1
2
−
−
−
−
−
−
D
u
m
m
y
y
ea
r
2
0
1
3
−0
.0
3
4
4
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
3
7
4
∗∗
∗
0
.1
1
3
4
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
3
7
7
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
3
7
9
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
4
5
1
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
0
1
6
)
(0
.0
0
1
9
)
(0
.0
3
9
6
)
(0
.0
0
1
8
)
(0
.0
0
2
2
)
(0
.0
0
3
5
)
R
e
la
ti
o
n
e
m
p
lo
y
m
e
n
t
G
ro
w
th
-
w
a
g
e
G
ro
w
th
G
ro
w
th
em
p
lo
y
m
en
t
fi
rm
(i
n
%
)
(t
)
0
.0
0
6
8
∗∗
0
.0
0
8
5
∗∗
0
.0
9
9
9
∗∗
0
.0
0
8
0
∗∗
0
.0
0
6
8
∗
0
.0
0
7
3
(0
.0
0
3
4
)
(0
.0
0
3
6
)
(0
.0
4
5
8
)
(0
.0
0
3
6
)
(0
.0
0
3
9
)
(0
.0
0
5
2
)
C
o
n
st
a
n
t
0
.0
3
6
0
∗∗
0
.0
5
6
8
∗∗
∗
0
.0
5
3
5
0
.0
5
1
1
∗∗
0
.0
4
2
8
∗
0
.0
3
3
5
(0
.0
1
6
3
)
(0
.0
2
0
9
)
(0
.0
5
3
5
)
(0
.0
1
9
9
)
(0
.0
2
4
5
)
(0
.0
2
6
0
)
135
T
a
b
le
A
4
.5
C
o
n
ti
n
u
e
d
fr
o
m
p
re
v
io
u
s
p
a
g
e
D
ep
en
d
en
t
va
ri
a
b
le
:
H
o
u
rl
y
w
a
g
e
H
o
u
rl
y
w
a
g
e
H
o
u
rl
y
w
a
g
e
H
o
u
rl
y
w
a
g
e
H
o
u
rl
y
w
a
g
e
H
o
u
rl
y
w
a
g
e
>
se
ct
o
r
m
ea
n
S
a
m
p
le
-
sa
le
s
g
ro
w
th
:
≥
0
<
0
<
0
<
P
5
0
<
P
2
5
<
P
1
0
E
st
im
a
ti
o
n
te
ch
n
iq
u
e:
O
L
S
O
L
S
P
ro
b
it
O
L
S
O
L
S
O
L
S
O
b
se
rv
a
ti
o
n
s
3
4
,1
5
0
2
9
,4
6
3
2
9
,4
6
3
3
1
,8
1
4
1
5
,9
0
8
6
,3
6
3
R
-s
q
u
a
re
d
0
.2
1
8
3
0
.2
0
2
6
0
.2
0
0
8
0
.2
0
3
4
0
.1
8
4
4
L
o
g
li
k
el
ih
o
o
d
1
.3
1
e+
0
5
N
o
te
s
:
D
a
ta
re
fe
r
to
a
ll
p
ri
va
te
se
ct
o
r
fi
rm
s
w
it
h
a
t
le
a
st
2
5
em
p
lo
y
ee
s
th
a
t
ex
is
t
in
tw
o
su
b
se
q
u
en
t
y
ea
rs
a
n
d
fo
r
w
h
ic
h
sa
le
s
g
ro
w
th
d
a
ta
a
re
av
a
il
a
b
le
,
w
h
er
ea
s
fi
rm
-y
ea
r
co
m
b
in
a
ti
o
n
s
w
it
h
fi
rm
d
y
n
a
m
ic
s
(m
er
g
er
s
et
c.
)
a
re
le
ft
o
u
t
o
f
th
e
d
a
ta
.
S
ig
n
ifi
ca
n
ce
le
v
el
s:
∗
:
5
%
∗∗
:
1
%
∗∗
∗
:
0
.1
%
.
T
h
e
ta
b
le
p
re
se
n
ts
O
L
S
-r
eg
re
ss
io
n
s
fo
r
th
e
n
o
m
in
a
l
ch
a
n
g
e
in
th
e
h
o
u
rl
y
w
a
g
es
o
f
st
ay
er
s
if
sa
le
s
a
re
in
cr
ea
si
n
g
(c
o
lu
m
n
1
)
o
r
d
ec
re
a
si
n
g
(c
o
lu
m
n
2
).
C
o
lu
m
n
3
g
iv
es
th
e
re
su
lt
s
o
f
a
p
ro
b
it
re
g
re
ss
io
n
o
f
th
e
p
ro
b
a
b
il
it
y
th
a
t
th
e
n
o
m
in
a
l
ch
a
n
g
e
in
th
e
h
o
u
rl
y
w
a
g
es
o
f
st
ay
er
s
ex
ce
ed
s
th
a
t
o
f
th
e
se
ct
o
r
th
e
fi
rm
is
in
.
C
o
lu
m
n
s
4
,
5
a
n
d
6
sh
ow
re
g
re
ss
io
n
s
p
er
fo
rm
ed
o
n
in
cr
ea
si
n
g
ly
sm
a
ll
er
sa
m
p
le
s
w
it
h
in
cr
ea
si
n
g
ly
a
d
v
er
se
sa
le
s
g
ro
w
th
,
th
e
sa
m
p
le
s
re
sp
ec
ti
v
el
y
co
n
ta
in
in
g
o
b
se
rv
a
ti
o
n
s
b
el
ow
th
e
m
ed
ia
n
,
th
e
2
5
th
p
er
ce
n
ti
le
a
n
d
th
e
1
0
th
p
er
ce
n
ti
le
o
f
th
e
sa
le
s
g
ro
w
th
d
is
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
.
H
en
ce
,
th
e
si
x
th
co
lu
m
n
co
n
ta
in
s
th
e
le
a
st
o
b
se
rv
a
ti
o
n
s,
o
n
ly
th
e
o
n
es
th
a
t
ex
p
er
ie
n
ce
a
se
v
er
e
sh
o
ck
in
sa
le
s.
D
u
m
m
y
2
0
1
2
d
ro
p
s
o
u
t
d
u
e
to
m
u
lt
ic
o
ll
in
ea
ri
ty
w
it
h
’d
u
m
m
y
en
d
o
f
fi
rm
o
u
t
o
f
o
b
se
rv
ed
p
er
io
d
(t
)’
.
S
o
u
rc
e
:
O
w
n
ca
lc
u
la
ti
o
n
s
u
si
n
g
re
g
is
tr
a
ti
o
n
d
a
ta
fr
o
m
S
ta
ti
st
ic
s
N
et
h
er
la
n
d
s.
136
T
a
b
le
A
4
.6
:
R
eg
re
ss
io
n
s
of
em
p
lo
y
m
en
t
gr
ow
th
b
y
sa
le
s
gr
ow
th
gr
ou
p
s
20
06
–2
01
3
D
ep
en
d
en
t
va
ri
a
b
le
:
E
m
p
lo
y
m
en
t
E
m
p
lo
y
m
en
t
E
m
p
lo
y
m
en
t
E
m
p
lo
y
m
en
t
E
m
p
lo
y
m
en
t
E
m
p
lo
y
m
en
t
>
se
ct
o
r
m
ea
n
S
a
m
p
le
-
sa
le
s
g
ro
w
th
:
≥
0
<
0
<
0
<
P
5
0
<
P
2
5
<
P
1
0
E
st
im
a
ti
o
n
te
ch
n
iq
u
e:
O
L
S
O
L
S
P
ro
b
it
O
L
S
O
L
S
O
L
S
S
ta
te
o
f
b
u
si
n
e
ss
G
ro
w
th
ra
te
sa
le
s
(t
)
0
.1
1
5
8
∗∗
∗
0
.3
2
7
5
∗∗
∗
1
.9
4
4
4
∗∗
∗
0
.3
1
4
5
∗∗
∗
0
.3
2
9
0
∗∗
∗
0
.3
4
4
2
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
1
0
3
)
(0
.0
1
2
8
)
(0
.0
7
7
7
)
(0
.0
1
2
5
)
(0
.0
1
9
8
)
(0
.0
3
7
2
)
G
ro
w
th
ra
te
sa
le
s,
sq
u
a
re
d
(t
)
−0
.0
7
5
1
∗∗
∗
0
.1
4
4
7
∗∗
∗
1
.0
5
4
4
∗∗
∗
0
.1
3
7
6
∗∗
∗
0
.1
4
6
4
∗∗
∗
0
.1
5
4
3
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
0
8
3
)
(0
.0
0
9
7
)
(0
.0
5
2
7
)
(0
.0
0
9
5
)
(0
.0
1
2
3
)
(0
.0
1
8
9
)
G
ro
w
th
ra
te
sa
le
s
(t
−1
)
0
.0
2
9
2
∗∗
∗
0
.0
6
5
3
∗∗
∗
0
.5
2
7
8
∗∗
∗
0
.0
6
2
1
∗∗
∗
0
.0
7
3
3
∗∗
∗
0
.0
7
9
3
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
0
4
1
)
(0
.0
0
5
5
)
(0
.0
3
8
9
)
(0
.0
0
5
2
)
(0
.0
0
7
3
)
(0
.0
1
1
1
)
D
u
m
m
y
m
is
si
n
g
o
b
s.
:
G
ro
w
th
sa
le
s
(t
−1
)
−0
.0
0
1
9
−0
.0
0
0
9
−0
.0
2
1
8
−0
.0
0
0
1
0
.0
0
2
8
0
.0
0
6
2
(0
.0
0
2
5
)
(0
.0
0
3
1
)
(0
.0
2
2
9
)
(0
.0
0
2
8
)
(0
.0
0
4
6
)
(0
.0
0
8
4
)
R
ef
.
g
ro
u
p
:
b
u
si
n
es
s
re
su
lt
(t
−1
)
<
0
−
−
−
−
−
−
B
u
si
n
es
s
re
su
lt
(t
−1
)
≥
0
0
.0
3
8
6
∗∗
∗
0
.0
6
3
3
∗∗
∗
0
.4
2
9
6
∗∗
∗
0
.0
6
0
8
∗∗
∗
0
.0
7
8
4
∗∗
∗
0
.1
0
0
7
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
0
2
3
)
(0
.0
0
3
0
)
(0
.0
2
0
7
)
(0
.0
0
2
8
)
(0
.0
0
4
3
)
(0
.0
0
8
2
)
R
ef
.
g
ro
u
p
:
co
n
ti
n
u
in
g
fi
rm
(t
)
−
−
−
−
−
−
D
u
m
m
y
fi
rm
ce
a
se
s
to
ex
it
s
n
ex
t
y
ea
r
(t
)
−0
.0
0
5
3
−0
.0
3
2
2
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
7
2
0
−0
.0
2
7
3
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
3
6
0
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
4
5
6
∗∗
(0
.0
0
6
1
)
(0
.0
0
8
2
)
(0
.0
4
4
0
)
(0
.0
0
7
2
)
(0
.0
1
0
5
)
(0
.0
1
8
5
)
D
u
m
m
y
en
d
o
f
fi
rm
o
u
t
o
f
o
b
se
rv
ed
p
er
io
d
(t
)
0
.0
2
0
8
∗∗
∗
0
.0
2
2
7
∗∗
∗
0
.0
9
3
6
∗∗
∗
0
.0
2
1
8
∗∗
∗
0
.0
2
5
4
∗∗
∗
0
.0
4
6
1
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
0
2
9
)
(0
.0
0
3
4
)
(0
.0
2
5
4
)
(0
.0
0
3
2
)
(0
.0
0
5
2
)
(0
.0
1
0
0
)
S
h
a
re
o
f
w
o
rk
er
s
su
b
je
ct
to
p
a
rt
-t
im
e
U
B
(t
−1
)
−0
.0
0
2
8
−0
.0
3
4
9
−0
.3
7
9
1
∗
−0
.0
3
7
3
∗
−0
.0
6
4
1
∗
−0
.0
0
7
3
(0
.0
1
1
5
)
(0
.0
2
3
7
)
(0
.1
9
5
5
)
(0
.0
2
1
5
)
(0
.0
3
3
4
)
(0
.0
5
3
7
)
D
u
m
m
y
m
is
si
n
g
o
b
s.
:
S
h
a
re
p
a
rt
-t
im
e
U
B
(t
−1
)
−0
.0
3
7
5
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
3
1
7
∗∗
∗
−0
.4
4
0
0
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
3
4
6
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
3
2
9
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
4
5
5
∗∗
(0
.0
0
4
5
)
(0
.0
0
6
4
)
(0
.0
4
4
3
)
(0
.0
0
6
0
)
(0
.0
0
9
5
)
(0
.0
1
9
0
)
137
T
a
b
le
A
4
.6
C
o
n
ti
n
u
e
d
fr
o
m
p
re
v
io
u
s
p
a
g
e
D
ep
en
d
en
t
va
ri
a
b
le
:
E
m
p
lo
y
m
en
t
E
m
p
lo
y
m
en
t
E
m
p
lo
y
m
en
t
E
m
p
lo
y
m
en
t
E
m
p
lo
y
m
en
t
E
m
p
lo
y
m
en
t
>
se
ct
o
r
m
ea
n
S
a
m
p
le
-
sa
le
s
g
ro
w
th
:
≥
0
<
0
<
0
<
P
5
0
<
P
2
5
<
P
1
0
E
st
im
a
ti
o
n
te
ch
n
iq
u
e:
O
L
S
O
L
S
P
ro
b
it
O
L
S
O
L
S
O
L
S
T
y
p
e
o
f
jo
b
S
h
a
re
o
f
o
p
en
-t
er
m
co
n
tr
a
ct
s
(t
−1
)
0
.0
2
8
1
∗∗
∗
0
.0
3
9
7
∗∗
∗
0
.2
5
3
0
∗∗
∗
0
.0
3
8
6
∗∗
∗
0
.0
4
5
6
∗∗
∗
0
.0
4
4
7
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
0
5
4
)
(0
.0
0
6
3
)
(0
.0
4
3
0
)
(0
.0
0
6
0
)
(0
.0
0
9
3
)
(0
.0
1
7
0
)
S
h
a
re
o
f
re
g
u
la
r
jo
b
s
(t
−1
)
0
.0
1
8
8
0
.0
3
7
6
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
5
3
6
0
.0
4
0
2
∗∗
∗
0
.0
3
2
6
∗
0
.0
7
4
7
∗∗
(0
.0
1
3
3
)
(0
.0
1
4
2
)
(0
.0
7
6
6
)
(0
.0
1
3
6
)
(0
.0
1
9
5
)
(0
.0
3
5
2
)
S
h
a
re
o
f
fu
ll
-t
im
e
jo
b
s
(t
−1
)
0
.0
4
0
1
∗∗
∗
0
.0
3
9
9
∗∗
∗
0
.1
7
2
5
∗∗
∗
0
.0
4
2
7
∗∗
∗
0
.0
6
9
1
∗∗
∗
0
.1
0
4
0
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
0
8
4
)
(0
.0
0
9
8
)
(0
.0
6
6
2
)
(0
.0
0
9
2
)
(0
.0
1
6
0
)
(0
.0
3
1
3
)
S
h
a
re
o
f
jo
b
s
h
ir
ed
fr
o
m
T
W
A
’s
(t
−1
)
0
.0
0
0
9
0
.0
0
2
1
∗
0
.0
1
4
7
0
.0
0
2
2
∗∗
0
.0
0
9
5
−0
.0
0
5
4
(0
.0
0
0
8
)
(0
.0
0
1
1
)
(0
.0
1
3
0
)
(0
.0
0
1
1
)
(0
.0
1
5
8
)
(0
.0
3
1
3
)
S
h
a
re
o
f
h
ir
ed
se
lf
-e
m
p
lo
y
ed
(t
−1
)
−0
.0
0
2
4
−0
.0
0
0
8
−0
.0
4
9
3
∗
−0
.0
0
1
2
−0
.0
0
0
4
−0
.0
1
8
1
(0
.0
0
1
6
)
(0
.0
0
3
1
)
(0
.0
2
5
4
)
(0
.0
0
3
2
)
(0
.0
0
5
3
)
(0
.0
1
4
3
)
D
u
m
m
y
m
is
si
n
g
o
b
s.
:
S
h
a
re
T
W
A
(t
−1
)
−0
.1
1
9
0
∗∗
∗
−0
.1
1
4
5
∗∗
∗
−1
.0
9
9
3
∗∗
∗
−0
.1
1
2
5
∗∗
∗
−0
.1
1
8
9
∗∗
∗
−0
.1
4
5
2
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
1
6
6
)
(0
.0
2
7
6
)
(0
.1
4
9
4
)
(0
.0
2
6
6
)
(0
.0
3
3
9
)
(0
.0
5
1
2
)
C
o
ll
e
c
ti
v
e
la
b
o
u
r
a
g
re
e
m
e
n
t
C
L
A
en
te
rp
ri
se
le
v
el
(t
−1
)
0
.0
0
0
7
−0
.0
0
4
3
0
.0
3
0
0
−0
.0
0
2
9
0
.0
0
1
4
0
.0
0
5
6
(0
.0
0
3
5
)
(0
.0
0
4
7
)
(0
.0
3
9
0
)
(0
.0
0
4
5
)
(0
.0
0
7
6
)
(0
.0
1
6
2
)
C
L
A
se
ct
o
r
le
v
el
,
n
o
ex
te
n
si
o
n
(t
−1
)
−0
.0
1
4
3
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
1
8
5
∗∗
∗
−0
.1
6
2
8
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
1
9
5
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
1
9
9
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
1
9
0
(0
.0
0
4
9
)
(0
.0
0
5
1
)
(0
.0
3
7
9
)
(0
.0
0
4
8
)
(0
.0
0
7
7
)
(0
.0
1
5
9
)
C
L
A
en
te
rp
ri
se
ex
te
n
d
ed
to
se
ct
o
r
le
v
el
(t
−1
)
0
.0
0
2
5
0
.0
0
0
7
−0
.0
4
6
7
∗∗
0
.0
0
2
6
−0
.0
0
0
8
0
.0
0
0
1
(0
.0
0
1
9
)
(0
.0
0
2
6
)
(0
.0
2
1
5
)
(0
.0
0
2
5
)
(0
.0
0
4
2
)
(0
.0
0
8
9
)
R
ef
.
g
ro
u
p
:
n
o
co
ll
ec
ti
v
e
la
b
o
u
r
a
g
re
em
en
t
(C
L
A
)
−
−
−
−
−
−
C
L
A
u
n
k
n
ow
n
(t
−1
)
−0
.0
5
3
3
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
3
5
6
∗∗
−0
.3
1
4
9
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
3
3
4
∗∗
−0
.0
3
5
2
−0
.0
1
6
3
(0
.0
1
2
9
)
(0
.0
1
7
8
)
(0
.1
0
3
7
)
(0
.0
1
5
6
)
(0
.0
2
4
3
)
(0
.0
4
4
0
)
C
o
m
p
o
si
ti
o
n
o
f
th
e
la
b
o
u
r
fo
rc
e
S
h
a
re
o
f
m
a
le
w
o
rk
er
s
(t
−1
)
−0
.0
2
5
5
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
3
1
9
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
5
9
9
−0
.0
3
6
0
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
4
5
8
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
7
3
4
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
0
7
9
)
(0
.0
0
9
0
)
(0
.0
6
1
2
)
(0
.0
0
8
5
)
(0
.0
1
4
2
)
(0
.0
2
7
4
)
138
T
a
b
le
A
4
.6
C
o
n
ti
n
u
e
d
fr
o
m
p
re
v
io
u
s
p
a
g
e
D
ep
en
d
en
t
va
ri
a
b
le
:
E
m
p
lo
y
m
en
t
E
m
p
lo
y
m
en
t
E
m
p
lo
y
m
en
t
E
m
p
lo
y
m
en
t
E
m
p
lo
y
m
en
t
E
m
p
lo
y
m
en
t
>
se
ct
o
r
m
ea
n
S
a
m
p
le
-
sa
le
s
g
ro
w
th
:
≥
0
<
0
<
0
<
P
5
0
<
P
2
5
<
P
1
0
E
st
im
a
ti
o
n
te
ch
n
iq
u
e:
O
L
S
O
L
S
P
ro
b
it
O
L
S
O
L
S
O
L
S
S
h
a
re
o
f
w
o
rk
er
s
a
g
ed
2
3
-3
5
(t
−1
)
−0
.0
2
0
4
∗∗
−0
.0
2
1
8
∗
−0
.1
2
6
9
−0
.0
1
5
5
−0
.0
2
3
5
−0
.0
3
1
8
(0
.0
0
8
9
)
(0
.0
1
1
8
)
(0
.0
8
3
8
)
(0
.0
1
1
2
)
(0
.0
1
8
7
)
(0
.0
3
5
2
)
R
ef
.
g
ro
u
p
:
S
h
a
re
o
f
w
o
rk
er
s
a
g
ed
3
6
-5
0
(t
−1
)
−
−
−
−
−
−
S
h
a
re
o
f
w
o
rk
er
s
a
g
ed
5
1
-6
5
(t
−1
)
−0
.0
8
1
9
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
6
2
7
∗∗
∗
−0
.6
2
6
0
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
5
7
4
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
5
9
4
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
6
5
8
(0
.0
1
1
0
)
(0
.0
1
2
8
)
(0
.1
0
2
1
)
(0
.0
1
2
1
)
(0
.0
1
9
8
)
(0
.0
4
0
1
)
S
h
a
re
o
f
jo
b
te
n
u
re
≥
1
0
y
ea
rs
(t
−1
)
0
.0
1
7
1
∗∗
∗
0
.0
2
7
1
∗∗
∗
0
.2
6
5
8
∗∗
∗
0
.0
2
7
8
∗∗
∗
0
.0
2
6
8
∗∗
∗
0
.0
1
0
9
(0
.0
0
5
4
)
(0
.0
0
6
8
)
(0
.0
5
1
8
)
(0
.0
0
6
5
)
(0
.0
0
9
8
)
(0
.0
2
0
0
)
R
ef
.
g
ro
u
p
:
D
u
tc
h
w
o
rk
er
s
−
−
−
−
−
−
S
h
a
re
o
f
im
m
ig
ra
n
ts
a
ft
er
E
U
-e
n
la
rg
em
en
t
(t
−1
)
0
.0
2
4
5
0
.0
8
2
5
0
.0
3
3
8
0
.0
9
3
3
0
.0
7
3
3
0
.1
4
2
0
(0
.0
4
8
4
)
(0
.0
6
7
5
)
(0
.3
8
2
9
)
(0
.0
6
4
4
)
(0
.0
7
9
0
)
(0
.1
3
2
0
)
S
h
a
re
o
f
im
m
ig
ra
n
ts
o
th
er
w
es
te
rn
co
u
n
tr
ie
s
−0
.0
8
3
0
∗∗
∗
−0
.1
1
3
3
∗∗
∗
−0
.7
4
1
5
∗∗
∗
−0
.1
1
4
2
∗∗
∗
−0
.1
3
0
2
∗∗
∗
−0
.2
0
1
5
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
1
6
9
)
(0
.0
2
3
5
)
(0
.1
2
2
6
)
(0
.0
2
2
0
)
(0
.0
3
6
4
)
(0
.0
7
4
0
)
S
h
a
re
o
f
o
th
er
n
o
n
-w
es
te
rn
im
m
ig
ra
n
ts
(t
−1
)
−0
.0
3
9
0
∗
−0
.0
2
3
0
0
.2
7
6
2
−0
.0
2
2
7
−0
.0
5
5
8
−0
.1
7
8
8
(0
.0
2
1
4
)
(0
.0
5
0
4
)
(0
.2
1
6
1
)
(0
.0
4
4
3
)
(0
.0
8
4
7
)
(0
.1
6
0
1
)
T
ra
in
in
g
,
e
d
u
c
a
ti
o
n
a
n
d
c
o
n
tr
a
c
tu
a
l
w
a
g
e
ra
ti
o
tr
a
in
in
g
ex
p
en
d
it
u
re
s
fi
rm
/
sa
le
s
(t
−1
)
−0
.0
0
8
1
0
.0
2
0
0
−1
.4
6
6
7
0
.0
4
7
8
0
.0
6
9
0
0
.1
1
0
2
(0
.0
8
3
7
)
(0
.1
1
7
1
)
(0
.9
7
4
1
)
(0
.1
1
5
6
)
(0
.1
6
8
3
)
(0
.2
3
6
0
)
S
h
a
re
lo
w
ed
u
ca
te
d
w
o
rk
er
s
(t
−1
)
0
.0
1
1
7
∗∗
0
.0
0
6
0
0
.0
8
0
8
0
.0
0
9
1
0
.0
0
1
7
0
.0
0
0
1
(0
.0
0
6
0
)
(0
.0
0
7
3
)
(0
.0
5
8
4
)
(0
.0
0
6
9
)
(0
.0
1
1
0
)
(0
.0
2
1
0
)
S
h
a
re
m
ed
iu
m
ed
u
ca
te
d
w
o
rk
er
s
(t
−1
)
0
.0
0
2
6
0
.0
0
3
0
0
.1
1
6
8
∗∗
0
.0
0
4
3
0
.0
0
3
4
−0
.0
0
5
2
(0
.0
0
5
1
)
(0
.0
0
6
5
)
(0
.0
5
3
8
)
(0
.0
0
6
2
)
(0
.0
0
9
9
)
(0
.0
1
8
3
)
R
ef
.
g
ro
u
p
:
S
h
a
re
h
ig
h
ed
u
ca
te
d
w
o
rk
er
s
(t
−1
)
−
−
−
−
−
−
S
h
a
re
w
o
rk
er
s
w
it
h
lo
w
w
a
g
e
(t
−1
)
−0
.0
7
4
1
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
3
2
7
−0
.3
4
3
7
∗
−0
.0
3
1
8
−0
.0
3
2
1
−0
.0
8
0
5
139
T
a
b
le
A
4
.6
C
o
n
ti
n
u
e
d
fr
o
m
p
re
v
io
u
s
p
a
g
e
D
ep
en
d
en
t
va
ri
a
b
le
:
E
m
p
lo
y
m
en
t
E
m
p
lo
y
m
en
t
E
m
p
lo
y
m
en
t
E
m
p
lo
y
m
en
t
E
m
p
lo
y
m
en
t
E
m
p
lo
y
m
en
t
>
se
ct
o
r
m
ea
n
S
a
m
p
le
-
sa
le
s
g
ro
w
th
:
≥
0
<
0
<
0
<
P
5
0
<
P
2
5
<
P
1
0
E
st
im
a
ti
o
n
te
ch
n
iq
u
e:
O
L
S
O
L
S
P
ro
b
it
O
L
S
O
L
S
O
L
S
(0
.0
1
9
8
)
(0
.0
2
5
7
)
(0
.1
8
0
7
)
(0
.0
2
4
5
)
(0
.0
3
9
3
)
(0
.0
7
5
2
)
S
h
a
re
w
o
rk
er
s
w
it
h
m
ed
iu
m
w
a
g
e
(t
−1
)
−0
.0
5
2
4
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
0
8
9
−0
.2
0
1
3
−0
.0
1
2
9
0
.0
0
6
0
−0
.0
1
7
3
(0
.0
1
4
7
)
(0
.0
1
9
1
)
(0
.1
3
9
3
)
(0
.0
1
8
3
)
(0
.0
2
8
0
)
(0
.0
5
2
7
)
R
ef
.
g
ro
u
p
:S
h
a
re
w
o
rk
er
s
w
it
h
h
ig
h
w
a
g
e
(t
−1
)
−
−
−
−
−
−
A
v
er
a
g
e
h
o
u
rl
y
w
a
g
e
o
f
th
e
fi
rm
(t
−1
)
−0
.0
0
2
0
∗∗
0
.0
0
1
0
0
.0
0
5
1
0
.0
0
1
2
0
.0
0
1
4
−0
.0
0
0
5
(0
.0
0
1
0
)
(0
.0
0
1
3
)
(0
.0
0
8
4
)
(0
.0
0
1
2
)
(0
.0
0
2
0
)
(0
.0
0
3
7
)
S
td
.
d
ev
.o
f
h
o
u
rl
y
w
a
g
e
in
th
e
fi
rm
(t
−1
)
−0
.0
0
0
2
0
.0
0
0
3
−0
.0
0
1
6
0
.0
0
0
2
0
.0
0
1
3
0
.0
0
3
5
∗
(0
.0
0
0
5
)
(0
.0
0
0
6
)
(0
.0
0
4
4
)
(0
.0
0
0
6
)
(0
.0
0
1
0
)
(0
.0
0
1
9
)
D
u
m
m
y
m
is
si
n
g
o
b
s.
:
tr
a
in
in
g
ex
p
en
d
it
u
re
s
(t
−1
)
−0
.0
7
1
7
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
4
7
0
∗
−0
.5
2
6
3
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
5
3
2
∗∗
−0
.0
3
1
7
0
.0
0
5
5
(0
.0
1
6
4
)
(0
.0
2
7
1
)
(0
.1
4
4
2
)
(0
.0
2
6
1
)
(0
.0
3
3
2
)
(0
.0
4
9
4
)
O
th
e
r
fi
rm
ch
a
ra
c
te
ri
st
ic
s
R
ef
.
g
ro
u
p
:
lo
w
S
h
a
re
o
f
in
ci
d
en
ta
l
w
a
g
e
(t
−1
)
−
−
−
−
−
−
In
te
rm
ed
ia
te
S
h
a
re
o
f
in
ci
d
en
ta
l
w
a
g
e
(t
−1
)
−0
.0
0
5
8
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
0
7
9
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
8
7
7
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
0
8
1
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
0
7
1
∗
−0
.0
0
1
8
(0
.0
0
2
1
)
(0
.0
0
2
6
)
(0
.0
2
2
1
)
(0
.0
0
2
4
)
(0
.0
0
4
1
)
(0
.0
0
8
4
)
H
ig
h
S
h
a
re
o
f
in
ci
d
en
ta
l
w
a
g
e
(t
−1
)
−0
.0
0
4
7
∗
−0
.0
0
0
3
−0
.0
2
2
1
−0
.0
0
0
7
0
.0
0
0
6
0
.0
1
3
2
(0
.0
0
2
6
)
(0
.0
0
3
2
)
(0
.0
2
7
0
)
(0
.0
0
3
0
)
(0
.0
0
5
0
)
(0
.0
1
0
2
)
R
ef
.
g
ro
u
p
:
fi
rm
si
ze
2
5
-
9
9
w
o
rk
er
s
(t
−1
)
−
−
−
−
−
−
F
ir
m
si
ze
1
0
0
-
5
0
0
w
o
rk
er
s
(t
−1
)
−0
.0
0
1
4
−0
.0
0
3
5
−0
.0
6
9
3
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
0
3
1
−0
.0
0
4
5
0
.0
0
8
2
(0
.0
0
1
9
)
(0
.0
0
2
3
)
(0
.0
1
9
6
)
(0
.0
0
2
2
)
(0
.0
0
3
7
)
(0
.0
0
7
5
)
F
ir
m
si
ze
≥
5
0
0
w
o
rk
er
s
(t
−1
)
−0
.0
0
1
7
0
.0
0
9
2
∗∗
−0
.0
6
7
2
0
.0
0
6
1
0
.0
1
8
8
∗∗
0
.0
2
4
1
(0
.0
0
5
0
)
(0
.0
0
4
5
)
(0
.0
4
5
8
)
(0
.0
0
4
5
)
(0
.0
0
7
5
)
(0
.0
1
6
7
)
R
ef
.
g
ro
u
p
:
#
es
ta
b
li
sh
m
en
ts
1
(t
−1
)
−
−
−
−
−
−
140
T
a
b
le
A
4
.6
C
o
n
ti
n
u
e
d
fr
o
m
p
re
v
io
u
s
p
a
g
e
D
ep
en
d
en
t
va
ri
a
b
le
:
E
m
p
lo
y
m
en
t
E
m
p
lo
y
m
en
t
E
m
p
lo
y
m
en
t
E
m
p
lo
y
m
en
t
E
m
p
lo
y
m
en
t
E
m
p
lo
y
m
en
t
>
se
ct
o
r
m
ea
n
S
a
m
p
le
-
sa
le
s
g
ro
w
th
:
≥
0
<
0
<
0
<
P
5
0
<
P
2
5
<
P
1
0
E
st
im
a
ti
o
n
te
ch
n
iq
u
e:
O
L
S
O
L
S
P
ro
b
it
O
L
S
O
L
S
O
L
S
#
es
ta
b
li
sh
m
en
ts
2
-
5
0
(t
−1
)
−0
.0
0
1
8
−0
.0
0
1
1
−0
.0
6
7
6
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
0
1
1
−0
.0
0
3
7
0
.0
0
3
5
(0
.0
0
1
8
)
(0
.0
0
2
1
)
(0
.0
1
7
5
)
(0
.0
0
2
0
)
(0
.0
0
3
3
)
(0
.0
0
6
7
)
H
ig
h
#
es
ta
b
li
sh
m
en
ts
≥
5
0
(t
−1
)
0
.0
0
6
1
0
.0
0
5
2
−0
.0
7
5
0
0
.0
0
5
1
0
.0
1
4
9
0
.0
3
4
0
(0
.0
1
2
3
)
(0
.0
0
9
1
)
(0
.0
8
5
0
)
(0
.0
0
9
4
)
(0
.0
1
6
9
)
(0
.0
4
5
5
)
R
ef
.
g
ro
u
p
:
D
u
tc
h
ow
n
er
sh
ip
(t
−1
)
−
−
−
−
−
−
U
K
/
U
S
ow
n
er
sh
ip
(t
−1
)
−0
.0
1
0
9
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
1
5
1
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
7
5
8
∗∗
−0
.0
1
4
2
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
2
1
1
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
1
5
2
(0
.0
0
3
6
)
(0
.0
0
5
1
)
(0
.0
3
8
7
)
(0
.0
0
4
6
)
(0
.0
0
7
7
)
(0
.0
1
4
4
)
F
o
re
ig
n
ow
n
er
sh
ip
,
n
o
U
K
/
U
S
(t
−1
)
−0
.0
0
6
1
∗∗
−0
.0
1
1
1
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
6
6
4
∗∗
−0
.0
1
1
9
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
1
4
3
∗∗
−0
.0
2
6
4
∗∗
(0
.0
0
2
6
)
(0
.0
0
3
8
)
(0
.0
3
0
1
)
(0
.0
0
3
5
)
(0
.0
0
6
1
)
(0
.0
1
2
5
)
O
w
n
er
sh
ip
u
n
k
n
ow
n
(t
−1
)
0
.0
0
9
0
0
.0
2
5
3
−0
.2
0
5
0
0
.0
3
1
6
∗∗
0
.0
5
4
6
∗∗
∗
0
.0
9
7
6
∗∗
(0
.0
2
0
1
)
(0
.0
1
6
7
)
(0
.1
6
8
1
)
(0
.0
1
5
3
)
(0
.0
1
9
9
)
(0
.0
4
4
5
)
R
ef
.
g
ro
u
p
:
n
o
n
-e
x
p
o
rt
in
g
fi
rm
(t
−1
)
−
−
−
−
−
−
E
x
p
o
rt
in
g
fi
rm
(t
−1
)
−0
.0
1
8
1
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
0
0
8
0
.0
1
0
5
−0
.0
0
2
9
0
.0
0
0
4
0
.0
0
9
1
(0
.0
0
3
7
)
(0
.0
0
4
5
)
(0
.0
3
5
0
)
(0
.0
0
4
3
)
(0
.0
0
7
2
)
(0
.0
1
3
9
)
E
x
p
o
rt
u
n
k
n
ow
n
(t
−1
)
−0
.0
2
7
1
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
0
6
3
0
.1
2
0
9
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
0
9
6
∗∗
−0
.0
1
4
2
∗∗
−0
.0
1
6
7
(0
.0
0
3
6
)
(0
.0
0
4
4
)
(0
.0
3
1
4
)
(0
.0
0
4
3
)
(0
.0
0
7
1
)
(0
.0
1
3
6
)
S
e
c
to
rs
o
f
e
c
o
n
o
m
ic
a
c
ti
v
it
y
a
n
d
y
e
a
rs
M
in
er
a
l
ex
tr
a
ct
io
n
se
ct
o
r
(t
)
0
.0
0
4
6
0
.0
1
7
1
−0
.0
2
9
2
0
.0
0
5
9
−0
.0
8
0
1
−0
.0
8
8
3
∗∗
(0
.0
6
3
3
)
(0
.0
3
2
9
)
(0
.3
5
6
6
)
(0
.0
3
3
7
)
(0
.0
4
9
6
)
(0
.0
4
0
4
)
M
a
n
u
fa
ct
u
ri
n
g
se
ct
o
r
(t
)
0
.0
2
6
3
−0
.0
0
5
1
−0
.1
9
2
6
−0
.0
0
3
5
−0
.0
8
1
9
∗
−0
.1
5
6
6
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
6
2
2
)
(0
.0
3
0
1
)
(0
.3
0
1
4
)
(0
.0
3
1
7
)
(0
.0
4
4
6
)
(0
.0
2
5
2
)
R
ef
.
g
ro
u
p
:
en
er
g
y
a
n
d
w
a
te
r
se
ct
o
r
(t
)
−
−
−
−
−
−
C
o
n
st
ru
ct
io
n
se
ct
o
r
(t
)
0
.0
1
4
7
−0
.0
0
1
7
−0
.1
8
1
5
−0
.0
0
3
6
−0
.0
8
2
9
∗
−0
.1
5
4
5
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
6
2
1
)
(0
.0
3
0
3
)
(0
.3
0
3
1
)
(0
.0
3
1
9
)
(0
.0
4
5
0
)
(0
.0
2
9
7
)
G
o
o
d
s
tr
a
d
e
se
ct
o
r
(t
)
0
.0
1
7
3
−0
.0
0
4
4
−0
.2
7
2
7
−0
.0
0
3
4
−0
.0
8
5
0
∗
−0
.1
5
2
7
∗∗
∗
141
T
a
b
le
A
4
.6
C
o
n
ti
n
u
e
d
fr
o
m
p
re
v
io
u
s
p
a
g
e
D
ep
en
d
en
t
va
ri
a
b
le
:
E
m
p
lo
y
m
en
t
E
m
p
lo
y
m
en
t
E
m
p
lo
y
m
en
t
E
m
p
lo
y
m
en
t
E
m
p
lo
y
m
en
t
E
m
p
lo
y
m
en
t
>
se
ct
o
r
m
ea
n
S
a
m
p
le
-
sa
le
s
g
ro
w
th
:
≥
0
<
0
<
0
<
P
5
0
<
P
2
5
<
P
1
0
E
st
im
a
ti
o
n
te
ch
n
iq
u
e:
O
L
S
O
L
S
P
ro
b
it
O
L
S
O
L
S
O
L
S
(0
.0
6
2
1
)
(0
.0
3
0
1
)
(0
.3
0
1
4
)
(0
.0
3
1
7
)
(0
.0
4
4
7
)
(0
.0
2
6
6
)
H
o
re
ca
se
ct
o
r
(t
)
−0
.0
0
1
5
−0
.0
1
2
3
−0
.4
6
5
5
−0
.0
1
3
2
−0
.0
9
0
7
∗∗
−0
.1
1
0
9
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
6
2
3
)
(0
.0
3
0
6
)
(0
.3
0
6
1
)
(0
.0
3
2
2
)
(0
.0
4
5
7
)
(0
.0
3
5
8
)
T
ra
n
sp
o
rt
a
n
d
co
m
m
u
n
ic
a
ti
o
n
se
ct
o
r
(t
)
0
.0
1
5
5
−0
.0
1
2
9
−0
.2
1
2
8
−0
.0
1
3
1
−0
.0
9
6
2
∗∗
−0
.1
7
6
7
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
6
2
1
)
(0
.0
3
0
2
)
(0
.3
0
2
6
)
(0
.0
3
1
9
)
(0
.0
4
5
0
)
(0
.0
2
9
3
)
B
u
si
n
es
s
se
rv
ic
es
se
ct
o
r
(t
)
0
.0
0
1
1
−0
.0
4
6
8
−0
.2
0
1
9
−0
.0
4
6
4
−0
.1
3
5
2
∗∗
∗
−0
.2
1
4
2
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
6
2
1
)
(0
.0
3
0
2
)
(0
.3
0
2
0
)
(0
.0
3
1
8
)
(0
.0
4
4
9
)
(0
.0
2
5
7
)
R
ef
.
va
ri
a
b
le
:
y
ea
r
2
0
0
8
−
−
−
−
−
−
D
u
m
m
y
y
ea
r
2
0
0
9
0
.0
0
1
2
−0
.0
0
4
6
0
.4
0
8
1
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
0
6
8
−0
.0
2
4
0
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
5
1
3
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
0
3
7
)
(0
.0
0
4
1
)
(0
.0
3
0
9
)
(0
.0
0
4
3
)
(0
.0
0
7
2
)
(0
.0
1
3
4
)
D
u
m
m
y
y
ea
r
2
0
1
0
−0
.0
2
9
1
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
1
9
2
∗∗
∗
0
.2
5
6
6
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
2
0
2
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
1
9
2
∗
−0
.0
3
1
8
(0
.0
0
5
5
)
(0
.0
0
6
4
)
(0
.0
4
5
9
)
(0
.0
0
6
3
)
(0
.0
0
9
8
)
(0
.0
1
9
5
)
D
u
m
m
y
y
ea
r
2
0
1
1
−0
.0
1
1
5
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
0
5
6
−0
.0
6
8
7
∗
−0
.0
0
8
2
∗
−0
.0
0
4
1
−0
.0
0
9
0
(0
.0
0
3
7
)
(0
.0
0
5
3
)
(0
.0
3
9
4
)
(0
.0
0
4
9
)
(0
.0
0
7
9
)
(0
.0
1
6
1
)
D
u
m
m
y
y
ea
r
2
0
1
2
−
−
−
−
−
−
D
u
m
m
y
y
ea
r
2
0
1
3
0
.0
3
8
0
∗∗
∗
0
.0
3
1
7
∗∗
∗
0
.4
9
2
3
∗∗
∗
0
.0
3
4
9
∗∗
∗
0
.0
3
4
5
∗∗
∗
0
.0
3
2
4
∗
(0
.0
0
4
1
)
(0
.0
0
6
0
)
(0
.0
4
4
4
)
(0
.0
0
5
6
)
(0
.0
0
9
4
)
(0
.0
1
8
8
)
R
e
la
ti
o
n
e
m
p
lo
y
m
e
n
t
G
ro
w
th
-
w
a
g
e
G
ro
w
th
G
ro
w
th
h
o
u
rl
y
w
a
g
e
st
ay
er
s
(i
n
%
)
(t
)
−0
.0
2
4
4
−0
.0
2
7
4
0
.0
2
6
4
−0
.0
3
8
3
−0
.0
5
6
1
−0
.0
4
4
1
(0
.0
3
2
8
)
(0
.0
3
6
4
)
(0
.1
7
3
4
)
(0
.0
3
6
5
)
(0
.0
4
8
8
)
(0
.1
0
1
5
)
In
d
ic
a
to
r
d
ow
n
w
a
rd
n
o
m
in
a
l
w
a
g
e
ri
g
id
it
y
(t
)
−0
.3
4
5
2
∗∗
∗
−0
.3
8
4
8
∗∗
∗
−4
.4
5
7
2
∗∗
∗
−0
.4
1
5
3
∗∗
∗
−0
.5
6
3
0
∗∗
∗
−0
.7
6
2
4
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
5
9
6
)
(0
.0
6
6
1
)
(0
.4
1
6
6
)
(0
.0
6
6
0
)
(0
.1
0
4
3
)
(0
.1
8
8
9
)
In
d
ic
a
to
r
d
ow
n
w
a
rd
re
a
l
w
a
g
e
ri
g
id
it
y
(t
)
−0
.3
4
7
9
∗∗
∗
−0
.3
4
4
8
∗∗
∗
−4
.3
8
0
6
∗∗
∗
−0
.3
7
3
4
∗∗
∗
−0
.5
2
4
3
∗∗
∗
−0
.6
9
8
7
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
6
4
6
)
(0
.0
7
2
5
)
(0
.4
5
2
1
)
(0
.0
7
1
9
)
(0
.1
1
3
8
)
(0
.2
0
3
2
)
W
a
g
e
d
ec
re
a
se
b
el
ow
ra
n
g
e
in
d
ic
a
to
r
(t
)
−0
.1
5
5
6
∗∗
−0
.1
9
3
3
∗∗
∗
−0
.1
6
1
6
−0
.2
3
6
9
∗∗
∗
−0
.2
8
1
1
∗∗
∗
−0
.3
4
8
3
∗∗
142
T
a
b
le
A
4
.6
C
o
n
ti
n
u
e
d
fr
o
m
p
re
v
io
u
s
p
a
g
e
D
ep
en
d
en
t
va
ri
a
b
le
:
E
m
p
lo
y
m
en
t
E
m
p
lo
y
m
en
t
E
m
p
lo
y
m
en
t
E
m
p
lo
y
m
en
t
E
m
p
lo
y
m
en
t
E
m
p
lo
y
m
en
t
>
se
ct
o
r
m
ea
n
S
a
m
p
le
-
sa
le
s
g
ro
w
th
:
≥
0
<
0
<
0
<
P
5
0
<
P
2
5
<
P
1
0
E
st
im
a
ti
o
n
te
ch
n
iq
u
e:
O
L
S
O
L
S
P
ro
b
it
O
L
S
O
L
S
O
L
S
(0
.0
6
7
6
)
(0
.0
6
2
9
)
(0
.2
9
4
1
)
(0
.0
6
6
8
)
(0
.0
9
1
9
)
(0
.1
4
7
0
)
W
a
g
e
d
ec
re
a
se
a
b
ov
e
ra
n
g
e
in
d
ic
a
to
r
(t
)
0
.4
1
6
1
∗∗
∗
0
.2
4
6
4
∗∗
∗
2
.5
8
5
5
∗∗
∗
0
.2
5
3
7
∗∗
∗
0
.2
5
9
1
∗∗
∗
0
.2
7
3
6
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
1
5
3
)
(0
.0
1
7
8
)
(0
.0
9
7
3
)
(0
.0
1
6
6
)
(0
.0
2
3
2
)
(0
.0
3
9
0
)
D
u
m
m
y
m
is
si
n
g
o
b
s.
:
w
a
g
e
ri
g
id
it
y
in
d
ic
a
to
r
(t
)
−0
.1
2
7
6
∗∗
∗
−0
.1
3
3
5
∗∗
∗
−0
.5
8
0
6
∗∗
∗
−0
.1
3
0
7
∗∗
∗
−0
.1
3
6
8
∗∗
∗
−0
.1
7
6
2
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
1
7
3
)
(0
.0
1
9
2
)
(0
.0
9
8
8
)
(0
.0
1
7
4
)
(0
.0
2
3
0
)
(0
.0
4
1
9
)
C
o
n
st
a
n
t
0
.3
1
5
3
∗∗
∗
0
.2
1
5
0
∗∗
∗
3
.8
9
3
5
∗∗
∗
0
.2
3
8
7
∗∗
∗
0
.4
3
0
7
∗∗
∗
0
.6
7
5
9
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
9
4
6
)
(0
.0
8
2
6
)
(0
.5
8
1
2
)
(0
.0
8
2
3
)
(0
.1
2
6
5
)
(0
.2
1
7
4
)
O
b
se
rv
a
ti
o
n
s
3
3
,1
2
4
2
8
,5
5
9
2
8
,5
5
9
3
0
,8
4
8
1
5
,4
7
1
6
,1
7
7
R
-s
q
u
a
re
d
0
.2
9
3
2
0
.2
3
7
7
0
.2
4
5
4
0
.2
3
2
3
0
.2
2
5
5
L
o
g
li
k
el
ih
o
o
d
1
.3
0
e
+
0
5
N
o
te
s
:
D
a
ta
re
fe
r
to
a
ll
p
ri
va
te
se
ct
o
r
fi
rm
s
w
it
h
a
t
le
a
st
2
5
em
p
lo
y
ee
s
th
a
t
ex
is
t
in
tw
o
su
b
se
q
u
en
t
y
ea
rs
a
n
d
fo
r
w
h
ic
h
sa
le
s
g
ro
w
th
d
a
ta
a
re
av
a
il
a
b
le
,
w
h
er
ea
s
fi
rm
-y
ea
r
co
m
b
in
a
ti
o
n
s
w
it
h
fi
rm
d
y
n
a
m
ic
s
(m
er
g
er
s
et
c.
)
a
re
le
ft
o
u
t
o
f
th
e
d
a
ta
.
S
ig
n
ifi
ca
n
ce
le
v
el
s:
∗
:
5
%
∗∗
:
1
%
∗∗
∗
:
0
.1
%
.
T
h
e
ta
b
le
p
re
se
n
ts
O
L
S
-r
eg
re
ss
io
n
s
fo
r
th
e
n
o
m
in
a
l
ch
a
n
g
e
in
th
e
em
p
lo
y
m
en
t
o
f
fi
rm
s
if
sa
le
s
a
re
in
cr
ea
si
n
g
(c
o
lu
m
n
1
)
o
r
d
ec
re
a
si
n
g
(c
o
lu
m
n
2
).
C
o
lu
m
n
3
g
iv
es
th
e
re
su
lt
s
o
f
a
p
ro
b
it
re
g
re
ss
io
n
o
f
th
e
p
ro
b
a
b
il
it
y
th
a
t
th
e
em
p
lo
y
m
en
t
g
ro
w
th
ex
ce
ed
s
th
a
t
o
f
th
e
se
ct
o
r
th
e
fi
rm
is
in
.
C
o
lu
m
n
s
4
,
5
a
n
d
6
sh
ow
re
g
re
ss
io
n
s
p
er
fo
rm
ed
o
n
in
cr
ea
si
n
g
ly
sm
a
ll
er
sa
m
p
le
s
w
it
h
in
cr
ea
si
n
g
ly
a
d
v
er
se
sa
le
s
g
ro
w
th
,
th
e
sa
m
p
le
s
re
sp
ec
ti
v
el
y
co
n
ta
in
in
g
o
b
se
rv
a
ti
o
n
s
b
el
ow
th
e
m
ed
ia
n
,
th
e
2
5
th
p
er
ce
n
ti
le
a
n
d
th
e
1
0
th
p
er
ce
n
ti
le
o
f
th
e
sa
le
s
g
ro
w
th
d
is
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
.
H
en
ce
,
th
e
si
x
th
co
lu
m
n
co
n
ta
in
s
th
e
le
a
st
o
b
se
rv
a
ti
o
n
s,
o
n
ly
th
e
o
n
es
th
a
t
ex
p
er
ie
n
ce
a
se
v
er
e
sh
o
ck
in
sa
le
s.
D
u
m
m
y
2
0
1
2
d
ro
p
s
o
u
t
d
u
e
to
m
u
lt
ic
o
ll
in
ea
ri
ty
w
it
h
’d
u
m
m
y
en
d
o
f
fi
rm
o
u
t
o
f
o
b
se
rv
ed
p
er
io
d
(t
)’
.
S
o
u
rc
e
:
O
w
n
ca
lc
u
la
ti
o
n
s
u
si
n
g
re
g
is
tr
a
ti
o
n
d
a
ta
fr
o
m
S
ta
ti
st
ic
s
N
et
h
er
la
n
d
s.
143
T
a
b
le
A
4
.7
:
O
L
S
-r
eg
re
ss
io
n
s
of
em
p
lo
y
m
en
t
gr
ow
th
an
d
jo
b
fl
ow
s
b
y
sa
le
s
gr
ow
th
gr
ou
p
s
20
06
–2
01
3
D
ep
en
d
en
t
va
ri
a
b
le
:
G
ro
w
th
ra
te
S
h
a
re
en
tr
a
n
ts
S
h
a
re
ex
it
er
s
G
ro
w
th
ra
te
S
h
a
re
en
tr
a
n
ts
S
h
a
re
ex
it
er
s
E
m
p
lo
y
m
en
t
E
m
p
lo
y
m
en
t
S
a
m
p
le
-
sa
le
s
g
ro
w
th
:
<
P
5
0
<
P
5
0
<
P
5
0
<
P
1
0
<
P
1
0
<
P
1
0
S
ta
te
o
f
b
u
si
n
e
ss
G
ro
w
th
ra
te
sa
le
s
(t
)
0
.3
1
4
5
∗∗
∗
0
.0
3
8
4
∗∗
∗
−0
.2
7
6
0
∗∗
∗
0
.3
4
4
2
∗∗
∗
0
.0
2
7
2
∗∗
−0
.3
1
7
0
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
1
2
5
)
(0
.0
0
4
3
)
(0
.0
1
1
3
)
(0
.0
3
7
2
)
(0
.0
1
1
1
)
(0
.0
3
3
6
)
G
ro
w
th
ra
te
sa
le
s,
sq
u
a
re
d
(t
)
0
.1
3
7
6
∗∗
∗
0
.0
1
9
5
∗∗
∗
−0
.1
1
8
1
∗∗
∗
0
.1
5
4
3
∗∗
∗
0
.0
1
4
1
∗∗
∗
−0
.1
4
0
2
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
0
9
5
)
(0
.0
0
2
8
)
(0
.0
0
8
8
)
(0
.0
1
8
9
)
(0
.0
0
5
4
)
(0
.0
1
7
3
)
G
ro
w
th
ra
te
sa
le
s
(t
−1
)
0
.0
6
2
1
∗∗
∗
0
.0
0
9
6
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
5
2
5
∗∗
∗
0
.0
7
9
3
∗∗
∗
0
.0
0
8
5
∗∗
−0
.0
7
0
9
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
0
5
2
)
(0
.0
0
2
1
)
(0
.0
0
4
4
)
(0
.0
1
1
1
)
(0
.0
0
3
7
)
(0
.0
0
9
4
)
D
u
m
m
y
m
is
si
n
g
o
b
s.
:
G
ro
w
th
sa
le
s
(t
−1
)
−0
.0
0
0
1
0
.0
0
4
2
∗∗
∗
0
.0
0
4
3
∗
0
.0
0
6
2
0
.0
0
2
9
−0
.0
0
3
2
(0
.0
0
2
8
)
(0
.0
0
1
4
)
(0
.0
0
2
5
)
(0
.0
0
8
4
)
(0
.0
0
3
2
)
(0
.0
0
7
3
)
R
ef
.
g
ro
u
p
:
b
u
si
n
es
s
re
su
lt
(t
−1
)
<
0
−
−
−
−
−
−
B
u
si
n
es
s
re
su
lt
(t
−1
)
≥
0
0
.0
6
0
8
∗∗
∗
0
.0
0
5
4
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
5
5
4
∗∗
∗
0
.1
0
0
7
∗∗
∗
0
.0
1
4
0
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
8
6
7
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
0
2
8
)
(0
.0
0
1
2
)
(0
.0
0
2
5
)
(0
.0
0
8
2
)
(0
.0
0
2
5
)
(0
.0
0
7
4
)
R
ef
.
g
ro
u
p
:
co
n
ti
n
u
in
g
fi
rm
(t
)
−
−
−
−
−
−
D
u
m
m
y
fi
rm
ce
a
se
s
to
ex
it
s
n
ex
t
y
ea
r
(t
)
−0
.0
2
7
3
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
1
1
2
∗∗
∗
0
.0
1
6
1
∗∗
−0
.0
4
5
6
∗∗
−0
.0
2
0
5
∗∗
∗
0
.0
2
5
1
(0
.0
0
7
2
)
(0
.0
0
3
0
)
(0
.0
0
6
3
)
(0
.0
1
8
5
)
(0
.0
0
6
4
)
(0
.0
1
6
0
)
D
u
m
m
y
en
d
o
f
fi
rm
o
u
t
o
f
o
b
se
rv
ed
p
er
io
d
(t
)
0
.0
2
1
8
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
1
3
3
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
3
5
1
∗∗
∗
0
.0
4
6
1
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
1
3
3
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
5
9
5
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
0
3
2
)
(0
.0
0
1
4
)
(0
.0
0
2
9
)
(0
.0
1
0
0
)
(0
.0
0
3
2
)
(0
.0
0
9
0
)
S
h
a
re
o
f
w
o
rk
er
s
su
b
je
ct
to
p
a
rt
-t
im
e
U
B
(t
−1
)
−0
.0
3
7
3
∗
−0
.0
0
3
9
0
.0
3
3
4
∗
−0
.0
0
7
3
0
.0
0
1
4
0
.0
0
8
6
(0
.0
2
1
5
)
(0
.0
0
6
9
)
(0
.0
1
9
9
)
(0
.0
5
3
7
)
(0
.0
1
1
1
)
(0
.0
5
1
6
)
D
u
m
m
y
m
is
si
n
g
o
b
s.
:
S
h
a
re
p
a
rt
-t
im
e
U
B
(t
−1
)
−0
.0
3
4
6
∗∗
∗
0
.0
1
9
5
∗∗
∗
0
.0
5
4
1
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
4
5
5
∗∗
0
.0
1
1
5
∗∗
0
.0
5
7
0
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
0
6
0
)
(0
.0
0
2
5
)
(0
.0
0
5
4
)
(0
.0
1
9
0
)
(0
.0
0
5
8
)
(0
.0
1
7
0
)
T
y
p
e
o
f
jo
b
S
h
a
re
o
f
o
p
en
-t
er
m
co
n
tr
a
ct
s
(t
−1
)
0
.0
3
8
6
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
4
3
1
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
8
1
7
∗∗
∗
0
.0
4
4
7
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
2
3
6
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
6
8
4
∗∗
∗
144
T
a
b
le
A
4
.7
C
o
n
ti
n
u
e
d
fr
o
m
p
re
v
io
u
s
p
a
g
e
D
ep
en
d
en
t
va
ri
a
b
le
:
G
ro
w
th
ra
te
S
h
a
re
en
tr
a
n
ts
S
h
a
re
ex
it
er
s
G
ro
w
th
ra
te
S
h
a
re
en
tr
a
n
ts
S
h
a
re
ex
it
er
s
E
m
p
lo
y
m
en
t
E
m
p
lo
y
m
en
t
S
a
m
p
le
-
sa
le
s
g
ro
w
th
:
<
P
5
0
<
P
5
0
<
P
5
0
<
P
1
0
<
P
1
0
<
P
1
0
(0
.0
0
6
0
)
(0
.0
0
3
3
)
(0
.0
0
5
2
)
(0
.0
1
7
0
)
(0
.0
0
7
0
)
(0
.0
1
4
5
)
S
h
a
re
o
f
re
g
u
la
r
jo
b
s
(t
−1
)
0
.0
4
0
2
∗∗
∗
−0
.1
9
6
1
∗∗
∗
−0
.2
3
6
3
∗∗
∗
0
.0
7
4
7
∗∗
−0
.1
8
8
1
∗∗
∗
−0
.2
6
2
8
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
1
3
6
)
(0
.0
0
9
3
)
(0
.0
1
1
3
)
(0
.0
3
5
2
)
(0
.0
1
8
2
)
(0
.0
2
8
1
)
S
h
a
re
o
f
fu
ll
-t
im
e
jo
b
s
(t
−1
)
0
.0
4
2
7
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
2
0
8
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
6
3
5
∗∗
∗
0
.1
0
4
0
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
0
3
7
−0
.1
0
7
8
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
0
9
2
)
(0
.0
0
4
7
)
(0
.0
0
8
0
)
(0
.0
3
1
3
)
(0
.0
1
1
8
)
(0
.0
2
6
9
)
S
h
a
re
o
f
jo
b
s
h
ir
ed
fr
o
m
T
W
A
’s
(t
−1
)
0
.0
0
2
2
∗∗
0
.0
0
4
0
∗∗
∗
0
.0
0
1
9
∗∗
−0
.0
0
5
4
−0
.0
1
0
0
−0
.0
0
4
6
(0
.0
0
1
1
)
(0
.0
0
1
2
)
(0
.0
0
0
9
)
(0
.0
3
1
3
)
(0
.0
1
5
4
)
(0
.0
1
7
6
)
S
h
a
re
o
f
h
ir
ed
se
lf
-e
m
p
lo
y
ed
(t
−1
)
−0
.0
0
1
2
0
.0
0
3
3
∗∗
0
.0
0
4
4
−0
.0
1
8
1
−0
.0
0
4
7
0
.0
1
3
4
(0
.0
0
3
2
)
(0
.0
0
1
7
)
(0
.0
0
2
8
)
(0
.0
1
4
3
)
(0
.0
0
7
2
)
(0
.0
1
4
7
)
D
u
m
m
y
m
is
si
n
g
o
b
s.
:
S
h
a
re
T
W
A
(t
−1
)
−0
.1
1
2
5
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
7
4
2
∗∗
∗
0
.0
3
8
2
∗
−0
.1
4
5
2
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
9
6
7
∗∗
∗
0
.0
4
8
5
(0
.0
2
6
6
)
(0
.0
0
9
6
)
(0
.0
2
2
7
)
(0
.0
5
1
2
)
(0
.0
1
6
2
)
(0
.0
4
2
7
)
C
o
ll
e
c
ti
v
e
la
b
o
u
r
a
g
re
e
m
e
n
t
C
L
A
en
te
rp
ri
se
le
v
el
(t
−1
)
−0
.0
0
2
9
0
.0
0
4
2
∗∗
0
.0
0
7
0
∗
0
.0
0
5
6
0
.0
1
1
2
∗∗
∗
0
.0
0
5
6
(0
.0
0
4
5
)
(0
.0
0
1
8
)
(0
.0
0
4
2
)
(0
.0
1
6
2
)
(0
.0
0
3
9
)
(0
.0
1
5
6
)
C
L
A
se
ct
o
r
le
v
el
,
n
o
ex
te
n
si
o
n
(t
−1
)
−0
.0
1
9
5
∗∗
∗
0
.0
0
9
2
∗∗
∗
0
.0
2
8
7
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
1
9
0
0
.0
0
8
4
0
.0
2
7
4
∗∗
(0
.0
0
4
8
)
(0
.0
0
2
7
)
(0
.0
0
4
1
)
(0
.0
1
5
9
)
(0
.0
0
7
0
)
(0
.0
1
3
5
)
C
L
A
en
te
rp
ri
se
ex
te
n
d
ed
to
se
ct
o
r
le
v
el
(t
−1
)
0
.0
0
2
6
0
.0
0
1
1
−0
.0
0
1
5
0
.0
0
0
1
−0
.0
0
1
2
−0
.0
0
1
4
(0
.0
0
2
5
)
(0
.0
0
1
1
)
(0
.0
0
2
2
)
(0
.0
0
8
9
)
(0
.0
0
2
9
)
(0
.0
0
8
0
)
R
ef
.
g
ro
u
p
:
n
o
co
ll
ec
ti
v
e
la
b
o
u
r
a
g
re
em
en
t
(C
L
A
)
−
−
−
−
−
−
C
L
A
u
n
k
n
ow
n
(t
−1
)
−0
.0
3
3
4
∗∗
0
.0
2
5
9
∗∗
∗
0
.0
5
9
3
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
1
6
3
0
.0
2
0
9
0
.0
3
7
3
(0
.0
1
5
6
)
(0
.0
0
7
5
)
(0
.0
1
3
1
)
(0
.0
4
4
0
)
(0
.0
1
8
0
)
(0
.0
3
4
6
)
C
o
m
p
o
si
ti
o
n
o
f
th
e
la
b
o
u
r
fo
rc
e
S
h
a
re
o
f
m
a
le
w
o
rk
er
s
(t
−1
)
−0
.0
3
6
0
∗∗
∗
0
.0
1
2
6
∗∗
∗
0
.0
4
8
5
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
7
3
4
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
0
8
9
0
.0
6
4
5
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
0
8
5
)
(0
.0
0
4
5
)
(0
.0
0
7
3
)
(0
.0
2
7
4
)
(0
.0
1
0
7
)
(0
.0
2
3
2
)
S
h
a
re
o
f
w
o
rk
er
s
a
g
ed
2
3
-3
5
(t
−1
)
−0
.0
1
5
5
0
.0
6
7
7
∗∗
∗
0
.0
8
3
2
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
3
1
8
0
.0
6
1
6
∗∗
∗
0
.0
9
3
4
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
1
1
2
)
(0
.0
0
5
3
)
(0
.0
0
9
6
)
(0
.0
3
5
2
)
(0
.0
1
2
7
)
(0
.0
3
0
3
)
R
ef
.
g
ro
u
p
:
S
h
a
re
o
f
w
o
rk
er
s
a
g
ed
3
6
-5
0
(t
−1
)
−
−
−
−
−
−
145
T
a
b
le
A
4
.7
C
o
n
ti
n
u
e
d
fr
o
m
p
re
v
io
u
s
p
a
g
e
D
ep
en
d
en
t
va
ri
a
b
le
:
G
ro
w
th
ra
te
S
h
a
re
en
tr
a
n
ts
S
h
a
re
ex
it
er
s
G
ro
w
th
ra
te
S
h
a
re
en
tr
a
n
ts
S
h
a
re
ex
it
er
s
E
m
p
lo
y
m
en
t
E
m
p
lo
y
m
en
t
S
a
m
p
le
-
sa
le
s
g
ro
w
th
:
<
P
5
0
<
P
5
0
<
P
5
0
<
P
1
0
<
P
1
0
<
P
1
0
S
h
a
re
o
f
w
o
rk
er
s
a
g
ed
5
1
-6
5
(t
−1
)
−0
.0
5
7
4
∗∗
∗
0
.0
0
7
2
0
.0
6
4
6
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
6
5
8
0
.0
1
0
0
0
.0
7
5
8
∗∗
(0
.0
1
2
1
)
(0
.0
0
6
0
)
(0
.0
1
1
1
)
(0
.0
4
0
1
)
(0
.0
1
2
5
)
(0
.0
3
6
7
)
S
h
a
re
o
f
jo
b
te
n
u
re
≥
1
0
y
ea
rs
(t
−1
)
0
.0
2
7
8
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
4
2
2
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
6
9
9
∗∗
∗
0
.0
1
0
9
−0
.0
4
5
2
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
5
6
1
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
0
6
5
)
(0
.0
0
2
8
)
(0
.0
0
6
0
)
(0
.0
2
0
0
)
(0
.0
0
5
9
)
(0
.0
1
8
7
)
R
ef
.
g
ro
u
p
:
D
u
tc
h
w
o
rk
er
s
−
−
−
−
−
−
S
h
a
re
o
f
im
m
ig
ra
n
ts
a
ft
er
E
U
-e
n
la
rg
em
en
t
(t
−1
)
0
.0
9
3
3
−0
.0
1
3
0
−0
.1
0
6
3
∗∗
0
.1
4
2
0
−0
.0
0
4
8
−0
.1
4
6
8
(0
.0
6
4
4
)
(0
.0
4
8
3
)
(0
.0
5
2
0
)
(0
.1
3
2
0
)
(0
.0
8
8
6
)
(0
.1
0
5
6
)
S
h
a
re
o
f
im
m
ig
ra
n
ts
o
th
er
w
es
te
rn
co
u
n
tr
ie
s
−0
.1
1
4
2
∗∗
∗
0
.0
0
0
6
0
.1
1
4
8
∗∗
∗
−0
.2
0
1
5
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
1
7
8
0
.1
8
3
7
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
2
2
0
)
(0
.0
1
0
0
)
(0
.0
1
8
2
)
(0
.0
7
4
0
)
(0
.0
2
4
3
)
(0
.0
6
0
4
)
S
h
a
re
o
f
o
th
er
n
o
n
-w
es
te
rn
im
m
ig
ra
n
ts
(t
−1
)
−0
.0
2
2
7
0
.0
3
8
1
∗∗
0
.0
6
0
7
∗
−0
.1
7
8
8
−0
.0
2
9
4
0
.1
4
9
4
(0
.0
4
4
3
)
(0
.0
1
6
1
)
(0
.0
3
5
8
)
(0
.1
6
0
1
)
(0
.0
3
7
1
)
(0
.1
3
4
1
)
T
ra
in
in
g
,
e
d
u
c
a
ti
o
n
a
n
d
c
o
n
tr
a
c
tu
a
l
w
a
g
e
R
a
ti
o
tr
a
in
in
g
ex
p
en
d
it
u
re
s
fi
rm
/
sa
le
s
(t
−1
)
0
.0
4
7
8
0
.1
4
0
6
∗∗
0
.0
9
2
8
0
.1
1
0
2
0
.1
7
3
6
0
.0
6
3
4
(0
.1
1
5
6
)
(0
.0
6
8
5
)
(0
.0
8
9
4
)
(0
.2
3
6
0
)
(0
.1
3
7
1
)
(0
.1
5
5
5
)
S
h
a
re
lo
w
ed
u
ca
te
d
w
o
rk
er
s
(t
−1
)
0
.0
0
9
1
−0
.0
0
9
1
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
1
8
2
∗∗
∗
0
.0
0
0
1
−0
.0
0
2
5
−0
.0
0
2
6
(0
.0
0
6
9
)
(0
.0
0
3
3
)
(0
.0
0
5
9
)
(0
.0
2
1
0
)
(0
.0
0
7
2
)
(0
.0
1
8
5
)
S
h
a
re
m
ed
iu
m
ed
u
ca
te
d
w
o
rk
er
s
(t
−1
)
0
.0
0
4
3
−0
.0
0
2
8
−0
.0
0
7
2
−0
.0
0
5
2
−0
.0
0
2
9
0
.0
0
2
3
(0
.0
0
6
2
)
(0
.0
0
2
9
)
(0
.0
0
5
5
)
(0
.0
1
8
3
)
(0
.0
0
6
4
)
(0
.0
1
6
3
)
R
ef
.
g
ro
u
p
:
S
h
a
re
h
ig
h
ed
u
ca
te
d
w
o
rk
er
s
(t
−1
)
−
−
−
−
−
−
S
h
a
re
w
o
rk
er
s
w
it
h
lo
w
w
a
g
e
(t
−1
)
−0
.0
3
1
8
−0
.0
5
8
0
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
2
6
2
−0
.0
8
0
5
−0
.0
7
0
0
∗∗
0
.0
1
0
4
(0
.0
2
4
5
)
(0
.0
1
2
2
)
(0
.0
2
0
5
)
(0
.0
7
5
2
)
(0
.0
2
8
1
)
(0
.0
6
4
5
)
S
h
a
re
w
o
rk
er
s
w
it
h
m
ed
iu
m
w
a
g
e
(t
−1
)
−0
.0
1
2
9
−0
.0
5
3
6
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
4
0
6
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
1
7
3
−0
.0
7
0
1
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
5
2
8
(0
.0
1
8
3
)
(0
.0
0
9
4
)
(0
.0
1
5
4
)
(0
.0
5
2
7
)
(0
.0
2
0
3
)
(0
.0
4
5
8
)
146
T
a
b
le
A
4
.7
C
o
n
ti
n
u
e
d
fr
o
m
p
re
v
io
u
s
p
a
g
e
D
ep
en
d
en
t
va
ri
a
b
le
:
G
ro
w
th
ra
te
S
h
a
re
en
tr
a
n
ts
S
h
a
re
ex
it
er
s
G
ro
w
th
ra
te
S
h
a
re
en
tr
a
n
ts
S
h
a
re
ex
it
er
s
E
m
p
lo
y
m
en
t
E
m
p
lo
y
m
en
t
S
a
m
p
le
-
sa
le
s
g
ro
w
th
:
<
P
5
0
<
P
5
0
<
P
5
0
<
P
1
0
<
P
1
0
<
P
1
0
R
ef
.
g
ro
u
p
:S
h
a
re
w
o
rk
er
s
w
it
h
h
ig
h
w
a
g
e
(t
−1
)
−
−
−
−
−
−
A
v
er
a
g
e
h
o
u
rl
y
w
a
g
e
o
f
th
e
fi
rm
(t
−1
)
0
.0
0
1
2
−0
.0
0
3
1
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
0
4
3
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
0
0
5
−0
.0
0
4
2
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
0
3
7
(0
.0
0
1
2
)
(0
.0
0
0
6
)
(0
.0
0
1
0
)
(0
.0
0
3
7
)
(0
.0
0
1
4
)
(0
.0
0
3
2
)
S
td
.
d
ev
.o
f
h
o
u
rl
y
w
a
g
e
in
th
e
fi
rm
(t
−1
)
0
.0
0
0
2
0
.0
0
0
9
∗∗
∗
0
.0
0
0
7
0
.0
0
3
5
∗
0
.0
0
1
5
∗∗
−0
.0
0
2
0
(0
.0
0
0
6
)
(0
.0
0
0
3
)
(0
.0
0
0
5
)
(0
.0
0
1
9
)
(0
.0
0
0
7
)
(0
.0
0
1
6
)
D
u
m
m
y
m
is
si
n
g
o
b
s.
:
tr
a
in
in
g
ex
p
en
d
it
u
re
s
(t
−1
)
−0
.0
5
3
2
∗∗
−0
.0
3
3
9
∗∗
∗
0
.0
1
9
3
0
.0
0
5
5
0
.0
0
2
9
−0
.0
0
2
6
(0
.0
2
6
1
)
(0
.0
0
9
5
)
(0
.0
2
2
4
)
(0
.0
4
9
4
)
(0
.0
1
5
8
)
(0
.0
4
1
4
)
O
th
e
r
fi
rm
ch
a
ra
c
te
ri
st
ic
s
R
ef
.
g
ro
u
p
:
lo
w
S
h
a
re
o
f
in
ci
d
en
ta
l
w
a
g
e
(t
−1
)
−
−
−
−
−
−
In
te
rm
ed
ia
te
S
h
a
re
o
f
in
ci
d
en
ta
l
w
a
g
e
(t
−1
)
−0
.0
0
8
1
∗∗
∗
0
.0
0
7
3
∗∗
∗
0
.0
1
5
4
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
0
1
8
0
.0
1
0
1
∗∗
∗
0
.0
1
1
9
(0
.0
0
2
4
)
(0
.0
0
1
1
)
(0
.0
0
2
2
)
(0
.0
0
8
4
)
(0
.0
0
2
6
)
(0
.0
0
7
6
)
H
ig
h
S
h
a
re
o
f
in
ci
d
en
ta
l
w
a
g
e
(t
−1
)
−0
.0
0
0
7
0
.0
0
4
5
∗∗
∗
0
.0
0
5
1
∗
0
.0
1
3
2
0
.0
0
4
0
−0
.0
0
9
2
(0
.0
0
3
0
)
(0
.0
0
1
5
)
(0
.0
0
2
7
)
(0
.0
1
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
3
7
)
(0
.0
0
9
1
)
R
ef
.
g
ro
u
p
:
fi
rm
si
ze
2
5
-
9
9
w
o
rk
er
s
(t
−1
)
−
−
−
−
−
−
F
ir
m
si
ze
1
0
0
-
5
0
0
w
o
rk
er
s
(t
−1
)
−0
.0
0
3
1
−0
.0
0
0
3
0
.0
0
2
8
0
.0
0
8
2
−0
.0
0
3
8
−0
.0
1
2
0
∗
(0
.0
0
2
2
)
(0
.0
0
1
1
)
(0
.0
0
1
9
)
(0
.0
0
7
5
)
(0
.0
0
2
8
)
(0
.0
0
6
6
)
F
ir
m
si
ze
≥
5
0
0
w
o
rk
er
s
(t
−1
)
0
.0
0
6
1
−0
.0
1
6
2
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
2
2
3
∗∗
∗
0
.0
2
4
1
−0
.0
1
7
6
∗∗
−0
.0
4
1
7
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
0
4
5
)
(0
.0
0
3
1
)
(0
.0
0
4
3
)
(0
.0
1
6
7
)
(0
.0
0
7
9
)
(0
.0
1
5
9
)
R
ef
.
g
ro
u
p
:
#
es
ta
b
li
sh
m
en
ts
1
(t
−1
)
−
−
−
−
−
−
#
es
ta
b
li
sh
m
en
ts
2
-
5
0
(t
−1
)
−0
.0
0
1
1
0
.0
0
1
2
0
.0
0
2
3
0
.0
0
3
5
0
.0
0
1
2
−0
.0
0
2
2
(0
.0
0
2
0
)
(0
.0
0
1
0
)
(0
.0
0
1
8
)
(0
.0
0
6
7
)
(0
.0
0
2
5
)
(0
.0
0
5
9
)
H
ig
h
#
es
ta
b
li
sh
m
en
ts
≥
5
0
(t
−1
)
0
.0
0
5
1
0
.0
0
7
8
∗
0
.0
0
2
7
0
.0
3
4
0
0
.0
0
6
6
−0
.0
2
7
5
(0
.0
0
9
4
)
(0
.0
0
4
7
)
(0
.0
0
7
7
)
(0
.0
4
5
5
)
(0
.0
1
0
2
)
(0
.0
4
2
5
)
147
T
a
b
le
A
4
.7
C
o
n
ti
n
u
e
d
fr
o
m
p
re
v
io
u
s
p
a
g
e
D
ep
en
d
en
t
va
ri
a
b
le
:
G
ro
w
th
ra
te
S
h
a
re
en
tr
a
n
ts
S
h
a
re
ex
it
er
s
G
ro
w
th
ra
te
S
h
a
re
en
tr
a
n
ts
S
h
a
re
ex
it
er
s
E
m
p
lo
y
m
en
t
E
m
p
lo
y
m
en
t
S
a
m
p
le
-
sa
le
s
g
ro
w
th
:
<
P
5
0
<
P
5
0
<
P
5
0
<
P
1
0
<
P
1
0
<
P
1
0
R
ef
.
g
ro
u
p
:
D
u
tc
h
ow
n
er
sh
ip
(t
−1
)
−
−
−
−
−
−
U
K
/
U
S
ow
n
er
sh
ip
(t
−1
)
−0
.0
1
4
2
∗∗
∗
0
.0
0
2
4
0
.0
1
6
5
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
1
5
2
0
.0
1
1
5
∗∗
∗
0
.0
2
6
7
∗∗
(0
.0
0
4
6
)
(0
.0
0
1
7
)
(0
.0
0
4
2
)
(0
.0
1
4
4
)
(0
.0
0
4
4
)
(0
.0
1
2
9
)
F
o
re
ig
n
ow
n
er
sh
ip
,
n
o
U
K
/
U
S
(t
−1
)
−0
.0
1
1
9
∗∗
∗
0
.0
0
2
3
∗
0
.0
1
4
2
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
2
6
4
∗∗
0
.0
0
0
6
0
.0
2
7
0
∗∗
(0
.0
0
3
5
)
(0
.0
0
1
4
)
(0
.0
0
3
2
)
(0
.0
1
2
5
)
(0
.0
0
3
3
)
(0
.0
1
1
4
)
O
w
n
er
sh
ip
u
n
k
n
ow
n
(t
−1
)
0
.0
3
1
6
∗∗
−0
.2
5
8
1
∗∗
∗
−0
.2
8
9
7
∗∗
∗
0
.0
9
7
6
∗∗
−0
.2
3
3
9
∗∗
∗
−0
.3
3
1
5
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
1
5
3
)
(0
.0
1
8
6
)
(0
.0
2
0
1
)
(0
.0
4
4
5
)
(0
.0
7
8
8
)
(0
.0
9
5
9
)
R
ef
.
g
ro
u
p
:
n
o
n
-e
x
p
o
rt
in
g
fi
rm
(t
−1
)
−
−
−
−
−
−
E
x
p
o
rt
in
g
fi
rm
(t
−1
)
−0
.0
0
2
9
−0
.0
1
6
1
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
1
3
2
∗∗
∗
0
.0
0
9
1
−0
.0
1
1
8
∗∗
−0
.0
2
0
8
∗
(0
.0
0
4
3
)
(0
.0
0
2
3
)
(0
.0
0
3
7
)
(0
.0
1
3
9
)
(0
.0
0
5
7
)
(0
.0
1
2
0
)
E
x
p
o
rt
u
n
k
n
ow
n
(t
−1
)
−0
.0
0
9
6
∗∗
−0
.0
2
0
3
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
1
0
7
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
1
6
7
−0
.0
1
7
8
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
0
1
1
(0
.0
0
4
3
)
(0
.0
0
2
3
)
(0
.0
0
3
6
)
(0
.0
1
3
6
)
(0
.0
0
5
4
)
(0
.0
1
1
4
)
S
e
c
to
rs
o
f
e
c
o
n
o
m
ic
a
c
ti
v
it
y
a
n
d
y
e
a
rs
M
in
er
a
l
ex
tr
a
ct
io
n
se
ct
o
r
(t
)
0
.0
0
5
9
−0
.0
0
8
2
−0
.0
1
4
1
−0
.0
8
8
3
∗∗
−0
.0
8
9
6
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
0
1
2
(0
.0
3
3
7
)
(0
.0
2
0
1
)
(0
.0
2
0
8
)
(0
.0
4
0
4
)
(0
.0
1
8
2
)
(0
.0
4
3
3
)
M
a
n
u
fa
ct
u
ri
n
g
se
ct
o
r
(t
)
−0
.0
0
3
5
0
.0
2
0
0
0
.0
2
3
5
−0
.1
5
6
6
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
3
5
5
∗∗
∗
0
.1
2
1
1
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
3
1
7
)
(0
.0
1
9
3
)
(0
.0
1
7
6
)
(0
.0
2
5
2
)
(0
.0
0
9
5
)
(0
.0
2
1
5
)
R
ef
.
g
ro
u
p
:
en
er
g
y
a
n
d
w
a
te
r
se
ct
o
r
(t
)
−
−
−
−
−
−
C
o
n
st
ru
ct
io
n
se
ct
o
r
(t
)
−0
.0
0
3
6
0
.0
1
0
6
0
.0
1
4
2
−0
.1
5
4
5
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
4
7
0
∗∗
∗
0
.1
0
7
4
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
3
1
9
)
(0
.0
1
9
4
)
(0
.0
1
7
9
)
(0
.0
2
9
7
)
(0
.0
1
1
0
)
(0
.0
2
5
3
)
G
o
o
d
s
tr
a
d
e
se
ct
o
r
(t
)
−0
.0
0
3
4
0
.0
2
1
9
0
.0
2
5
3
−0
.1
5
2
7
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
3
6
1
∗∗
∗
0
.1
1
6
7
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
3
1
7
)
(0
.0
1
9
3
)
(0
.0
1
7
6
)
(0
.0
2
6
6
)
(0
.0
1
0
0
)
(0
.0
2
2
5
)
H
o
re
ca
se
ct
o
r
(t
)
−0
.0
1
3
2
0
.0
3
3
1
∗
0
.0
4
6
3
∗∗
−0
.1
1
0
9
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
1
7
9
0
.0
9
3
0
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
3
2
2
)
(0
.0
1
9
6
)
(0
.0
1
8
2
)
(0
.0
3
5
8
)
(0
.0
1
4
1
)
(0
.0
3
0
6
)
T
ra
n
sp
o
rt
a
n
d
co
m
m
u
n
ic
a
ti
o
n
se
ct
o
r
(t
)
−0
.0
1
3
1
0
.0
1
3
9
0
.0
2
7
0
−0
.1
7
6
7
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
4
8
1
∗∗
∗
0
.1
2
8
6
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
3
1
9
)
(0
.0
1
9
4
)
(0
.0
1
7
8
)
(0
.0
2
9
3
)
(0
.0
1
1
0
)
(0
.0
2
5
1
)
148
T
a
b
le
A
4
.7
C
o
n
ti
n
u
e
d
fr
o
m
p
re
v
io
u
s
p
a
g
e
D
ep
en
d
en
t
va
ri
a
b
le
:
G
ro
w
th
ra
te
S
h
a
re
en
tr
a
n
ts
S
h
a
re
ex
it
er
s
G
ro
w
th
ra
te
S
h
a
re
en
tr
a
n
ts
S
h
a
re
ex
it
er
s
E
m
p
lo
y
m
en
t
E
m
p
lo
y
m
en
t
S
a
m
p
le
-
sa
le
s
g
ro
w
th
:
<
P
5
0
<
P
5
0
<
P
5
0
<
P
1
0
<
P
1
0
<
P
1
0
B
u
si
n
es
s
se
rv
ic
es
se
ct
o
r
(t
)
−0
.0
4
6
4
0
.0
2
2
4
0
.0
6
8
8
∗∗
∗
−0
.2
1
4
2
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
3
3
5
∗∗
∗
0
.1
8
0
7
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
3
1
8
)
(0
.0
1
9
4
)
(0
.0
1
7
8
)
(0
.0
2
5
7
)
(0
.0
0
9
9
)
(0
.0
2
1
9
)
R
ef
.
va
ri
a
b
le
:
y
ea
r
2
0
0
8
−
−
−
−
−
−
D
u
m
m
y
y
ea
r
2
0
0
9
−0
.0
0
6
8
−0
.0
1
2
8
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
0
5
9
−0
.0
5
1
3
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
1
6
6
∗∗
∗
0
.0
3
4
7
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
0
4
3
)
(0
.0
0
1
9
)
(0
.0
0
3
7
)
(0
.0
1
3
4
)
(0
.0
0
4
6
)
(0
.0
1
1
7
)
D
u
m
m
y
y
ea
r
2
0
1
0
−0
.0
2
0
2
∗∗
∗
0
.0
0
6
2
∗∗
0
.0
2
6
4
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
3
1
8
0
.0
0
1
8
0
.0
3
3
6
∗
(0
.0
0
6
3
)
(0
.0
0
2
7
)
(0
.0
0
5
6
)
(0
.0
1
9
5
)
(0
.0
0
5
9
)
(0
.0
1
7
6
)
D
u
m
m
y
y
ea
r
2
0
1
1
−0
.0
0
8
2
∗
0
.0
3
4
5
∗∗
∗
0
.0
4
2
7
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
0
9
0
0
.0
3
0
5
∗∗
∗
0
.0
3
9
5
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
0
4
9
)
(0
.0
0
2
1
)
(0
.0
0
4
4
)
(0
.0
1
6
1
)
(0
.0
0
4
8
)
(0
.0
1
4
4
)
D
u
m
m
y
y
ea
r
2
0
1
2
−
−
−
−
−
−
D
u
m
m
y
y
ea
r
2
0
1
3
0
.0
3
4
9
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
2
0
2
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
5
5
1
∗∗
∗
0
.0
3
2
4
∗
−0
.0
1
4
1
∗∗
−0
.0
4
6
5
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
0
5
6
)
(0
.0
0
2
5
)
(0
.0
0
5
1
)
(0
.0
1
8
8
)
(0
.0
0
5
7
)
(0
.0
1
6
9
)
R
e
la
ti
o
n
e
m
p
lo
y
m
e
n
t
G
ro
w
th
-
w
a
g
e
G
ro
w
th
G
ro
w
th
h
o
u
rl
y
w
a
g
e
st
ay
er
s
(i
n
%
)
(t
)
−0
.0
3
8
3
−0
.0
3
6
2
∗∗
0
.0
0
2
1
−0
.0
4
4
1
−0
.0
1
6
7
0
.0
2
7
4
(0
.0
3
6
5
)
(0
.0
1
6
2
)
(0
.0
3
2
5
)
(0
.1
0
1
5
)
(0
.0
2
9
4
)
(0
.0
8
5
6
)
In
d
ic
a
to
r
d
ow
n
w
a
rd
n
o
m
in
a
l
w
a
g
e
ri
g
id
it
y
(t
)
−0
.4
1
5
3
∗∗
∗
0
.0
5
1
1
∗
0
.4
6
6
5
∗∗
∗
−0
.7
6
2
4
∗∗
∗
0
.0
6
2
1
0
.8
2
4
5
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
6
6
0
)
(0
.0
2
9
5
)
(0
.0
5
6
4
)
(0
.1
8
8
9
)
(0
.0
6
3
7
)
(0
.1
6
3
1
)
In
d
ic
a
to
r
d
ow
n
w
a
rd
re
a
l
w
a
g
e
ri
g
id
it
y
(t
)
−0
.3
7
3
4
∗∗
∗
0
.0
6
5
5
∗∗
0
.4
3
9
0
∗∗
∗
−0
.6
9
8
7
∗∗
∗
0
.0
8
6
3
0
.7
8
5
0
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
7
1
9
)
(0
.0
3
2
4
)
(0
.0
6
1
3
)
(0
.2
0
3
2
)
(0
.0
6
9
7
)
(0
.1
7
4
0
)
W
a
g
e
d
ec
re
a
se
b
el
ow
ra
n
g
e
in
d
ic
a
to
r
(t
)
−0
.2
3
6
9
∗∗
∗
0
.0
1
2
3
0
.2
4
9
2
∗∗
∗
−0
.3
4
8
3
∗∗
0
.0
2
5
3
0
.3
7
3
7
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
6
6
8
)
(0
.0
2
0
4
)
(0
.0
6
1
0
)
(0
.1
4
7
0
)
(0
.0
2
7
8
)
(0
.1
3
6
6
)
W
a
g
e
d
ec
re
a
se
a
b
ov
e
ra
n
g
e
in
d
ic
a
to
r
(t
)
0
.2
5
3
7
∗∗
∗
0
.5
3
9
5
∗∗
∗
0
.2
8
5
8
∗∗
∗
0
.2
7
3
6
∗∗
∗
0
.5
3
9
1
∗∗
∗
0
.2
6
5
5
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
1
6
6
)
(0
.0
1
1
8
)
(0
.0
1
3
8
)
(0
.0
3
9
0
)
(0
.0
2
3
2
)
(0
.0
3
1
1
)
D
u
m
m
y
m
is
si
n
g
o
b
s.
:
w
a
g
e
ri
g
id
it
y
in
d
ic
a
to
r
(t
)
−0
.1
3
0
7
∗∗
∗
−0
.1
0
2
0
∗∗
∗
0
.0
2
8
7
∗∗
−0
.1
7
6
2
∗∗
∗
−0
.1
0
8
5
∗∗
∗
0
.0
6
7
7
∗∗
(0
.0
1
7
4
)
(0
.0
1
0
5
)
(0
.0
1
4
3
)
(0
.0
4
1
9
)
(0
.0
1
8
9
)
(0
.0
3
4
3
)
149
T
a
b
le
A
4
.7
C
o
n
ti
n
u
e
d
fr
o
m
p
re
v
io
u
s
p
a
g
e
D
ep
en
d
en
t
va
ri
a
b
le
:
G
ro
w
th
ra
te
S
h
a
re
en
tr
a
n
ts
S
h
a
re
ex
it
er
s
G
ro
w
th
ra
te
S
h
a
re
en
tr
a
n
ts
S
h
a
re
ex
it
er
s
E
m
p
lo
y
m
en
t
E
m
p
lo
y
m
en
t
S
a
m
p
le
-
sa
le
s
g
ro
w
th
:
<
P
5
0
<
P
5
0
<
P
5
0
<
P
1
0
<
P
1
0
<
P
1
0
C
o
n
st
a
n
t
0
.2
3
8
7
∗∗
∗
0
.3
0
6
3
∗∗
∗
0
.0
6
7
6
0
.6
7
5
9
∗∗
∗
0
.3
5
2
8
∗∗
∗
−0
.3
2
3
1
∗
(0
.0
8
2
3
)
(0
.0
4
0
4
)
(0
.0
6
6
7
)
(0
.2
1
7
4
)
(0
.0
7
7
0
)
(0
.1
8
6
5
)
O
b
se
rv
a
ti
o
n
s
3
0
,8
4
8
3
0
,8
4
8
3
0
,8
4
8
6
,1
7
7
6
,1
7
7
6
,1
7
7
R
-s
q
u
a
re
d
0
.2
4
5
4
0
.6
9
5
8
0
.4
7
6
5
0
.2
2
5
5
0
.6
9
0
3
0
.4
1
8
9
N
o
te
s
:
D
a
ta
re
fe
r
to
a
ll
p
ri
va
te
se
ct
o
r
fi
rm
s
w
it
h
a
t
le
a
st
2
5
em
p
lo
y
ee
s
th
a
t
ex
is
t
in
tw
o
su
b
se
q
u
en
t
y
ea
rs
a
n
d
fo
r
w
h
ic
h
sa
le
s
g
ro
w
th
d
a
ta
a
re
av
a
il
a
b
le
,
w
h
er
ea
s
fi
rm
-y
ea
r
co
m
b
in
a
ti
o
n
s
w
it
h
fi
rm
d
y
n
a
m
ic
s
(m
er
g
er
s
et
c.
)
a
re
le
ft
o
u
t
o
f
th
e
d
a
ta
.
S
ig
n
ifi
ca
n
ce
le
v
el
s:
∗
:
5
%
∗∗
:
1
%
∗∗
∗
:
0
.1
%
.
T
h
e
ta
b
le
ex
p
lo
re
s
th
e
se
n
si
ti
v
it
y
o
f
em
p
lo
y
m
en
t
g
ro
w
th
a
s
w
el
l
a
s
th
e
sh
a
re
o
f
en
tr
a
n
ts
a
n
d
ex
it
er
s
in
th
e
w
o
rk
fo
rc
e
fo
r
sa
le
s
sh
o
ck
s.
T
h
e
le
ft
th
re
e
co
lu
m
n
s
re
fe
r
to
sa
le
s
b
el
ow
th
e
m
ed
ia
n
,
th
e
ri
g
h
t
th
re
e
co
lu
m
n
s
re
fe
r
to
th
e
fi
rs
t
d
ec
il
e
o
f
th
e
sa
le
s
g
ro
w
th
d
is
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
,
re
p
re
se
n
ti
n
g
a
se
v
er
e
n
eg
a
ti
v
e
sh
o
ck
in
sa
le
s.
N
o
te
th
a
t
th
e
co
effi
ci
en
ts
fo
r
em
p
lo
y
m
en
t
a
re
eq
u
a
l
to
th
e
d
iff
er
en
ce
b
et
w
ee
n
th
e
co
effi
ci
en
ts
fo
r
th
e
sh
a
re
o
f
en
tr
a
n
ts
en
th
e
sh
a
re
o
f
ex
it
er
s.
D
u
m
m
y
2
0
1
2
d
ro
p
s
o
u
t
d
u
e
to
m
u
lt
ic
o
ll
in
ea
ri
ty
w
it
h
’d
u
m
m
y
en
d
o
f
fi
rm
o
u
t
o
f
o
b
se
rv
ed
p
er
io
d
(t
)’
.
S
o
u
rc
e
:
O
w
n
ca
lc
u
la
ti
o
n
s
u
si
n
g
re
g
is
tr
a
ti
o
n
d
a
ta
fr
o
m
S
ta
ti
st
ic
s
N
et
h
er
la
n
d
s.
150
T
a
b
le
A
4
.8
:
R
eg
re
ss
io
n
s
of
gr
ow
th
h
ou
rl
y
w
ag
e
jo
b
-s
ta
y
er
s
an
d
em
p
lo
y
m
en
t
gr
ow
th
:
O
L
S
,
F
E
an
d
R
E
-s
p
ec
ifi
ca
ti
o
n
s,
20
06
–2
01
3
D
ep
en
d
en
t
va
ri
a
b
le
:
H
o
u
rl
y
w
a
g
e
H
o
u
rl
y
w
a
g
e
H
o
u
rl
y
w
a
g
e
E
m
p
lo
y
m
en
t
E
m
p
lo
y
m
en
t
E
m
p
lo
y
m
en
t
E
st
im
a
ti
o
n
te
ch
n
iq
u
e:
O
L
S
F
E
R
E
O
L
S
F
E
R
E
S
a
le
s
g
ro
w
th
G
ro
w
th
ra
te
sa
le
s
(t
)
0
.0
0
5
4
∗∗
∗
0
.0
0
3
4
∗∗
∗
0
.0
0
5
3
∗∗
∗
0
.1
1
2
4
∗∗
∗
0
.0
6
9
9
∗∗
∗
0
.1
0
3
6
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
0
0
8
)
(0
.0
0
1
1
)
(0
.0
0
0
9
)
(0
.0
0
4
1
)
(0
.0
0
4
6
)
(0
.0
0
4
2
)
G
ro
w
th
ra
te
sa
le
s,
sq
u
a
re
d
(t
)
0
.0
0
0
9
0
.0
0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
8
−0
.0
2
9
3
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
2
5
0
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
2
9
8
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
0
0
7
)
(0
.0
0
1
0
)
(0
.0
0
0
7
)
(0
.0
0
3
9
)
(0
.0
0
4
5
)
(0
.0
0
3
9
)
C
o
n
tr
a
c
t
ty
p
e
S
h
a
re
o
f
o
p
en
-t
er
m
co
n
tr
a
ct
s
(t
−1
)
−0
.0
0
2
3
∗
0
.0
1
6
1
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
0
1
9
0
.0
3
3
3
∗∗
∗
0
.0
6
0
6
∗∗
∗
0
.0
3
6
7
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
0
1
2
)
(0
.0
0
3
2
)
(0
.0
0
1
3
)
(0
.0
0
4
3
)
(0
.0
1
2
4
)
(0
.0
0
4
9
)
S
h
a
re
o
f
re
g
u
la
r
jo
b
s
(t
−1
)
−0
.0
0
5
2
∗∗
−0
.0
0
3
4
−0
.0
0
5
2
∗∗
0
.0
2
9
5
∗∗
∗
0
.0
4
9
1
0
.0
2
7
1
∗∗
(0
.0
0
2
4
)
(0
.0
0
9
0
)
(0
.0
0
2
4
)
(0
.0
0
9
9
)
(0
.0
4
5
5
)
(0
.0
1
1
0
)
C
o
ll
e
c
ti
v
e
la
b
o
u
r
a
g
re
e
m
e
n
t
C
L
A
en
te
rp
ri
se
le
v
el
(t
−1
)
0
.0
0
5
8
∗∗
∗
0
.0
0
2
3
0
.0
0
6
2
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
0
0
6
−0
.0
0
2
3
−0
.0
0
1
7
(0
.0
0
1
2
)
(0
.0
0
2
7
)
(0
.0
0
1
3
)
(0
.0
0
2
9
)
(0
.0
0
8
2
)
(0
.0
0
3
6
)
C
L
A
se
ct
o
r
le
v
el
,
n
o
ex
te
n
si
o
n
(t
−1
)
−0
.0
0
1
6
0
.0
0
2
8
−0
.0
0
1
5
−0
.0
1
8
0
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
0
1
1
−0
.0
1
7
4
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
0
1
1
)
(0
.0
0
3
3
)
(0
.0
0
1
1
)
(0
.0
0
3
6
)
(0
.0
1
3
5
)
(0
.0
0
4
3
)
C
L
A
en
te
rp
ri
se
ex
te
n
d
ed
to
se
ct
o
r
le
v
el
(t
−1
)
0
.0
0
0
0
−0
.0
0
2
0
−0
.0
0
0
4
0
.0
0
1
2
0
.0
0
4
1
0
.0
0
1
8
(0
.0
0
0
6
)
(0
.0
0
2
3
)
(0
.0
0
0
6
)
(0
.0
0
1
6
)
(0
.0
0
7
5
)
(0
.0
0
2
0
)
Im
m
ig
ra
n
t
w
o
rk
e
rs
S
h
a
re
o
f
im
m
ig
ra
n
ts
a
ft
er
E
U
-e
n
la
rg
em
en
t
(t
−1
)
−0
.0
2
6
0
∗∗
0
.1
4
4
7
−0
.0
2
9
6
∗∗
∗
0
.0
6
0
1
0
.3
2
4
9
0
.0
7
1
3
∗
(0
.0
1
1
6
)
(0
.1
2
8
0
)
(0
.0
1
1
3
)
(0
.0
4
0
4
)
(0
.6
6
3
1
)
(0
.0
4
0
8
)
S
h
a
re
o
f
im
m
ig
ra
n
ts
o
th
er
w
es
te
rn
co
u
n
tr
ie
s
0
.0
0
0
4
0
.1
9
3
6
0
.0
0
1
6
−0
.1
1
2
5
∗∗
∗
−0
.1
4
1
1
−0
.1
1
3
4
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
0
3
9
)
(0
.1
4
0
3
)
(0
.0
0
4
2
)
(0
.0
1
4
5
)
(0
.5
7
5
0
)
(0
.0
1
8
8
)
S
h
a
re
o
f
o
th
er
n
o
n
-w
es
te
rn
im
m
ig
ra
n
ts
(t
−1
)
−0
.0
1
8
4
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
0
3
2
−0
.0
2
1
1
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
2
9
6
4
.8
3
0
7
∗∗
∗
−0
.0
3
3
0
(0
.0
0
5
6
)
(0
.2
1
0
3
)
(0
.0
0
5
3
)
(0
.0
2
3
7
)
(1
.5
2
0
5
)
(0
.0
3
4
0
)
W
a
g
e
ri
g
id
it
y
In
d
ic
a
to
r
d
ow
n
w
a
rd
n
o
m
in
a
l
w
a
g
e
ri
g
id
it
y
(t
)
−0
.3
9
7
9
∗∗
∗
−0
.2
6
1
2
∗∗
∗
−0
.3
7
0
9
∗∗
∗
151
T
a
b
le
A
4
.8
C
o
n
ti
n
u
e
d
fr
o
m
p
re
v
io
u
s
p
a
g
e
D
ep
en
d
en
t
va
ri
a
b
le
:
H
o
u
rl
y
w
a
g
e
H
o
u
rl
y
w
a
g
e
H
o
u
rl
y
w
a
g
e
E
m
p
lo
y
m
en
t
E
m
p
lo
y
m
en
t
E
m
p
lo
y
m
en
t
E
st
im
a
ti
o
n
te
ch
n
iq
u
e:
O
L
S
F
E
R
E
O
L
S
F
E
R
E
(0
.0
4
5
7
)
(0
.0
6
5
5
)
(0
.0
4
7
8
)
In
d
ic
a
to
r
d
ow
n
w
a
rd
re
a
l
w
a
g
e
ri
g
id
it
y
(t
)
−0
.3
7
1
2
∗∗
∗
−0
.2
5
7
3
∗∗
∗
−0
.3
4
6
3
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
4
9
8
)
(0
.0
7
4
2
)
(0
.0
5
2
4
)
C
o
n
st
a
n
t
0
.0
4
6
7
∗∗
∗
0
.1
9
4
5
∗∗
∗
0
.0
6
5
4
∗∗
∗
0
.2
9
5
3
∗∗
∗
0
.0
1
7
6
0
.2
7
2
5
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
1
3
0
)
(0
.0
3
4
7
)
(0
.0
1
4
3
)
(0
.0
6
5
9
)
(0
.1
5
0
5
)
(0
.0
7
0
1
)
O
b
se
rv
a
ti
o
n
s
6
3
,6
1
3
6
3
,6
1
3
6
3
,6
1
3
6
1
,6
8
3
6
1
,6
8
3
6
1
,6
8
3
R
-s
q
u
a
re
d
0
.2
1
0
8
0
.2
6
1
8
N
u
m
b
er
o
f
fi
rm
s
2
1
,0
0
7
2
1
,0
0
7
2
0
,4
5
4
2
0
,4
5
4
N
o
te
s
:
D
a
ta
re
fe
r
to
a
ll
p
ri
va
te
se
ct
o
r
fi
rm
s
w
it
h
a
t
le
a
st
2
5
em
p
lo
y
ee
s,
w
h
er
ea
s
fi
rm
-y
ea
r
co
m
b
in
a
ti
o
n
s
w
it
h
fi
rm
d
y
n
a
m
ic
s
(m
er
g
er
s
et
c.
)
a
re
le
ft
o
u
t
o
f
th
e
d
a
ta
.
S
ig
n
ifi
ca
n
ce
le
v
el
s:
∗
:
5
%
∗∗
:
1
%
∗∗
∗
:
0
.1
%
.
T
h
e
ta
b
le
co
m
p
a
re
s
re
su
lt
s
u
si
n
g
O
L
S
,
F
ix
ed
E
ff
ec
ts
(F
E
)
a
n
d
R
a
n
d
o
m
E
ff
ec
ts
(R
E
)
es
ti
m
a
ti
o
n
s
fo
r
a
se
le
ct
io
n
o
f
co
va
ri
a
te
s.
T
h
e
re
su
lt
s
o
f
th
e
O
L
S
a
n
d
R
E
-e
st
im
a
ti
o
n
s
a
re
o
ft
en
si
m
il
a
r.
A
H
a
u
sm
a
n
sp
ec
ifi
ca
ti
o
n
te
st
re
je
ct
s
th
a
t
th
e
u
n
d
er
ly
in
g
a
ss
u
m
p
ti
o
n
s
o
f
th
e
R
E
-m
o
d
el
a
re
sa
ti
sfi
ed
.
A
te
st
u
si
n
g
a
n
a
u
x
il
ia
ry
O
L
S
re
g
re
ss
io
n
,
w
h
ic
h
in
a
d
d
it
io
n
in
cl
u
d
es
th
e
ti
m
e-
av
er
a
g
es
o
f
a
ll
ti
m
e-
va
ry
in
g
in
d
ep
en
d
en
t
va
ri
a
b
le
s,
sh
ow
s
th
a
t
th
e
av
er
a
g
es
o
f
th
e
va
ri
a
b
le
s
a
re
jo
in
tl
y
si
g
n
ifi
ca
n
tl
y
d
iff
er
en
t
fr
o
m
ze
ro
,
th
er
ef
o
re
th
e
R
E
-m
o
d
el
is
re
je
ct
ed
.
T
h
e
F
E
-m
o
d
el
o
n
ly
u
se
s
th
e
w
it
h
in
-v
a
ri
a
ti
o
n
o
f
fi
rm
s.
S
in
ce
m
y
sa
m
p
le
s
a
re
co
n
fi
n
ed
to
fi
rm
-y
ea
r
o
b
se
rv
a
ti
o
n
s
th
a
t
sa
ti
sf
y
ce
rt
a
in
re
st
ri
ct
io
n
s
re
g
a
rd
in
g
sa
le
s
g
ro
w
th
(p
o
si
ti
v
e/
n
eg
a
ti
v
e/
b
el
ow
th
e
X
th
p
er
ce
n
ti
le
o
f
th
e
sa
le
s
g
ro
w
th
d
is
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
),
th
e
p
a
n
el
sp
el
ls
fo
r
fi
rm
o
b
se
rv
a
ti
o
n
s
a
re
sh
o
rt
.
T
h
er
ef
o
re
O
L
S
-e
st
im
a
ti
o
n
s
a
re
u
se
d
in
th
e
m
a
in
a
n
a
ly
si
s.
S
o
u
rc
e
:
O
w
n
ca
lc
u
la
ti
o
n
s
u
si
n
g
re
g
is
tr
a
ti
o
n
d
a
ta
fr
o
m
S
ta
ti
st
ic
s
N
et
h
er
la
n
d
s.
152
Appendix B: Robustness checks
I have performed three robustness checks on the decomposition analysis with
regard to the selections applied to the data: first, the selection of firms for
which data regarding sales growth is available; second, the exclusion of firms
that are subject to firm dynamics (e.g., mergers); and third, within firms, the
exclusion of workers aged 18–22.
The first robustness check assesses the representativeness of the sub-sample
for which sales growth data are available. The probability of being subject
to the sales-survey increases with firm size. Table B4.1 indicates that the
decomposition results for this sub-sample agreed with those for the full sample
of firms. The first two columns describe the wage-bill decompositions for all
firms with respective growing and shrinking wage bills. Columns 5 and 6 repeat
this for the sub-sample of firms for which the change in sales is available. The
results for the βˆ′s are quite similar, confirming that the selected sub-sample
is representative for the entirety of private sector firms. Columns 9 and 10
show the decomposition already described in Table 4.2, with the results for
the sub-sample sliced by sales growth. These results are much more mitigated,
stemming from the mixture of firms with growing and declining wage bills (the
categories presented in the first two sets of columns), since not all firms with
decreasing sales reduce their wage bills.
The second robustness check concerns the exclusion of firm-year observa-
tions subject to firm dynamics, such as mergers. I repeat the decomposition
by sales groups but now include these observations, which makes the sam-
ple about 4% larger. Table B4.2 shows that the results of decomposition are
largely comparable to those in Table 4.2.
As a third robustness check, I repeat the decomposition for one year (2009–
2010), now including workers aged 18–22. This age group was excluded from
the data because the Dutch mandatory youth minimum wage follows a steep
profile from ages 15 to 23. Since this study examines, among other things, to
what extent firms adjust wages of representative stayers in response to periods
of negative sales growth, the inclusion of youth workers (with their high min-
imum wage increases) could partly mask this adjustment. The decomposition
results for this robustness check are presented in the footnote to Table A4.4).
Although job flows are larger, the overall picture remains the same: wage bills
are primarily adjusted through job flows, while the wage changes of stayers
are only slightly lower, remaining positive when sales growth is negative.
Regarding the regresions, Table A4.8 explores Random Effects and Fixed
Effects estimations, as alternatives to the OLS regressions used in the main
analysis. The results are described in the note underneath this table.
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Appendix C: Creation of the dataset and description of variables
Creation of the dataset and applied selections
Yearly linked-employer–employee datasets (LEED) have been created by merg-
ing job data from the Social Statistical Datasets (SSD) with data on workers’
characteristics from municipal registrations (GBA) and firm data, made avail-
able by Statistics Netherlands. The SSD (Bakker et al. (2014)) contain wages,
hours worked and other job characteristics for all jobs in the Netherlands.
Firm-level data, typically survey data, are often only available for a subset of
firms. Firm-level variables from the Production Statistics data files, as sales,
are available only for relatively large firms in the industrial, commercial ser-
vices, retail trade, wholesale trade, construction and transport sector. Data
on workers’ attained level of education are available for only about two-thirds
of workers. I use these data (applying the corresponding weights) to calculate
the share of low, medium and highly educated workers at each firm.
The data are confined to jobs existing on October 1, since October is
considered by Statistics Netherlands to be a representative month. Hourly
contractual wages were derived based on gross contractual wages and contrac-
tual working hours. The contractual wage is the base wage as agreed in the
labour contract, which in many cases increases according to pay scales stated
in the collective labour agreement. Besides the contractual wages and hours,
overtime hours and -payments are available in the data, as well as incidental
wages (such as bonuses) and extra wages (agreed upon in the labour contract,
collectively or individually). Holiday allowances—there is a legal requirement
to pay holiday allowances of 8% of gross salary with some CLAs agreeing to a
higher percentage—are included in these extra wages.
The job-level datasets have been combined pairwise to two-year datasets
(2006–2007; 2007–2008, etc.), while firm-level variables, such as the number
of stayers, entrants and exiters and the average contractual wage and hours
worked per group (i.e., stayers, entrants, exiters) were generated before creat-
ing firm-level datasets. Wage-bill growth was then decomposed for each firm
that existed in both years. In cases of firm dynamics (mergers, split-ups, etc.)
firms’ ID number may change from year to year. However, the data allow a
firm’s predecessor to be identified, in which case the observations for old and
new ID numbers were treated as one firm. For entrant workers in enterprises
characterised by firm dynamics, the predecessor firm is unknown, however; in
those cases I have assigned entrants to the firm and sector that is the most
frequent predecessor among the stayers in that particular firm.
The applied selections are best illustrated by closely examining a particular
two-year dataset. The initial LEED set for 2010–2011, for example, contained
159
13.3 million jobs. After removing 0.4 million observations for which the con-
tractual wage, the contractual hours worked or the hourly wage were very high
or low22 and after removing 0.2 million observations of (generally very small)
firms with zero stayers, 12.7 million observations remained: (6.3 million for
2010 and 6.4 million for 2011). Jobs in the (semi-)public sector (about 40%)
were excluded, as were jobs in firms that did not exist in both years (fewer than
2%). Converted to the firm-level, a dataset for 2011 was obtained with over
250,000 observations, containing wage-bill growth for 2010–2011 and its de-
composed items. Putting the years together, the resulting 2007–2013 dataset
comprised 1.94 million firm-year observations, out of which 1.80 million were
not subject to firm-dynamics. Small firms comprise a large share of the lat-
ter dataset: only about 125,000 firms have 25 workers or more. For 75,602
of these observations, sales data are available for the two subsequent years
(42,997 firm-year observations feature zero or increasing sales and 32.605 fea-
ture decreasing sales, see Table 4.2). A robustness check explores how similar
are the decomposition results of firms for which sales growth data are available
to those of all larger firms.
Description of variables
In the dataset used for the regression analyses, the explanatory variables typ-
ically refer to (t−1) to address possible problems of reverse causality. Various
covariates, such as variables regarding the level of workers’ level of education,
have some missing observations. I address this by imputing missing covariate
data with their means in the particular year and by creating dummy variables
that indicate whether a firm has a missing observation for that particular vari-
able in that particular year. In this way, I include as many observations as
possible in my regressions. Wherever relevant, the dummy-variables have been
included in the regressions.
Some of the explanatory variables used in the regressions might require
clarification. Open-term contracts are defined as agreements for an indefi-
nite period of time, in contrast to fixed-term employment contracts which
lasts for a specified period. The term ‘regular jobs’ refers to all jobs except
for on-call workers, workers for temporary work agencies, workers under the
Sheltered Employment Act (‘WSW’), interns and directors/main sharehold-
ers. Full-time jobs are defined as those with at least 35 working hours each
week. Migrant workers have at least one parent born outside the Nether-
lands or were born abroad themselves. The level of education is categorised as
22I excluded observations for which the contractual monthly wage was (thresholds 2008)
below e 24 or above e 25,000, the contractual hours worked per month below 8 or above 250
hours or for which the calculated hourly wage was below e 3 or above e 100
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‘low’ if the highest-attained level is primary school or pre-vocational secondary
education (‘VMBO’); as ‘medium’ in cases of senior general secondary edu-
cation (‘HAVO’), pre-university education (‘VWO’) or vocational secondary
education (‘MBO’); and as ‘high’ if a degree from a university of applied sci-
ences (‘HBO’) or university (‘WO’) is obtained. Wage levels were classified as
‘low’ if the gross monthly wage is below the modal wage (e 2315 in 2006), as
‘medium’ when between modal and 2*modal; and as ‘high’ if the gross wage
exceeds 2*modal. Firms are classified as continuing if they still exist in the
following year and as ceasing to exist if they do not. Firms that still exist in
2013 fall into the category, ‘end of firm out of observed period’. The share of
workers subject to part-time UB reflects the extent to which a firm used the
temporary (April 2009–July 2011) facility for part-time unemployment bene-
fits. Firms meeting the requirements to participate in this facility could reduce
the working hours of (some of) their employees by at most 50%, while these
workers received UB for their reduced hours. The variable ‘share of incidental
wage’ is based on a ranking of firms according to the share of workers receiving
incidental wage. It is classified as ‘low’ if the firm belongs to the lowest 25%,
‘medium’ for percentiles 25–75, and as ‘high’ for firms that are in the top 25%
of this distribution.
Immigrants are defined as workers who have at least one parent born out-
side the Netherlands. I distinguish three groups of immigrants: (1) immigrants
from EU-enlargement countries, who originated from a country that entered
the EU in 2004 or 2007 and who have been immigrating into the Netherlands
in or after the year the country joined the EU; (2) other western immigrants,
originating from western countries, except for those countries covered in Group
1, or Morocco, Turkey, the Republic of Suriname and the Netherlands Antilles;
and (3) other, non-western immigrants. The group of native workers serves as
a reference in the regressions.
To address possible endogeneity (i.e., firms that intend to reduce wages or
increase job turnover could hire more migrant workers) I applied an instrumen-
tal variables (IV) approach. The instrument comprises the predicted shares
of each type of immigrants in a firm. Following the approach proposed by
D. Card (Altonji and Card (1991) and Card (2001)), I calculate the predicted
share of foreigners in a certain geographical location in a certain year based on
the distribution of foreigners across these locations in the previous year and
the total net flows of foreigners since. The rationale behind the instrument is
that foreigners from a certain origin tend to locate in the same location be-
cause of already-existing social networks. For this prediction, I use a version
of the ‘shift-share’ instrument, in the sense that I depart from the actual share
of immigrant workers in a firm in the base year, with the predicted stock of
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immigrants developing according to changes in the stock of immigrant citizens
aged 23 to 65 located in the geographical area (the statistical agency distin-
guishes 40 so called ‘COROP-regions’) in which the firm resides. 2006 is used
as a base year, unless the firm formed after 2006, in which case the founding
year is taken as the base year. So, instead of using the actual changes in the
share of migrant workers in the firm, I use as an instrument the changes in
the share of migrant citizens in the area in which the firm is located.
Finally, I include indicators for nominal and real downward wage rigidity
as explanatory variables in the regression in order to analyse the relationship
between downward wage rigidity and employment growth. In the literature,
a worker is considered subject to wage rigidity if he or she receives a real or
nominal wage freeze during a period where he or she would have received a
wage change below a certain threshold if wages would have been fully flexible.
For nominal rigidity, this threshold is equal to zero, whereas for real down-
ward wage rigidity, the threshold is the inflation expectation. Several methods
for measuring wage rigidity are based on comparing the actual wage-growth
distribution with a symmetric, so-called notional (theoretical) wage-growth
distribution. In this study, I use the Maximum Likelihood method described
by Goette et al. (2007), which controls for measurement error and endoge-
nously estimates the inflation expectation. This method calculates for each
job-year combination the probability of being subject to downward nominal
wage rigidity, real wage rigidity or no wage rigidity. Wage changes are as-
sumed to be generated according to a linear combination of covariates and a
normally distributed error term. I use gender, age, company size and dummy
variables for part-time employment, year and sector as covariates. The method
was applied to the monthly wages of stayers whose wage growth was between
-35% and 60% and who worked at least 12 hours a week as a regular worker
(excluding interns, on-call workers, etc.). See Deelen and Verbeek (2015) for
a description of these methods and their application to Dutch data. The firm-
level indicators used in the regressions are averages of the indicators by jobs
per firm, per year. For observations outside the applied selections, the indi-
cators are missing values. Since the three indicators sum to 1, the indicator
‘not subject to wage rigidity’ serves as a reference group in the regressions.
Two respective variables are included in the regressions regarding the shares
of workers in the firm for which no wage rigidity indicator was calculated due
to growth in monthly wages below -35% or above 60%.
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Conclusions
This thesis comprises four applied micro-econometric studies on wages and
employment in the Netherlands. The various investigated aspects can be
summarised using the metaphor that the labour market resembles a game
of ‘Snakes and Ladders’. Chapter 1 and 2 studied the steepness of Dutch
‘wage-ladders’, while chapter 3 analysed the consequences of encountering a
‘snake’—in this case, displacement due to firm bankruptcy—for various groups
of workers. Chapter 4 considered both the ‘ladders’ and the ‘snakes’, studying
how firms react to declining demand: do they predominantly reduce employ-
ment, or do they also adjust wages?
The ageing of the Dutch labour force and the ensuing policy targets to
keep older workers in the work force urge us towards a better understanding
of the determinants of older workers’ labour-market position. Given the rel-
atively rigid labour market for older workers in the Netherlands, the relation
between older workers’ steep wage-tenure profiles and their low job-to-job mo-
bility is particularly important in this respect. To explore the factors behind
the relatively high wages and low employment rates of older workers after
displacement, older and prime-aged displaced workers are examined, mapping
out their sensitivity to, for example, moving to a different sector of economic
activity.
The first chapter presents evidence that the returns to tenure in the Nether-
lands are high relative to other countries. This suggests that it is not very
attractive for older workers to switch jobs, since their higher wages are partly
related to firm- or sector-specific elements which are lost through job mobil-
ity. Furthermore, workers’ seniority positions apparently increase wages to a
certain extent, which may be related to labour-market institutions that pro-
tect senior workers relative strongly. Finally, the results suggest that firms in
industries with high returns to tenure employ relatively high shares of older
workers and workers with high average tenures, indicating that the low job-
to-job mobility of older workers and steep wage-tenure profiles are two sides
of the same coin.
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The second chapter finds evidence that a wage cushion contributes to the
steepness of the age-wage profile in the private sector. The results suggest
that the collective wage-scales themselves cannot be a major cause of wages
continued increase at older ages; only wages exceeding the highest wage-scale
ceilings contribute to the steepness of the wage profile over potential experi-
ence. This wage cushion allows for wage differentiation between and within
age groups, but it remains uncertain to what degree this wage differentiation
allows for heterogeneity across sectors and/or firms.
The third chapter identifies that labour-market outcomes after displace-
ment are highly contingent on age, especially in terms of employment prob-
abilities. Prospects for older displaced workers are more adverse in cases of
long tenure in the lost job, displacement from a declining local labour market
or reemployment in a different sector. For example, older displaced workers
who find new employment in a different sector of economic activity than the
one from which they were displaced suffer wage losses that are almost 10 per-
centage points larger than those who find work in the same industry. This
also holds for prime-age workers, but to a much lesser extent. The results sug-
gest that job- and sector- specific factors are important to understanding the
fact that displacement affects older workers more negatively than prime-age
workers.
Theoretically, delayed compensation schemes, strong bargaining positions
of well-protected older workers and accumulated firm- and sector-specific hu-
man capital are possible reasons for steep profiles of wages over tenure. High
labour costs due to these factors of in older workers’ jobs prior to displacement
may be responsible for their poor outcomes after displacement. Moreover, spe-
cial provisions for older workers in collective bargaining schemes may reduce
their hiring probability. On the other hand, supply side arguments may also
partly explain the more severe outcomes of older workers after displacement.
Older workers often have more options to retire from the labour market and
have longer benefit entitlements, leading to higher reservation wages that come
down more slowly.
Empirically, the data do not allow all possible determinants of steep wage-
tenure profiles and the adverse position of older workers after displacement
to be pinned down. For example, investments in firm-specific human capital
and the importance of deferred payment schemes are difficult to identify, since
individual productivity is unobservable. Nevertheless, the results give some
indications.
Since there is no reason to assume that investments in specific human
capital are much higher in the Netherlands than in other western countries,
these are unlikely explanations for the high returns to tenure from an interna-
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tional perspective. Empirical evidence also suggests that productivity remains
stable, at best, at older ages. Still, this study establishes that switching to
another sector of economic activity after displacement has a larger negative
effect on the wages of older workers (aged 45–54) than on those of prime-age
workers (aged 35–44), which points to the importance of firm- and industry-
specific capital lost upon displacement. On the other hand, older workers’
human capital may be more frequently obsolete because they are concentrated
in shrinking occupations; the result that older workers have a larger loss in
employment probability after displacement from a declining sector supports
this notion.
Deferred compensation schemes may be another part of the explanation.
Firms may use such schemes as an incentive for employees to remain at the
firm, thereby lengthening the period over which firms can reap the rewards
of investments in human capital. Moreover, such schemes can be used as a
motivational tool, especially if individual output is difficult to observe. I find
that collective wage-scale systems are important guidelines for remuneration
in most sectors and that the cushion for wages above the highest wage-scale
ceiling in part explains steep wage-tenure profiles. Also, industries employing
high shares of older and long-tenured workers tend to have high returns to
tenure. Both findings are compatible with the motivation argument.
On the other hand, high returns to tenure may just as well point at the
increased bargaining power of older workers, induced by employment protec-
tions that increase over tenure. The established positive correlation between
the seniority position of workers within a firm and their wage supports this
argument.
To summarise these results, job- and sector-specific factors are important
to understanding steep wage-tenure profiles and the more vulnerable position
of older workers after job losses. Job- and sector-specific factors encompass
not only specific human capital, but also tenure-related employment protection
and compensation schemes.
A relevant question is the extent to which this is sub-optimal. Wages that
continue to increase at older ages may result from optimal firm behaviour,
for example if they are caused by firm-specific investments in human capital
that are accompanied by deferred compensation schemes. Strong bargaining
positions of older workers may, however, lead to a wage-productivity gap at
older ages, negatively affecting older workers’ job mobility. This can harm
labour-market efficiency by preventing the optimal allocation of workers across
jobs. Moreover, although theoretically high returns to tenure and low job
mobility may be optimal in terms of welfare, the ageing of the workforce
underlines the policy relevance of the subject. With an ageing workforce, the
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mechanisms favouring wage-tenure profiles come under increasing pressure.
As the period of employment at older age lengthens, workers’ knowledge risks
becoming obsolete, and the employment share of young workers decreases.
Chapter 4 examined the role played by wages when firms have to adjust to
falling sales. The results show that when firms face declining sales, employ-
ment reduction is by far the most important channel to contract wage bills. A
striking result is that the contractual wage growth of stayers is only somewhat
lower at firms hit by adverse sales shocks (even if sales decline over several
years) compared to firms with increasing sales, and wage growth remains pos-
itive on average. Employment reduction contributes about 20 times more to
reduced wage bills than wage reduction of stayers does. Over the years, how-
ever, stayers’ wage growth has decelerated across the board. Employment
losses do not hit a random group of workers; I find after a severe negative
shock in sales, employment losses are larger at firms with higher percentages
of immigrants, short-tenured workers, temporary contracts, non-regular job
types and part-time jobs. Moreover, there is evidence for a significant nega-
tive relationship between firms’ degree of downward wage rigidity and their
employment growth, suggesting that if wages were more downwardly flexi-
ble, job losses would be significantly lower after adverse shocks. All in all,
these findings illustrate a segmented labour market, where employment ad-
justment on the one hand predominantly affects workers with relatively weak
labour-market positions, while workers who stay are assured of wage increases
notwithstanding any sales shocks suffered by the firm.
This limited responsiveness of wages to sales shocks matches the suggestion
of the first three chapters that firms perceive wage growth as an important
instrument to motivate workers. For the same reason, employers are generally
opposed to ‘demotion’ (reduced rank and salary) for older workers. Paradox-
ically, although demotion is very uncommon within firms, once displaced, the
labour-market clearly forces older workers to adjust to a lower wage level.
The fact that the wage growth of stayers has decelerated across the board
may point to a high level of coordination: the outcomes of the consultations
of the Dutch social partners serve as important guidelines for wage bargaining
at enterprise and sector level. One merit of this model of ‘controlled decen-
tralisation’ is that wage increases of stayers are moderate and predictable and
labour-market unrest is avoided, but the model may limit wage flexibility.
To conclude in terms of the metaphor of the ‘Snakes and Ladders’ game,
this thesis has found evidence for rather steep ‘wage-ladders’ over tenure. The
ladders remain standing throughout any storm, as wage growth is relatively
irresponsive to declining firm sales and is merely reduced across the board
over the course of years. The trade-off for this situation is that encountering
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a ‘snake’ of job loss has large consequences: particularly for older workers,
employment probabilities after displacement are relatively low and wage drops
are large, especially for those with strong firm and sector ties. Moreover,
‘the dice are loaded’: there is no level playing field, with the probability of
job loss strongly depending on the type of job-contract, tenure and other
characteristics of workers and firms.
Firms and workers plausibly optimise their behaviour given the conditions
provided by trends and institutions; therefore, it is important to learn more
about the impact of labour-market institutions and their interactions on labour
market outcomes. Wage-formation institutions, employment-protection legis-
lation, active labour-market policies and, for example, special provisions for
older workers all impact the outcomes for firms and workers. Since adjust-
ment currently runs primarily through employment adjustment, more knowl-
edge regarding the effectiveness of various types of active labour-market pol-
icy is needed. And, although employment-protection legislation is justifiable
to curb the externalities of displacement, its design requires precision: dis-
couraging voluntary job-to-job mobility or to induce rent-seeking behaviour is
sub-optimal. Determining the impacts of Dutch wage-formation institutions
and employment-protection legislation is therefore an important challenge for
future research.
167

Summary
Chapter 1 of this dissertation, titled ‘Wage-tenure profiles and mobility’,
investigates the role of wage-tenure profiles in explaining patterns of job mo-
bility using the Dutch Social Statistical Database for the years 1999–2005.
The Dutch labour market is characterized by low job mobility for older work-
ers and high average duration of unemployment for older jobseekers, features
that might be interrelated and make this investigation especially relevant.
The study provides a set of estimated wage-tenure profiles, and international
comparison shows that wage-tenure profiles in the Netherlands are relatively
steep.
The chapter focuses on the impact of tenure (the duration of a match be-
tween a worker and the firm for which he works) on wages, as opposed to the
impact of the workers’ total (potential) labour market experience. Returns
to tenure are generally interpreted as the firm-related component of wages.
They may, for example, reflect returns on firm-specific human capital or de-
ferred compensation schemes, with senior employees remunerated above their
marginal productivity. A drawback of firm-related wage components is that
they may act as impediments to job-mobility, because if the worker moves to
another firm, he or she will no longer receive these components.
The measurement and interpretation of wage-tenure profiles is not without
debate in the economic literature. There are several approaches to estimating
the returns to tenure, each aiming to address the problem of endogeneity of
tenure in the wage equation in order to prevent biased estimates. The problem
of endogeneity arises because tenure is not a fully exogenous explanatory vari-
able of wages, since unobserved individual and match-specific characteristics
determine both wage level and tenure. In other words, highly productive in-
dividuals tend to experience fewer quits and layoffs, and high-quality matches
tend to survive longer. Unbiased estimates of the cumulative effect of tenure
can be interpreted as an estimate of what a typical worker would lose in terms
of wage if his job were to end exogenously.
Although the approaches of Altonji and Shakotko (1987) and Topel (1991)
are likely to produce somewhat biased estimates, I apply them to ensure sound
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international comparison. Next, I analyse the effect of workers’ seniority po-
sition (relative to that of their colleagues in the same firm and conditional
on tenure and experience) on wages. The underlying idea is that workers
with higher seniority positions may have stronger wage bargaining positions,
because they derive more protection from being displaced due to last-in, first-
out layoff rules. Finally, I investigate—at the sector level—the correlation
between high returns to tenure and older workers’ job mobility.
Three main results are obtained. First, Dutch wage-tenure profiles are
steep compared to those of other countries, strongly suggesting that wage
growth is partly related to firm-specific elements, that are lost in cases of job
mobility. Second, estimates show that relative seniority position raises wages:
conditional on overall experience in the labour market and tenure, real wages
are three-to-four percent higher when comparing the most senior worker with
a recently hired worker. However, this effect is modest from an international
perspective. Third, I find a significant correlation between high returns to
tenure and low mobility: a sector with higher returns to tenure has a higher
share of older workers who have longer average tenure. These findings suggest
that the low job mobility of older workers and steep wage-tenure profiles are,
to some extent, two sides of the same coin.
Chapter 2, titled ‘Do wages continue increasing at older ages? Evidence
on the wage cushion in the Netherlands’ (with Rob Euwals), investigates the
anatomy of older workers’ wages. The steep wage-tenure profiles established
in the first chapter raise the question of how these profiles occur with wages
largely determined by collective-bargaining agreements. After all, once work-
ers have reached the top of their maximum wage-scale, one would expect their
wage profiles to be rather flat, as wage negotiations and collective labour
agreements generally take the wage system as given. Hence, in a system of
collectively bargained wage-scales, it is not evident that wages should increase
with experience or tenure at older ages, unless a wage cushion plays an im-
portant role.
The central research question of this chapter is whether the wage cushion—
that is the difference between actual wages and collectively agreed (maximum)
contractual wages—contributes to the fact that wages continue to increase at
older ages. This wage cushion comprises two parts: (1) extra and incidental
wages paid in addition to the contractual wage; and (2) contractual wages
exceeding the ceiling of the highest wage-scale as stipulated in the collective
labour agreements.
Wages of individual male workers in twenty-two sectors in the Netherlands
are followed from 2006 to 2010. Administrative data are merged with wage-
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scale data collected from collective labour agreements (CLAs), such as the
number of wage-scales, the minimum and maximum wages per scale and the
number of spinal points (the wage levels associated with standard increments
along a wage-scale). Combining actual wages with wage-scale data enables
analysing the effect of the wage-scale system on actual wages.
Indicators are developed for (1) the ‘likelihood’ of receiving a contractual
wage equal to the ceiling of one of the wage-scales of the sector’s wage-scale
system; and (2) the likelihood of receiving a contractual wage exceeding the
ceiling of the highest wage-scale. These indicators are used to answer a number
of empirical questions to unravel the puzzle of wages that continue to increase
at older ages:
• Does the likelihood of being at a wage ceiling continue to increase at older
ages? Or, alternatively, does the likelihood of receiving a contractual
wage above the highest wage ceiling continue to increase at older ages?
• Do workers receiving a contractual wage equal to a wage ceiling receive
more in additional wages?
• Do workers receiving a contractual wage above the highest wage ceiling
experience more contractual wage growth?
The results are different for the public and private sectors. For the public
sector, no evidence is found of a wage cushion. First, the likelihood of a con-
tractual wage equal to a wage-scale ceiling increases with age, whereas wages
exceeding the highest wage-scale ceiling are very rare, with the wage-scale
system including all types of managerial jobs. Second, workers earning a con-
tractual wage equal to one of the wage-scale ceilings receive less in additional
wages than workers who have not yet reached a wage ceiling. Apparently, in
the public sector, additional wages are not used to motivate workers who find
themselves at the ceiling of their respective wage-scales.
In the private sector, however, evidence is found for a wage cushion, lead-
ing to wages that continue to increase at older ages. First, the likelihood of
a contractual wage that exceeds the highest wage-scale ceiling increases with
age. Since wage-scale systems in the private sector do not seem to include all
types of higher and better paid (i.e., managerial) jobs, ceilings are often not
restrictive; wages above the highest ceiling are rather common. Second, work-
ers earning a contractual wage above the highest ceiling receive both higher
contractual wage growth and a larger amount of additional pay, compared to
other workers. The growth in their additional wages is lower, however, possi-
bly because there is less need to use additional wages since contractual wages
can be set rather freely.
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Re-estimating wage profiles to now include information on individual’s po-
sitions with respect to the wage-scale system shows that wages exceeding the
highest wage-scale ceiling contribute to the steepness of the wage profile over
potential experience. So, in the private sector, the wage cushion enhances wage
differentiation, and wages above the highest wage-scale ceiling contribute to
the steepness of the age-wage profile. Although more research is needed to
determine what exactly causes wages to continue increasing at older ages,
the empirical evidence at least suggests that the collective wage-scale systems
cannot be a major cause. Wage cushions seem to allow for wages to be dif-
ferentiated between and within age groups, but it remains uncertain to what
degree this wage differentiation allows for heterogeneity across sectors and/or
firms.
Chapter 3, ‘Labour market effects of job displacement for prime-age and
older workers’ (with Marloes de Graaf-Zijl and Wiljan van den Berge), analy-
ses the effect of job separations related to firm bankruptcies on the employment
probabilities and wages of the workers involved.
Displacement may place the burden of economic adjustments on an un-
fortunate minority of workers. Especially for older workers, finding new em-
ployment after displacement appears to be challenging. The labour-market
position of older displaced workers has specific policy interest due to the age-
ing Dutch population and the resulting policy targets to keep older workers
in the work force. This chapter investigates to what extent the impact of firm
bankruptcy differs between older and prime-age workers, studying how these
differences correlate with three factors: (1) long tenures in a job prior to dis-
placement; (2) obtaining reemployment in a different industry and (3) local
labour-market conditions in the industry from which workers are displaced.
Displacements due to firm bankruptcy are considered a random sample,
because workers so leaving jobs are neither switching jobs voluntarily nor are
they selected for dismissal by the firm. The effects will therefore at least
partly reflect the impact of the loss of firm- and sector-specific factors. This
chapter focusses on comparing the effects in terms of the job opportunities
and earnings for older (45–54) and prime-age (35–44) workers.
A difference-in-difference approach is combined with exact matching, using
extensive, administrative linked employer–employee data for the Netherlands
that includes all workers, combined with data on firm bankruptcies also drawn
from an administrative source. The sample comprises nearly 45,000 workers
who were displaced due to firm closures between 2000 and 2009; workers can be
followed through 2011. A control group of about 158,000 workers not displaced
due to bankruptcy was constructed using exact-matching techniques, so that
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treated and control groups have comparable observable characteristics.
The results indicate that labour-market outcomes after displacement are
highly contingent on age, especially in terms of employment probabilities.
Three possible factors behind the different results by age group (long tenures
before displacement, the local labour-market situation in the industry from
which workers are displaced and the transition to another sector of economic
activity) all partly explain the stronger impact of displacement on older work-
ers. Our results suggest that job- and sector-specific factors are important for
understanding the more vulnerable position older workers face after job losses.
Older workers not only have longer tenures but are also impacted more
severely by displacement after a long-tenured prior job; for prime-age workers,
the tenure before displacement is less decisive for their outcomes after displace-
ment. For older workers, longer tenures are accompanied by an extra reduction
in employment probability of 2 to 3 percentage points, compared to prime-age
workers of the same tenure. Regarding wages, longer tenures are associated
with larger wage drops after displacement, both for older and prime-age work-
ers. Older workers displaced from a declining local labour-market experience
a stronger loss by 3.5 percentage points in their employment probability in the
first year compared to workers displaced from a stable or growing industry.
This difference declines to 1.7 percentage point in the third year and disap-
pears over the longer run. The adverse impact is concentrated among older
workers, since the impact for prime age workers is small and mostly insignifi-
cant. There are no clear differences between age groups regarding wages.
Older displaced workers who find new employment in a different industry
than that from which they were displaced suffer wage losses that are 8 to 9 per-
centage points larger than those who find work in the same industry. This also
holds for prime-age workers, but to a much lesser extent. Theoretically, the
more severe outcomes of older workers after displacement can be explained by
their relatively high labour costs resulting from delayed compensation schemes,
stronger bargaining position of well-protected older workers or costly special
provisions for older workers in collective- bargaining schemes. Alternatively,
the wage-to-productivity ratio may be higher for displaced older workers due to
firm-specific, industry-specific or task-specific human capital, that is lost upon
displacement, especially after long job tenure and when switching industries.
Also, the wage-to-productivity ratio might be higher due to declining produc-
tivity with age. On the other hand, supply side factors may play a role: older
workers have longer benefit entitlements, causing higher reservation wages,
and they often have more options to retire from the labour-market. The re-
sults confirm the importance of job tenure and switching industries, which may
point to a loss of firm- and industry-specific capital. However, a substantial
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part of the difference between age groups remains after controlling for these
factors, suggesting that other, yet-unexplored factors also play an important
role.
Chapter 4, titled ‘Flexible wages or flexible workers? A decomposition of
wage bill adjustment by Dutch firms, 2006–2013’, investigates to what extent
firms adjust wages and employment in periods of adverse economic circum-
stances, exploring the determinants of these adjustments. If wages’ downward
flexibility is limited, induced either by institutions or because employers fear
harming workers’ motivation and productivity, employment reduction in re-
sponse to adverse shocks is expected to be relatively large. The adjustments
of wages and job flows are studied simultaneously at the firm level, using
an extensive, administrative linked employer–employee panel dataset for the
Netherlands. The analysis includes firms with 25 or more workers for which
the year-to-year change in sales is available, comprising more than 75,000
firm-year observations, based on 12.3 million job-year observations.
The study has two parts: (1) decomposition and (2) regression analysis.
In the first part, changes in the contractual wage bills of firms are decomposed
into items related to price (hourly wages) and volume (hours worked, number
of jobs), distinguishing between stayers and workers entering and exiting the
firm. I also considered overtime pay and incidental wages. I analyse the impact
of adverse sales shocks of various sizes on this decomposition by estimating
the asymmetry in the responses by firms to falling or growing sales. The de-
compositions are examined through various variables, such as sales growth (by
group) and the share of open-term contracts. The results of these decomposi-
tions are accompanied by additional detailed information regarding job flows,
wages and hours worked by groups of workers and types of contract.
The decomposition-analysis discloses how firms choose their mix of wage
mitigation and employment reduction in response to adverse sales growth.
One limitation arises, however, that comparing decompositions of two groups
of firms does not take into account the differences in observed characteristics.
The second part of the analysis comprises multivariate regressions which relate
wage changes, job flows or employment growth to a number of firm character-
istics. Again, the unit of observation is the firm. The analyses generally focus
on firm-year observations for which sales decrease, or even decline sharply,
since this is when adjustments typically occur.
The main findings of this chapter are the following. In the first part,
the decomposition analysis shows that employment reduction is by far the
most important channel for wage-bill contraction, indicating downward wage
rigidity. Firms use not only increased exits but also reduced entries, probably
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to avoid firing costs. A striking result is that the contractual wage growth of
stayers is only somewhat lower at firms hit by an adverse shock (even if sales
decline for several years in a row), compared to firms with increasing sales, and
wage changes remain positive on average. Employment reduction contributes
about 20 times more to reductions in wage bills than does any reduction in the
wage of stayers. Over the years, however, wage growth has decelerated across
the board. I find no indication that job flows are used as a vehicle to reduce
the average wage; wages of newly hired workers do not lag further behind those
of stayers when sales growth is more adverse. Hence, contractual wages have
minor importance for wage-bill adjustment in adverse times, for both stayers
and entrants. Contractual working hours provide some downward flexibility,
as do overtime pay and incidental wages, but the magnitude of the effect is
small.
In the second part, regression analysis confirms that the wage growth of
stayers is only somewhat responsive to negative sales shocks. By contrast,
employment growth is quite sensitive to firm characteristics, especially with
larger negative sales shocks. Employment loss, however, does not hit a random
group of workers: given a severe negative shock in sales, employment losses
are larger in firms with high percentages of immigrants, short-tenured workers,
temporary contracts, non-regular job types and part-time jobs. Moreover, I
find a significant negative relationship between firms’ degree of downward wage
rigidity and their employment growth, suggesting that job losses in response
to adverse shocks would be significantly lower if wages were more downwardly
flexible. These findings illustrate a segmented labour market, where employ-
ment adjustment on the one hand predominantly affects workers in a relatively
weak labour-market position, while continuing workers are assured of wage in-
creases regardless of sales shocks suffered by the firm at which they work.
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Samenvatting - Summary in Dutch
Dit proefschrift bevat vier toegepaste micro-economische analyses over lonen
en banen in Nederland. De verschillende facetten van het proefschrift kunnen
worden samengevat aan de hand van een metafoor: het bordspel ‘Slangen en
Ladders’. Hoofdstuk 1 en 2 onderzoeken hoe steil de ‘loon-ladders’ in Neder-
land zijn, terwijl hoofdstuk 3 onderzoekt hoeveel nadeel werknemers ondervin-
den als zij een ‘slang’ (in dit geval baanverlies vanwege bedrijfsfaillissement)
tegenkomen, en hoe de gevolgen verschillen tussen oudere en jongere werkne-
mers. Hoofdstuk 4 verenigt de slangen en ladders in zich door te onderzoeken
hoe bedrijven reageren als hun omzet daalt: verminderen zij vooral het aantal
banen of ook de loongroei?
De motivatie voor deze studie ligt in de vergrijzing van de beroepsbevolking
en het daarop ge¨ınspireerde beleidsdoel om ouderen langer aan het werk te
houden. Hiervoor is meer kennis nodig over de factoren die bepalend zijn voor
de arbeidsmarktpositie van ouderen. Omdat de Nederlandse arbeidsmarkt
van ouderen relatief rigide is, is meer inzicht nodig in relatie tussen de oploop
van lonen over het dienstverband en lage vrijwillige baanmobiliteit. Het vol-
gen van twee leeftijdsgroepen na ontslag geeft vervolgens zicht op verschillende
achterliggende factoren van de arbeidsmarktpositie van ouderen. Verder wordt
onderzocht hoe bedrijven hun loonsom aanpassen, en in hoeverre neerwaartse
loonrigiditeit een factor is die daarbij meespeelt.
Hoofdstuk 1 van dit proefschrift, getiteld ‘Wage-tenure profiles and mo-
bility’, onderzoekt in hoeverre loonprofielen over baanduur samenhangen met
baanmobiliteit. Het onderzoek is uitgevoerd op het Sociaal Statistisch Be-
stand voor de periode 1999-2005. De relevantie van dit onderzoek ligt in
het feit dat de Nederlandse arbeidsmarkt wordt gekenmerkt door een lage
baanmobiliteit en lange werkloosheidsduur bij ouderen; kenmerken die mo-
gelijk verband houden met elkaar. De schattingen in dit hoofdstuk tonen
aan dat loonprofielen over baanduur voor Nederland een steil verloop kennen,
vergeleken met bevindingen uit de literatuur voor andere landen.
De focus van het onderzoek ligt op het effect van baanduur (de lengte van
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de periode waarin een werknemer aaneengesloten voor een specifiek bedrijf
werkt) op het loon, in tegenstelling tot het effect van het totaal aantal jaren
dat men op de arbeidsmarkt werkzaam is. Rendement op baanduur wordt
veelal ge¨ınterpreteerd als bedrijfsspecifieke looncomponent: zo kan het ren-
dement op investeringen in bedrijfsspecifiek menselijk kapitaal weerspiegelen
of samenhangen met een beloningsstructuur waarbij sprake is van ‘uitgestelde
beloning’ (jonge werknemers worden lager bepaald dan hun marginale produc-
tiviteit, ouderen juist daarboven). Een mogelijk nadeel van bedrijfsspecifieke
looncomponenten is dat zij een belemmering kunnen vormen voor baan-baan
mobiliteit, omdat werknemers deze looncomponenten verliezen bij overstap
naar een andere werkgever.
De literatuur kent diverse technieken om loonprofielen te bepalen; deze
corrigeren op verschillende manieren voor de endogeniteit van baanduur in de
loonvergelijking. Baanduur is namelijk niet volledig exogeen als verklarende
variabele van het loon, doordat niet-geobserveerde kenmerken invloed hebben
op zowel loon als baanduur. Zo gaat een succesvolle match tussen een werkne-
mer en een bedrijf vaak gepaard met zowel een hoog loon als een langere baan-
duur. Wanneer hiervoor wordt gecorrigeerd kan het geschatte cumulatieve
effect van baanduur worden ge¨ınterpreteerd als het loonverlies dat een repre-
sentatieve werknemer zou ondergaan als hij zijn baan verliest als gevolg van een
exogene schok. Hoewel de methoden van Altonji and Shakotko (1987) en Topel
(1991) waarschijnlijk niet volledig corrigeren voor het endogeniteitsprobleem
hebben ze als voordeel dat de resulterende loonprofielen internationaal verge-
lijkbaar zijn.
Naast het schatten van de loonprofielen wordt het effect wordt geanaly-
seerd wat het effect is van de senioriteit van werknemers (ten opzichte van
hun collega’s in hetzelfde bedrijf) op hun loon. De idee is dat een hoge senior-
iteit de loononderhandelingspositie van werknemers kan vergroten, doordat
zij relatief sterk beschermd zijn tegen mogelijk ontslag door ‘last-in-first-out’
(LIFO) ontslagregels. Ten slotte kijk ik (op sectorniveau) naar de correlatie
tussen enerzijds een hoog rendement op baanduur en anderzijds de arbeidsmo-
biliteit van oudere werknemers.
De eerste bevinding van dit hoofdstuk is dat Nederlandse loonprofielen
over baanduur in internationaal perspectief relatief steil zijn. Dit suggereert
dat de beloning gedeeltelijk samenhangt met bedrijfsspecifieke elementen die
de werknemer verliest bij overstap naar een andere werkgever. Ten tweede
levert senioriteit een bijdrage aan een hoger loon: conditioneel op ervaring
en baanduur is het ree¨le loonverschil tussen de langstzittende en de nieuwst
binnengekomen werknemer 3–4 procent. Ten derde is er een negatief verband
tussen een hoog rendement op baanduur en lage arbeidsmobiliteit: hoe hoger
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het rendement op baanduur in een sector is, hoe hoger het aandeel oudere
werknemers in een sector is en hoe hoger de gemiddelde leeftijd en baanduur
van de werknemers in die sector. Deze bevindingen suggereren dat de lage
baan-mobiliteit van oudere werknemers en de steile loonprofielen twee kanten
van dezelfde medaille zijn.
Hoofdstuk 2 is getiteld ‘Do wages continue increasing at older ages? Evidence
on the wage cushion in the Netherlands’. Dit onderzoek (met Rob Euwals)
gaat in op de vraag hoe de steile loonprofielen over baanduur, zoals gevonden in
het eerste artikel, verenigbaar zijn met het feit dat lonen voornamelijk worden
bepaald via collectieve loononderhandelingen. Collectieve loonovereenkom-
sten (cao’s) bevatten bijna altijd een stelsel van loonschalen, waarbij elke
loonschaal een bepaald maximum heeft. Wanneer werknemers de hoogste
trede van de maximale loonschaal die behoort bij hun functie hebben bereikt,
zou men verwachten dat hun loongroei verder beperkt is, uitgaande van het
idee dat loononderhandelingen het loongebouw volgen. Bij een systeem van
collectief onderhandelde loonschalen liggen lonen die blijven doorstijgen over
baanduur of leeftijd niet voor de hand, tenzij een loonbuffer (‘wage cushion’)
mede bepalend is voor het loon van ouderen.
De hoofdvraag die dit onderzoek beantwoordt is in hoeverre de loonbuffer –
het verschil tussen het werkelijke loon en het (maximum) contractloon volgens
de loonschalen – bijdraagt aan het feit dat loonprofielen blijven doorstijgen
op latere leeftijd. De omvang van deze loonbuffer wordt ten eerste bepaald
door additioneel loon naast het contractloon (zoals incidenteel loon en extra
beloning) en ten tweede door de mate waarin het contractloon zelf het maxi-
mum van het loongebouw van de cao overschrijdt.
Het loon van mannen in loondienst in 22 sectoren wordt gevolgd van 2006
tot 2010. Deze administratieve data zijn gekoppeld met gegevens ontleend aan
cao’s, zoals het aantal loonschalen, het minimum en maximum contractloon
per schaal en het aantal overgangen naar een volgende trede, om het effect
van het loonschaal-systeem op de werkelijke lonen te onderzoeken.
Hiertoe zijn indicatoren aangemaakt voor 1) de kans dat het contractloon
gelijk is aan het maximum van een van de loonschalen van de betreffende cao
en 2) de kans dat het loon het maximum van de hoogste loonschaal van de cao
overstijgt. Deze indicatoren worden gebruikt om drie vragen te beantwoorden:
• Neemt de kans om met het contractloon aan het eind van een loonschaal
te zitten toe met leeftijd? Of neemt de kans op een contractloon dat het
maximum van de hoogste cao-schaal overschrijdt toe met leeftijd?
• Ontvangen werknemers die met hun contractloon op het eind van een
loonschaal zitten meer additioneel loon?
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• Ontvangen werknemers met een contractloon dat het maximum van de
hoogste cao-schaal overschrijdt een hogere contractuele loongroei?
Voor de publieke sector blijkt geen sprake van een loonbuffer die bijdraagt
aan lonen die doorstijgen op latere leeftijd. Ten eerste komen lonen boven
het maximum van de hoogste loonschaal vrijwel niet voor omdat de loon-
schalen ook vrijwel alle leidinggevende functies omvatten. Ten tweede ont-
vangen werknemers met een contractloon gelijk aan het maximum van een
loonschaal minder aanvullend loon dan zij die nog geen maximum hebben
bereikt. Blijkbaar wordt additioneel loon in de publieke sector niet gebruikt
ter motivering van hen die een schaal-maximum hebben bereikt.
Voor de marktsector vinden wordt wel gevonden dat de loonbuffer bijdraagt
aan lonen die doorstijgen op latere leeftijd. Ten eerste neemt de kans op
een loon boven het maximum van de hoogste loonschaal van de cao toe met
leeftijd. In tegenstelling tot de publieke sector lijken de loonschalen in de
private sector vaak niet de beter betaalde, leidinggevende functies te omvatten.
Het maximum van de hoogste loonschaal is niet restrictief: veel werknemers
hebben een loon dat boven dit maximum ligt. Ten tweede is zowel de jaarlijkse
loonstijging als het bedrag aan additioneel loon bij deze groep hoger dan bij
hen die nog niet het maximum van de hoogste loonschaal heeft bereikt. De
groei van het additioneel loon is overigens wel lager, waarschijnlijk omdat de
contractuele loonmutatie relatief vrij kan worden bepaald.
Herschatting van loonprofielen, nu inclusief informatie over de positie van
individuen in het systeem van loonschalen, laat zien dat in de marktsector
lonen boven het maximum van de hoogste schaal van de cao bijdragen aan
het steile loonprofiel over leeftijd. De groep die betaald wordt boven dit
maximum maakt het loonprofiel over leeftijd steiler. De loonbuffer draagt
in de marktsector dus bij aan loondifferentiatie. Hoewel meer onderzoek
nodig is om te bepalen welke factoren precies veroorzaken dat lonen blijven
doorstijgen op hogere leeftijd, lijkt het dat het systeem van loonschalen in
cao’s geen hoofdoorzaak is. De loonbuffer lijkt loondifferentiatie mogelijk te
maken tussen en binnen leeftijdsgroepen, maar in hoeverre deze differentiatie
ook leidt tot heterogeniteit in beloning tussen sectoren en bedrijven is nog
onduidelijk.
Hoofdstuk 3, getiteld ‘Labour market effects of job displacement for prime-
age and older workers’ (met Marloes de Graaf-Zijl en Wiljan van den Berge),
onderzoekt het effect van baanverlies in verband met bedrijfsfaillissement op de
baankans en lonen van de getroffen werknemers. We zijn hierin ge¨ınteresseerd
omdat massaontslag en faillissementen de lasten van economische aanpassing
neerleggen bij een beperkte groep werknemers. Vooral ouderen komen ver-
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volgens vaak moeilijk weer aan de slag. Dit staat op gespannen voet met de
maatschappelijke behoefte om, met het oog op de vergrijzing, ouderen langer
te laten participeren. Dit hoofdstuk onderzoekt in hoeverre het effect van
bedrijfsfaillissementen verschilt tussen oudere en minder oude werknemers en
hoe dit samenhangt met drie factoren: lange dienstverbanden voorafgaand aan
ontslag, een ongunstige lokale arbeidsmarktsituatie in de sector van waaruit
men is ontslagen en het maken van een oversstap naar een andere sector.
Het achterliggende idee is dat het baanverlies in geval van faillissement een
willekeurige groep treft, aangezien zij niet uit eigen keus van baan veranderen
noch zijn geselecteerd voor ontslag door de werkgever. De effecten zullen
daarom naar verwachting, in elk geval deels, samenhangen met bedrijf en
sector gerelateerde factoren. De focus ligt in dit hoofdstuk op de vergelijking
van de effecten in termen van baankansen en lonen voor oudere (45–54 jaar)
werknemers en de leeftijdsgroep 35–44 jaar (in het navolgende aangemerkt als
‘jongere werknemers’).
We passen een ‘difference-in-difference’-benadering toe in combinatie met
exacte matching. De data zijn administratieve ‘linked employer-employee’
data gekoppeld aan administratieve data met betrekking tot bedrijfsfaillisse-
menten. De data bevatten observaties voor een ‘behandelgroep’ van bijna
45.000 werknemers die hun baan hebben verloren in verband met faillissement
tussen 2000 en 2009; zij worden gevolgd tot en met 2011. De controle groep
bestaat uit circa 158.000 werknemers die (via exacte matching) vergelijkbare
kenmerken hebben als de behandelgroep maar op dat moment geen baanverlies
door faillissement meemaakten.
De resultaten geven aan dat de arbeidsmarktuitkomsten na baanverlies
sterk afhankelijk zijn van leeftijd, vooral waar het gaat om de baankans.
De drie factoren die mogelijk de verschillende over leeftijdsgroepen kunnen
verklaren (lange dienstverbanden voorafgaand aan ontslag, een ongunstige
lokale arbeidsmarktsituatie in de sector van waaruit men is ontslagen en het
maken van een oversstap naar een andere sector) blijken alle drie relevant. De
resultaten suggereren dat baan- en sectorspecifieke factoren van belang zijn
bij het verklaren van de meer kwetsbare positie van ouderen na ontslag.
Niet alleen komen lange baanduren vaker voor bij oudere werknemers,
ouderen met lange baanduren ondervinden sterkere negatieve gevolgen van
ontslag: voor jongere werknemers is de baanduur voorafgaand aan het ontslag
minder bepalend. Een lange baanduur betekent bij oudere werknemers een
extra daling van de baankans van 2 tot 3 procent, in vergelijking met de
jongere leeftijdsgroep. De loondaling na ontslag is gemiddeld groter na een
lang dienstverband bij de oude werkgever; dit geldt bij beide leeftijdsgroepen
in even sterke mate.
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Ook zijn ontslagen oudere werknemers gevoeliger voor de situatie op de
lokale arbeidsmarkt in de sector van waaruit zij worden ontslagen. In het
eerste jaar na baanverlies zijn de baankans van ontslagen oudere werknemers
afkomstig uit krimpende sectoren 3,5 procentpunt lager dan die van oudere
werknemers ontslagen vanuit goed presterende sectoren. Dit verschil neemt
wel af over de tijd en wordt insignificant. Voor jongere werknemers is er geen
effect. Het effect op het loon is voor beide leeftijdsgroepen vergelijkbaar.
Eveneens geldt dat de gevolgen voor oudere ontslagen werknemers sterker
negatief zijn wanneer zij voor hun nieuwe baan moeten overstappen naar een
andere sector. Hun loonverlies is extra groot, waarschijnlijk als gevolg van
sectorspecifieke menselijk kapitaal dat niet meer te gelde kan worden gemaakt
na de transitie. Oudere ontslagen werknemers die een nieuwe baan vinden
in een andere sector lijden loonverliezen van 8 a 9 procentpunt. Dit loon-
nadeel is voor jongere werknemers duidelijk geringer. Theoretisch kunnen
er verschillende oorzaken zijn voor de ongunstiger effecten bij ouderen. De
loonkosten van ouderen kunnen hoger zijn dan hun productiviteit als gevolg
van beloningsschema’s met uitgestelde beloning, of doordat de productiviteit
daalt op hogere leeftijd. Ook kunnen hogere lonen hoog zijn doordat hoge
ontslagbescherming leidt tot een sterke loononderhandelingspositie en kun-
nen bijzondere bepalingen voor oudere werknemers in de cao’s ouderen duur
maken. Na ontslag kan de productiviteit van ouderen laag doordat eerder ver-
worven bedrijfsspecifiek, industrie specifiek of taak specifiek menselijk kapitaal
in een nieuwe baan niet meer kan worden aangewend Anderzijds kunnen
factoren aan de aanbodkant een rol spelen: wellicht is het reserveringsloon
van oudere werknemers hoog door hun lange uitkeringsrechten en kunnen ze
kieskeuriger zijn bij het aanvaarden van een nieuwe baan omdat ze meer mo-
gelijkheden hebben om zich terugtrekken uit de arbeidsmarkt. De resultaten
bevestigen dat een lange baanduur in de verloren gegane baan en een sector
switch bijdragen aan de ongunstiger effecten bij ouderen, wat kan duiden op
verlies van specifiek menselijk kapitaal. Maar een groot deel van het verschil
tussen de leeftijdsgroepen blijft na correctie voor deze factoren overeind, wat
suggereert dat ook andere factoren een rol spelen.
Hoofdstuk 4, getiteld ‘Flexible wages or flexible workers? A decomposition
of wage bill adjustment by Dutch firms, 2006-2013’, onderzoekt in hoeverre
bedrijven hun lonen en werkgelegenheid neerwaarts aanpassen in tijden van
tegenspoed en welke factoren bepalend zijn voor deze aanpassingen. Als
de neerwaartse loonflexibiliteit beperkt is, door instituties of wellicht om-
dat bedrijven vrezen anders de motivatie en productiviteit van werknemers
te schaden, zal er naar verwachting een relatief grote werkgelegenheidsdaling
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nodig zijn. Dit hoofdstuk analyseert gelijktijdig de aanpassing van zowel lonen
als banenstromen, op bedrijfsniveau, op basis van ‘linked employer-employee’
data (databestanden waarin gegevens van bedrijven en werknemers gekoppeld
zijn). Ik richt me op een steekproef van bedrijven met minstens 25 werkne-
mers waarvoor de omzetgroei beschikbaar is. Deze dataset bestaat uit meer
dan 75.000 bedrijf-jaar observaties, gebaseerd op 12,3 miljoen baan-jaar ob-
servaties.
De analyse omvat twee delen: decompositie analyse en regressieanalyse.
Het eerste deel geeft een decompositie van de groei in de contractuele loonsom
van bedrijven; deze wordt uitgesplitst in bijdragen vanuit prijs (uurlonen) en
volume (aantal gewerkte uren, aantal banen), waarbij enerzijds baanblijvers
en anderzijds nieuw ingehuurde en vertrekkende werknemers worden onder-
scheiden. Loon uit overwerk en additioneel loon worden ook meegenomen in
de analyse. De focus ligt op de asymmetrie in respons op negatieve versus
positieve omzetschokken (van verschillende omvang). Hierbij vergelijk ik niet
alleen bedrijven met veel of weinig omzet groei, maar ook bijvoorbeeld met
veel of weinig vaste contracten. Een sterk punt van de decompositie-analyse
is dat het zicht geeft op hoe bedrijven hun mix van loonmatiging en snoeien
in banen kiezen. Een beperking is dat decomposities slechts kunnen worden
vergeleken tussen groepen, waarbij niet gecorrigeerd wordt voor verschillen in
geobserveerde kenmerken.
Het tweede deel van de analyse richt zich daarom op multivariate regressies
die loonveranderingen, werkgelegenheidsstromen of werkgelegenheidsgroei op
bedrijfsniveau verklaren op basis van een groot aantal bedrijfskarakteristieken.
De regressies focussen op bedrijven die door een negatieve omzetschok getrof-
fen worden, omdat daar aanpassing van de loonsom plaatsvindt.
De decompositie-analyse toont aan dat bedrijven in mindere tijden de loon-
som voornamelijk verlagen via het baanvolume, zowel via meer uitstroom
als minder instroom van werknemers, wat kan duiden op neerwaartse loon-
rigiditeit. Een opvallende bevinding is dat de contractuele loongroei van
blijvers nauwelijks lager is bij bedrijven die hun omzet zien dalen, zelfs als dat
meerdere jaren achtereen het geval is. Hun loongroei blijft gemiddeld genomen
positief: de werkgelegenheid draagt dan ook circa 20 keer zoveel bij aan de
loonsomaanpassing als het loon van blijvers. Wel is in de loop van de jaren na
de grote recessie de contractuele loongroei over de hele linie gedaald, wat zou
kunnen duiden op relatief sterke coo¨rdinatie binnen het loonvormingsstelsel.
Ik vind geen aanwijzingen dat werkgelegenheidsstromen worden gebruikt om
het gemiddelde loon te verlagen: de lonen van nieuw aangenomen werkne-
mers lijken niet extra te worden verlaagd. Contractlonen blijken dus van on-
dergeschikt belang voor de loonsomaanpassing in slechte tijden, zowel waar het
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gaat om blijvers als met betrekking tot de nieuwe instroom. Verder bieden de
contractuele arbeidsduur, overwerk loon en incidentele lonen weliswaar enige
neerwaartse flexibiliteit, maar hun bijdragen is beperkt.
De regressieanalyse bevestigt dat op de korte termijn de loongroei van
baanblijvers slechts beperkt reageert op een negatieve schok in de omzet. De
werkgelegenheidsgroei varieert sterk over bedrijfskenmerken, zeker bij grote
omzetdalingen. Het baanverlies raakt geen willekeurige groep werknemers
maar is geconcentreerd in bedrijven met een hoog percentage immigranten,
werknemers met een korte baanduur, tijdelijke contracten, niet-reguliere baan-
types en deeltijdbanen.
Loonrigiditeit is gemeten op basis van de loongroei-verdeling: hoe meer
sprake is van een ophoping rond de nul procent of de verwachte inflatie hoe
meer neerwaartse nominale of ree¨le loonrigiditeit. Ik vind een significant
negatief verband tussen de indicatoren voor neerwaartse loonrigiditeit en de
werkgelegenheidsgroei van bedrijven. Dit suggereert dat als lonen neerwaarts
flexibeler zouden zijn er minder banen verloren gingen.
De bevindingen wijzen op een gesegmenteerde arbeidsmarkt, waarbij het
baanverlies vooral werknemers met een relatief zwakke arbeidsmarktpositie
treft, terwijl zittende werknemers zijn verzekerd van loonsverhoging die maar
in beperkte mate be¨ınvloed wordt door negatieve omzetschokken die het bedrijf
treffen.
In termen van de metafoor van het spel ‘Slangen en Ladders’ is een bevinding
van dit proefschrift dat de ‘loon-ladders’ over het dienstverband in Nederland
een relatief steil verloop hebben. Deze ladders lijken bovendien stormvast,
aangezien de loongroei weinig gevoelig is voor verslechtering van de omzet
van een bedrijf. Pas op termijn wordt loongroei beperkt, maar dan over de
hele linie en niet zozeer voor bedrijven die het moeilijk hebben. Hier staat
tegenover dat het tegenkomen van een ‘slang’ - in dit geval van ontslag door
bedrijfsfaillissement - grote gevolgen heeft: vooral voor oudere werknemers is
de kans op werk na ontslag relatief laag en is het loonverlies groot, zeker bij
een lang dienstverband en veel bedrijfs- en sectorspecifiek menselijk kapitaal.
Ook is de kans op baanverlies sterk afhankelijk van het type arbeidscontract,
duur van het dienstverband en kenmerken van werknemers en bedrijven.
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